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NOTE
Grandparents Retain Visitation Privileges After Adoption: In re Grandpa-
rental Visitation of C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 408 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
After raising children, most individuals eagerly anticipate
grandparenthood.1 However, the untimely death of an adult child may put
the relationship between grandparent and grandchild in jeopardy.2 The
surviving parent of the minor child may have little motivation to nurture
the relationship between the deceased spouse's parents and the child, partic-
ularly after a remarriage and subsequent adoption by the new stepparent.3
At common law, grandparents generally had no visitation rights when
the custodial parent or parents objected to the visitation.4 In the last three
1. Lillian H. Robinson, Grandparenting: Intergenerational Love and Hate, 17 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 483, 483 (1989). Grandparents often enjoy their grandchildren more than they
enjoyed their children. Id. at 486. But see Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Con-
straints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 118, 122 (1986) (citing studies
indicating peer relationships are more important to grandparents than their relationships with
their grandchildren).
2. A 1984 study of grandparent couples with divorced children revealed that "by remaining
nonjudgmental and by offering help and emotional support," grandparents could maintain a cor-
dial relationship with the custodial parent even when their own child did not have visitation
rights. Robinson, supra note 1, at 484. This same grandparental conduct is also likely to foster a
better relationship with the custodial parent when the grandparents' child has died.
3. Grandparents are more likely to have more frequent and more gratifying contacts with
their grandchildren if they have a good relationship with the child's parents. See id. at 483-84.
4. Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissi-
tudes, 23 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 644-46 (1979). Five reasons were commonly given for denying
grandparent visitation rights:
(1) Ordinarily the parent's obligation to allow the grandparent to visit the child is moral,
and not legal. [Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).]
(2) The judicial enforcement of grandparent visitation rights would divide parental au-
thority, thereby hindering it. [Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1962); Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).]
(3) The best interests of the child are not furthered by forcing the child into the midst of a
conflict of authority and ill feelings between the parent and grandparent. [Noll v. Noll, 98
N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30
A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).]
(4) Where there is a conflict as between grandparent and parent, the parent alone should
be the judge, without having to account to anyone for the motives in denying the grandpar-
ent visitation. [Odell, 177 P.2d at 629; Reiss, 15 So. at 152.]
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decades,' grandparents, with power through their increased numbers,6 lob-
bied their legislatures for the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes.
7
Many of the new statutes did not mention the existing adoption or visitation
statutes. Consequently, some uncertainty arose about the overlap between
grandparent visitation statutes and adoption statutes. Visitation statutes
gave grandparents visitation rights.' However, state adoption statutes fre-
quently severed all rights of the biological family upon adoption.9 Courts
were then called upon to reconcile the grandparent visitation statutes, the
adoption statutes, and the general visitation statutes. 0
A recent decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re Grandparental
Visitation of C.G.F.,II addressed the family conflict that arises when grand-
parents, after the death of their child, are denied visitation of their minor
grandchild who has been adopted by a stepparent.1 2 The issue before the
court was "whether a trial court can award visitation rights to grandparents
under [Wisconsin Statute] sec. 880.155 ...notwithstanding the child's
adoption by a stepparent." 3 The court held that Section 880.155 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, 4 the statute providing for visitation by a grandparent
(5) The ties of nature are the only efficacious means of restoring normal family relations
and not the coercive measures which follow judicial intervention. [See Smith v. Painter,
408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (1967); Reiss,
15 So. at 152.]
Duncan Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 474, 480-81 (1973) (citations
added).
5. State legislatures began enacting grandparent visitation statutes in the late 1960s. Patricia
Wendlandt, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Remaining Problems and the Need for Uniformity,
67 MARQ. L. REv. 730, 737 (1984).
6. Because people are living longer today, they are spending a greater portion of their lives as
grandparents. Cf. Wayne Moore, Improving the Delivery of Legal Services for the Elderly: A Com-
prehensive Approach, 41 EMORY L.J. 805, 812 (1992) (attributing longer lives to new medical
practices and technologies). By 1989, an estimated 94% of people over the age of 65 with children
were grandparents and almost half of the grandparents were great-grandparents. Gregory E.
Kennedy, College Students' Relationships with Grandparents, 64 PSYCHOL. REP. 477, 477 (1989).
7. At present, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes that allow a
grandparent to petition the court for visitation. Jacquelynn B. Rothstein, Grandparent Visitation
Rights: Over the River and thru the Woods.... Wis. LAW., Nov. 1992, at 10, 10.
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1991); Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92).
9. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.140 (1991); Wis. STAT. § 48.92 (1991-92).
10. See, e.g., Bond v. Yount, 734 P.2d 39, 40 (Wash. 1987) (denying grandparents standing to
bring petition for visitation with adopted grandchild because ties to natural parent were com-
pletely severed by adoption).
11. 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
12. Id. at 65, 483 N.W.2d at 804.
13. Id. at 64, 483 N.W.2d at 803 (footnote omitted).
14. Section 880.155 provides as follows:
If one or both parents of a minor child is deceased and the minor is in the custody of the
surviving parent or any other person, any grandparent of the minor may petition for visita-
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after the death of either or both of the grandchild's parents, is an exception
to Section 48.92(1) and (2), the adoption statute that provides for termina-
tion of the relationship between an adopted child and the biological
family.15
Part II of this Note discusses the background of grandparent visitation
rights. Part III examines Wisconsin statutory and case law on grandparent
visitation rights. Part IV provides a statement of the case of In re Grandpa-
rental Visitation Rights of C.G.F. Part V recites the court's reasoning in
C.G.F., and Part VI analyzes that reasoning. Finally, Part VII provides
recommendations for the application of Section 880.155 and the C.G.F
decision.
II. BACKGROUND OF GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION RIGHTS
An 1894 Louisiana case, Succession of Reiss,16 is often cited as the first
case holding that grandparents do not have visitation rights at common law
when the parents object.17 In Reiss, the maternal grandmother was denied
visitation by her former son-in-law after the death of her daughter. The
grandmother sued to compel visitation. She was awarded visitation by the
trial court, but the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed. The court held
that a "parent's obligation to allow the grandparents visitation is a moral
and not a legal one."18
Subsequent to Reiss and its progeny, state legislatures enacted statutes
creating visitation privileges for grandparents.19 Judicial response to the
tion privileges with respect to the minor, whether or not the person with custody is mar-
ried. The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent if the court
determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, may issue any necessary
order to enforce the same, and may from time to time modify such privileges or orders
upon a showing of good cause.
Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92). This section allows either a parent of the deceased parent or
of the surviving parent to petition for visitation. Under this section, the court retains jurisdiction
to modify visitation "upon a showing of good cause." Id.
15. Wis. STAT. § 48.92 (1991-92), "Effect of Adoption," provides in relevant part:
(1) After the order of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and child and all the
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent there-
after exist between the adopted person and the adoptive parents.
(2) After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and child between
the adopted person and his birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adop-
tive parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal conse-
quences of the relationship shall cease to exist.
16. 15 So. 151 (La. 1894).
17. Eg., Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 646.
18. Reiss, 15 So. at 152.
19. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (1991); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (Deering 1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 752.01
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conflicts between the adoption statutes and visitation statutes has varied.
This variation can be attributed to differences in judicial philosophy and
differences in statutory language.
In Browning v. Tarwater,20 a 1974 decision, the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas held that, when granting an adoption decree, a court does not have
authority to also grant visitation privileges to a member of the biological
family pursuant to the visitation statute.21 The Kansas visitation statutes
allowed only the parents of the deceased parent to bring an action.22 This
court found that the Kansas Legislature's failure to specify the effect of
adoption on the visitation statute and its failure to specify what would hap-
pen if both parents died indicated a legislative intent that the grandparent
visitation statute should not apply after a grandchild was adopted by a step-
parent.23 The court reasoned that upon adoption there is a changing of the
guard, with the new adoptive parent and extended family assuming all of
the rights and responsibilities that were once associated with the birth par-
ent's family.24 Furthermore, the interests in preserving the unity of author-
ity in the adoptive family were said to compel the denial of grandparent
visitation rights.2 5
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Michie 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607 (1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Bums 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1991); 1991 La. Acts 235
(allowing limited post-adoption visitation rights of grandparents); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.,
§ 9-102 (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.27b (1990); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1991); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.402 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.330 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d
(1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-7.1 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1991); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 72 (Consol. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (Law. Co-op. 1990); 1992 Utah Laws 175; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1012 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1991); Wis. STAT. § 767.245 (1991-92); WIS.
STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1991).
20. 524 P.2d 1135 (Kan. 1974) (superseded by statute as stated in In re Adoption of J.M.U.,
819 P.2d 1244 (Kan. 1991)).
21. Browning, 524 P.2d at 1139.
22. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-129 to 38-130 (1971). The 1982 version of Kansas Statutes An-
notated section 38-129 overruled Browning and provided that the court may grant visitation rights
to the parents of a deceased person "even if the surviving parent has remarried and the surviving
parent's spouse has adopted the child." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1982).
23. Browning, 524 P.2d at 1140.
24. Id. at 1139; see also In re Marriage of Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 572-73, 453 N.W.2d 624,
627 (1990).
25. See Browning, 524 P.2d at 1139; see also Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 628 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947).
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However, in Mimkon v. Ford,2 6 the Supreme Court of New Jersey con-
cluded that the visitation statute changed the common law rule providing
that grandparents have no independent cause of action to compel visitation
rights.27 The court addressed the issue of whether a maternal grandmother
was entitled to visit her grandchild after the death of that child's mother
and after the adoption by a stepparent.2" The New Jersey visitation statute
in effect at the time provided that if either or both parents of a minor child
were deceased, the court could order grandparent visitation upon applica-
tion by writ of habeas corpus if it was in the best interests of the child.29
The visitation statute did not indicate the effect of adoption on grandparent
visitation petitions. The court reasoned that the adoption statute, which
provided for the termination of "all rights, duties, and obligations" of the
natural parents to the child, was "principally concerned with adoptions by
persons other than relatives of children 'placed for adoption' because their
parents are unwilling or unable to care for them."30 In that situation, ac-
cording to the court, the visitation by members of the biological family
would be more detrimental to the child's well-being because it would cause
more interference in the adoptive home."1 However, in the situation where
one of the birth parents had died, the court posited that grandparental visi-
tation poses "a much lesser risk of threat to the physical and psychological
well-being of the child or to the development of a healthy and natural rela-
tionship between the child and the adopting parents."32
III. WISCONSIN LAW
A. Statutes
In Wisconsin, grandparents can petition for visitation of their grandchil-
dren pursuant to three statutes: Sections 48.925, 767.245, and 880.155. 33
In these sections, the Wisconsin Legislature has specified the circumstances
26. 332 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1975).
27. Id at 205.
28. Id. at 200.
29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1972).
30. Mimkon, 332 A.2d at 203 (citations omitted). The court stated that the legislative objec-
tive behind both the adoption statute and the visitation statute was to "provide substitute parental
relationships for children, who, for some reason, have been deprived of the benefits of a healthy
relationship with one or both natural parents." Id. at 202.
31. Id. at 203.
32. Id. at 204. In fact, the court asserted that "the continuous love and attention of a grand-
parent may mitigate the feelings of guilt or rejection, which a child may feel at the death of or
separation from a parent." Id. at 205.
33. For a brief discussion of all three statutes, see Rothstein, supra note 7, at 11. Rothstein
points out that all three statutes incorporate the "best interests of the child" standard. Id
1993]
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in which persons have standing to petition for visitation.34 Section
767.245(4) allows persons who have maintained a parent-like relationship
with the minor child to petition for visitation rights. 35 However, Section
767.245 petitions cannot be pursued unless an "action affecting the family"
has been filed.3 6 Section 880.155 allows only the parent of a deceased or
surviving parent to petition for visitation.37 Section 48.925 allows relatives
to petition for visitation only if the child was adopted by a stepparent or
relative, and the relative has had a parent-like relationship with the child
within two years of petitioning.38 The following descriptions are given to
provide a background on Wisconsin statutory law in the area of grandpar-
ent visitation.
1. Section 767.245 of the Wisconsin Statutes
Section 767.245 3 allows a "grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent,
or person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child rela-
tionship with the child" to petition the court for visitation rights "if the
parents have notice of the hearing and if the court determines that visitation
is in the best interest of the child."'  Wisconsin case law has interpreted
this section to require that, before a petition can be filed under this section,
there must have been a "previously filed action affecting the family. 41
"Actions affecting the family" include divorce, legal separation, custody,
and child support.4 2 The statute is silent about the effect of adoption on
visitation rights.
2. Section 880.155
Section 880.155 allows a parent of the deceased parent or a parent of the
surviving parent to petition for visitation of a minor child "in the custody of
the surviving parent or any other person.., whether or not the person with
custody is married. ' 43 The court may grant "reasonable visitation privi-
leges" to grandparents "if the court determines that it is in the best interests
34. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
35. Wis. STAT. § 767.245(4) (1991-92).
36. Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 545, 415 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 1987).
37. Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92).
38. Wis. STAT. § 48.925 (1991-92).
39. Chapter 122, Laws of 1975 created Wis. STAT. § 247.24(1)(c), renumbered as
§ 767.245(4).
40. Wis. STAT. § 767.245(1) (1991-92).
41. Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 545, 415 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 1987);
see infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
42. Wis. STAT. § 767.02(1) (1991-92).
43. Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92).
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and welfare of the child."'  Under this section, the court retains jurisdic-
tion to modify visitation "upon a showing of good cause.""a Grandparents
can petition for visitation of their grandchildren even if their own child
denies them visitation.'
3. Section 48.925
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard oral arguments in In re
Grandparental Visitation of C.G.E,a the Wisconsin Legislature enacted
Section 48.925, which amended the Wisconsin adoption statute, Section
48.92.48 Although this amendment had no effect on the C. G.E decision, a
discussion of Section 48.925 is included to give a broader perspective on the
current state of grandparent visitation rights in Wisconsin.
Pursuant to Section 48.925, relatives of a child adopted by a stepparent
or relative may petition the court for reasonable visitation rights if they
have "maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship"
within two years of filing the petition.49 The parents must receive notice of
the hearing.50 Further, to grant reasonable visitation, the court must find
all of the following:
(a) That visitation is in the best interest of the child.
(b) That the petitioner will not undermine the adoptive parent's
or parents' relationship with the child or, if a birth parent is the
spouse of an adoptive parent, the adoptive parent's and birth par-
ent's relationship with the child.
(c) That the petitioner will not act in a manner that is contrary
to parenting decisions that are related to the child's physical, emo-
tional, educational or spiritual welfare and that are made by the
adoptive parent or parents or, if a birth parent is the spouse of an
adoptive parent, by the adoptive parent and birth parent.5"
Section 48.925 does not cross-reference to either of the other visitation
statutes. One commentator has raised the question of whether Section
880.155 still controls "for grandparental visitation petitions filed after step-
parent or relative adoption following the death of a parent" or whether
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id
47. 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
48. Id at 73, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
49. Wis. STAT. § 48.925 (1991-92).
50. Wis. STAT. § 48.925(1).
51. Wis. STAT. § 48.925(l)(a), (b), (c) (1991-92).
1993]
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Section 48.925 "limited the compass of Section 880.155 to petitions filed
before adoption."52 This question remains unresolved.
B. Case Law
Previous Wisconsin case law does not construe the adoption statute
with Section 880.155. However, Wisconsin courts have addressed grand-
parent visitation petitions pursuant to Chapter 767 in actions affecting the
family.53
In Weichman v. Weichman,54 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that,
in actions affecting the family, a court may grant visitation to grandparents
and others where it is "for the best interest and welfare of the child."' 55 In
Weichman, the dispute arose between the natural mother and the paternal
grandparents of a minor child.56 Annette and John Weichman were mar-
ried in February 1969. Two months later, they separated. About two
months after that, Annette gave birth to their daughter. John enlisted in
the Armed Services shortly after the birth of his child, and a divorce action
was commenced. John was absent without leave from the Armed Services
52. Barbara S. Hughes, The Effect of C.G.F. and Section 48.925 on Grandparental Visitation
Petitions, WIs. LAW., Nov. 1992, at 13, 13.
53. "Actions affecting the family" are listed in Wisconsin Statutes section 767.02 and include:
to affirm marriage, annulment, divorce, legal separation, custody, for child support, and for main-
tenance payments. Wis. STAT. § 767.02 (1991-92); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54. 50 Wis. 2d 731, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971).
55. Id. at 734, 184 N.W.2d at 884 (citation omitted). This holding was reaffirmed in Pon-
sford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 415, 202 N.W.2d 5, 9 (1972).
One commentator has listed factors to be considered for the determination of whether grand-
parental visitation rights are in the best interests of the child:
(1) friction in the minor child's home as a result of grandparental visits, see Common-
wealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 85 A.2d 686, 687-88 (Pa. 1952) (grandparental visita-
tion denied because irreconcilable animosity between parents and grandparents engendered
a contest for child's affection which was deemed to be detrimental to the child). But see
Evans v. Lane, 70 S.E. 603, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911) (granted visitation to maternal grand-
mother despite friction between natural father and grandparent, stating that child could
possibly effect a reconciliation between the "warring families"); (2) child's physical and
psychological response to visits or deprivation of visits by grandparents, see Common-
wealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1952) (denied visits by grandpar-
ents which were deemed to cause emotional conflicts); (3) child previously resided with
petitioning grandparent, particularly where mutual affection demonstrated, see Evans, 70
S.E. at 605; (4) previous surrender of custody to grandparent, see Jackson v. Martin, 167
S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. 1969) (implied that proving prior surrender of parental control to
grandparents might have been influential in granting visitation rights to grandparents); and
(5) whether visitation sought in context of divorce, stepparent adoption, or death of biolog-
ical parent.
Michael L. Allen, Note, Visitation Rights of Grandparent over the Objection of a Parent: The Best
Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 51, 59-73 (1976-77).
56. Weichman, 50 Wis. 2d at 733, 184 N.W.2d at 883.
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shortly after the divorce decree. The grandparent visitation was granted as
part of the divorce action between Annette and the grandparents' son,
John.5 7 Annette appealed the order and judgment granting the paternal
grandparents visitation privileges with the minor child."8
The court held that no common-law rule or statutory rule proscribed
the grant of visitation rights to grandparents. Instead, the question was a
matter of judicial discretion: "The underlying principle or guideline for the
granting of visitation privileges, as it is for the granting of custody, is what
is for the best interest and welfare of the child."59 The court opined that
many divorced parents allow their personal conflicts to obfuscate the child's
best interests.6' Furthermore, the court reasoned that grandparents' visita-
tion rights do not derive from parents' visitation rights and, therefore, the
parents' rights are "not controlling on the question of whether in a given
case the child may have his grandparents visit him or he visit his grandpar-
ents."61 Section 767.245(4)62 codified the Weichman holding.63 Therefore,
when an action affecting the family has been filed, a court may intervene in
decisions about visitation."4
Conversely, Wisconsin courts have refused to intervene in decisions
about visitation when an "intact family" exists.65 By implication, an intact
family exists when a Chapter 767 action has not been filed or when an intact
family is created by an adoption.6 6 In Van Cleve v. Hemminger,67 a 1987
decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, a grandparent petitioned
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Id. at 734, 184 N.W.2d at 884 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 736, 184 N.W.2d at 885.
61. Id. at 737, 184 N.W.2d at 885.
62. This statute was previously Section 247.24(1). Section 767.245(4) was amended and is
now set forth in Section 767.245(1) (1991-92). Section 767.245 provides:
(1) Upon petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, the court
may grant reasonable visitation rights to that person if the parents have notice of the hear-
ing and if the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child.
(2) Whenever possible, in making a determination under sub. (1), the court shall con-
sider the wishes of the child.
Wis. STAT. § 767.245 (1991-92).
63. In re Marriage of Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 570, 453 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1990) (citation
omitted).
64. See, eg., Marotz v. Marotz, 80 Wis. 2d 477, 486, 259 N.W.2d 524, 529 (1977).
65. Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d at 567, 453 N.W.2d at 625 (grandparents denied visitation under
Section 767.245(4) after child, his biological mother, and his adoptive stepfather formed an intact
family); Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 546, 415 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1987).
66. Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d at 572-73, 453 N.W.2d at 627.
67. 141 Wis. 2d 543, 415 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1987).
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under Section 767.245(4) for visitation of her grandchildren. 68 Linda and
Kurt Hemminger were married and living with their two children. 69 The
Hemmingers did not allow Mary Van Cleve, Linda's mother, to visit their
two children. The grandmother subsequently petitioned the court for visi-
tation of her two grandchildren even though there had been no previously
filed action affecting the family.70 The court denied the grandparent's re-
quest, stating that "sec. 767.245(4) applies only to situations involving a
previously filed action affecting the family .... [T]he legislature did not
intend to reach into intact families to override parental determinations in-
volving visitation privileges between their children and the grandparents. '71
The court concluded that strong public policy reasons exist for limiting visi-
tation petitions pursuant to Section 767.245(4).72 In the absence of "the
trauma and impact of a dissolving family relationship," the court stated
that "there is no justifiable reason for the state to override determinations
made by parents as to what is in the best interests of their children. '73
Hence, grandparents lack standing to bring a Section 767.245 action unless
an action affecting the family has previously been filed.
The legislative intent behind the adoption statute, Section 48.92, was
examined in Estate of TopeL 74 The court noted that subsection (1) of Sec-
tion 48.92 gives the adopted child the same rights and legal consequences
with the adoptive parent that the child had with the birth parent. 71 Subsec-
tion (2) declares that all "rights, duties and legal consequences" of the rela-
tionship between the adopted child and the natural parent(s) shall cease to
exist after the order of adoption "unless the natural parent is the spouse of
the adoptive parent."' 76 Interpreting these provisions broadly, the Topel
court held that adoption creates a "complete substitution of the adoptive
68. Id. at 545, 415 N.W.2d at 572. The court stated that when the family unit has been
disturbed by adjudication or by death, "the children's best interests are frequently compromised
for reasons of spite, hostility, or economics." Id at 546, 415 N.W.2d at 572-73 (citing Weichman
v. Weichman, 50 Wis. 2d 731, 734-36, 184 N.W.2d 882, 884-85 (1971)).
69. Id. at 545, 415 N.W.2d at 572.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 546-47, 415 N.W.2d at 573. In construing Section 767.245(4), the court stated that
to allow the grandparent visitation under the circumstances of this case would be to render Sec-
tion 880.155 superfluous. Id.
72. Van Cleve, 141 Wis. 2d at 547, 415 N.W.2d at 573.
73. Id. at 549, 415 N.W.2d at 574.
74. 32 Wis. 2d 223, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966), limited by In re Grandparental Visitation of
C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992); see infra note 127
and accompanying text. The issue in Topel was whether an adoption pursuant to Section 48.92(1)
and (2) terminated the right of the adopted child to inherit through a natural parent or that
parent's family members. Topel, 32 Wis. 2d at 226, 145 N.W.2d at 163.
75. Topel, 32 Wis. 2d at 226-27, 145 N.W.2d at 164.
76. Id. at 226-27 n.1, 145 N.W.2d at 164 n.1 (citing Wis. STAT. § 48.92(2) (1965)).
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relationship for the natural relationship."" Accordingly, adoption cuts off
the child's right to inherit via intestate succession from the child's biological
family while creating that same right with the adoptive family.7" However,
the rule set forth in Topel was altered when the Wisconsin Legislature sub-
sequently amended Section 48.92 and enacted Section 851.51.11 These sec-
tions created a limited exception to Section 48.92 for a child who has been
adopted by a stepparent after one of the child's natural parents has died and
the other natural parent has remarried." These children are allowed to
inherit from their natural parents under the law of intestate succession or
wills.
81
In In re Marriage of Soergel,8 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court read Sec-
tion 767.245(4) with Section 48.92(1) and (2) and concluded that adoption
severs "all rights of the adopted child's birth family to the child" and that
the effect of the adoption statute must prevail over any visitation allowed
under Section 767.245.83 In Soergel, the biological father voluntarily termi-
nated his parental rights after a divorce with the child's mother.8 4 After the
mother's remarriage, the child was adopted by the new stepfather.85 The
grandparents, parents of the biological father, petitioned for visitation pur-
suant to Section 767.245(4).86 The provisions pertaining to adoption and
termination of parental rights were silent about their effect on visitation
privileges.87 The grandparents argued that "had the legislature intended
that their grandparental visitation rights would not survive the termination
of their son's parental rights and the subsequent stepparent adoption.., the
legislature would have expressly stated such intent in ch. 48. "88 Further,
the grandparents argued that their visitation rights did not derive from their
son's rights but should be determined according to their grandchild's best
interests.89
The Soergel court denied the grandparents' request. Relying on the
broad construction of Section 48.92 set forth in Topel, the court reasoned
77. Id. at 227, 145 N.W.2d at 164-65.
78. Id.
79. In re Grandparental Visitation of C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 69-70, 483 N.W.2d 803, 806,
cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
80. Id
81. Id.
82. 154 Wis. 2d 564, 453 N.W.2d 624 (1990).
83. Id at 573-74, 453 N.W.2d at 627 (citation omitted).
84. Id at 566, 453 N.W.2d at 624.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 567, 453 N.W.2d at 624-25.
87. Id at 568, 453 N.W.2d at 625.
88. Id
89. Id
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that the stepfather "established a status between himself and the child that
is identical to the status that exists between a natural parent and his or her
child."90 A "complete substitution of the adoptive relationship for the nat-
ural relationship" results.91 Consequently, the biological mother, stepfa-
ther, and child formed an intact family, the existence of which, under the
Van Cleve holding,92 precluded a petition for visitation rights pursuant to
Section 767.245(4).93 Citing Browning v. Tarwater,9 4 the court further
stated that "[o]ne of the rights parents have as a result of the natural rela-
tion of parent and child is the right to determine whether a relationship
with the grandparents, or any other person, is contrary to the child's best
interests." 95
Justice Louis J. Ceci concurred in the result of this case, but stated that
"loving grandparents have effectively become 'nonpersons' as a conse-
quence of the law in this case.",9 6 He suggested that the legislature might
respond to this "sad result" by revising Section 48.92(1) and (2). 7
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The biological father of the minor child, C.G.F., died in 1988 after heart
surgery. 98 The grandparents were the parents of the deceased father.99 Af-
ter her father's death, the child continued to live with her mother, and con-
tinued to visit with her grandparents on a regular basis."°° However, after a
gradual decrease in the frequency of visits permitted by the mother, the
mother denied the grandparents all visitation."° l The child's mother remar-
ried in 1990, and the new stepfather subsequently began adoption proceed-
90. Id. at 574, 453 N.W.2d at 627.
91. Id. at 573, 453 N.W.2d at 627.
92. Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 546-47, 415 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App.
1987).
93. Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d at 567, 453 N.W.2d at 625.
94. 524 P.2d 1135 (Kan. 1974).
95. Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d at 574, 453 N.W.2d at 628 (citing Browning v. Tarwater, 524 P.2d
1135 (Kan. 1974)).
96. Id. at 575, 453 N.W.2d at 628 (Ceci, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Steven Walters, Grandparent Rights Affirmed, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 8, 1992, at
Al.
99. In re Grandparental Visitation of C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 65, 483 N.W.2d 803, 804, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
100. Id. Before her father's death, C.G.F. had frequent visits with her grandparents, includ-
ing seven to eight weekends per year. Petitioners' Brief at 3, C.G.F. (No. 91-0293). However,
according to the mother, after their son's death, the grandparents never came to Baraboo, the
mother's home town. Respondents' Brief at 1, C.G.F (No. 91-0293).
101. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 65, 483 N.W.2d at 804.
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ings.1 ° 2 Before the adoption was finalized, the grandparents petitioned the
circuit court for visitation pursuant to Section 880.155.03 In a detailed
order, the circuit court set forth the grandparents' visitation rights and its
findings that "such visitation is in the best interest of the child."" °  How-
ever, the circuit court also noted that the visitation order would have no
force if the stepfather's adoption of the child was granted. The circuit court
held that "the completion of the adoption proceedings vests with the par-
ents the determination relating to grandparent visitation."105
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals, relying on In re Mar-
riage of Soergel,1°6 upheld the circuit court's decision. 1 7 In Soergel, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial court could not grant visita-
tion to grandparents pursuant to Section 767.245(4) after adoption of the
minor child because the effect of Section 48.92(1) and (2) was to sever "all
rights of the adopted child's birth family to the child."108 In C.G.F., the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, deciding that the
factual distinctions between Soergel and the present case rendered "the logi-
cal underpinnings of Soergel inapplicable" to the present case. 09
V. IN RE GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION OF C.G.F.
A. Majority Opinion
In In re Grandparental Visitation of C.G.F., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that a trial court has authority pursuant to Section 880.155 to
grant grandparental visitation if it is in the best interests of the child, even
after subsequent adoption and even if it is "in direct opposition to the
wishes of the custodian regardless of who the custodian is."110
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, identifying factual distinctions between
In re Marriage of Soergel and C. G.F., held that the Soergel holding is lim-
ited to grandparent visitation petitions pursuant to Chapter 767.111 Under
Chapter 767, if an action affecting the family has been filed, the court may
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 66, 483 N.W.2d at 804.
105. Id. at 65-66, 483 N.W.2d at 804.
106. 154 Wis. 2d 564, 453 N.W.2d 624 (1990). In Soergel, the court held that the effect of the
adoption statutes was to sever, upon the child's adoption, all rights of the birth family. Id. at 574,
453 N.W.2d at 627.
107. CG.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 66, 483 N.W.2d at 804.
108. Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d at 573-74, 453 N.W.2d at 627.
109. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 67, 483 N.W.2d at 805.
110. Id. at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
111. Id. at 68, 483 N.W.2d at 805.
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grant visitation to grandparents, great-grandparents, stepparents, or others
who have had a parent-child"1 2 relationship with the minor child.' 13  In
comparison, Section 880.155 "affords visitation to only a limited class of
persons, that is, grandparents of a child whose parent is deceased" and is
further limited by the "best interest of the child" requirement.1 4 Because
Section 880.155 is narrower in effect than Section 767.245, the court im-
plied that it is consistent with legislative intent for a court to exempt peti-
tions pursuant to Section 880.155 from the effect of Section 48.92.115
The court made a second factual distinction. The parental rights in
C.G.F were terminated because of death. In comparison, the parental
rights in Soergel had been terminated by legal process. The court found
that the difference between termination of parental rights by legal process
and by death was dispositive. According to the court, a parent is defined by
Wisconsin law as "either a biological parent.., or parent by adoption."' 1 6
Furthermore, persons whose parental rights have been severed are not in-
112. "Parent-child" relationship is not defined in this statute. Case law has characterized a
parent-like relationship as being one in which the person seeking custody or visitation has pro-
vided primary care for the child. See In re Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 1007, 1010,471 N.W.2d 202,
204, 206 (1991).
113. Wis. STAT. § 767.245 (1989-90).
114. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 68, 483 N.W.2d at 805.
115. After C.G.F. was argued, the legislature adopted an amendment to Section 48.92(2)
which provides that a court may order reasonable visitation to certain relatives after the adoption
of a child by a relative or a stepparent. C. G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 73, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abraham-
son, J., concurring) (citing 1991 Wis. Laws 191 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 48.925)). Section 48.925
provides, in relevant part:
(1) Upon petition by a relative who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-
child relationship with a child who has been adopted by a stepparent or relative, the court
may grant reasonable visitation rights to that person if the petitioner has maintained such a
relationship within 2 years prior to the filing of the petition, if the adoptive parent or
parents, or if a birth parent is the spouse of an adoptive parent, the adoptive parent and
birth parent, have notice of the hearing and if the court determines all of the following:
(a) That visitation is in the best interests of the child.
(b) That the petitioner will not undermine the adoptive parent's or parents' relation-
ship with the child or, if a birth parent is the spouse of an adoptive parent, the adoptive
parent's and birth parent's relationship with the child.
(c) That the petitioner will not act in a manner that is contrary to parenting decisions
that are related to the child's physical, emotional, educational or spiritual welfare and that
are made by the adoptive parent or parents or, if a birth parent is the spouse of an adoptive
parent, by the adoptive parent and birth parent.
(2) Whenever possible, in making a determination under sub. (1), the court shall con-
sider the wishes of the adopted child.
Wis. STAT. § 48.925 (1991-92).
116. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 67, 483 N.W.2d at 805 (quoting WIs. STAT. § 48.02(13) (1989-
90)).
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cluded in the definition of "parent." '17 Consequently, although the father
in the present case lost his parental rights through his death, by definition
he was still considered a parent.1 18 However, the father in Soergel ceased to
be a parent by definition when he terminated his parental rights.1 9
The court also rejected the application of Soergel because of its reliance
on Estate of Topel.120 In C. G.F., the court concluded that Topel was super-
seded by statute.' 21 After Topel, the legislature enacted Section 48.92(3), 122
which, when read with Section 851.51,123 would allow an adopted child to
inherit via intestate succession from the birth parent's family "after the
birth parent's death and the child's subsequent stepparent adoption." 1
24
Further, these sections could foreseeably allow grandparents to inherit from
their grandchildren.1 25 By creating an exception to Section 48.92(1) and
(2), the legislature, according to the C.G.E court, had demonstrated its in-
tent to "maintain ties between a child adopted by a stepparent and the
117. Id.
118. Id. The petitioners asserted that the adoption statute does not "terminate a deceased
birth parent's status as a parent." Petitioners' Brief at 11, C.G.F. (No. 91-0293).
119. In C G.F., the court of appeals, in its unpublished opinion, applied Soergel and held that
adoption terminates the grandparents' legal status as grandparents. In re Grandparental Visita-
tion of C.G.F., No. 91-0293-FT, 1991 Wis. App. LEXIS 1030, at *5 (Ct. App. July 3, 1991), rev'd,
168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992). Therefore, the effect of the
adoption statute prevailed over the effect of Section 767.245.
120. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 69-70, 483 N.W.2d at 806. The Topel court concluded that be-
cause adoption terminates the adopted child's relationship with the birth parents' family, the child
could not inherit via intestate succession from the birth parents' family. Estate of Topel, 32 Wis.
2d 233, 227, 145 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1966), limited by C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 70-71,483 N.W.2d at
806.
121. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 68-70, 483 N.W.2d at 805-06.
122. Section 48.92(3) provides that "[r]ights of inheritance by, from and through an adopted
child are governed by s. 851.51." Wis. STAT. § 48.92(3) (1991-92).
123. Section 851.51(2)(b) reads in part: "Mhe child is treated as the child of the deceased
natural parent.., for purposes of any statute conferring rights upon ... relatives of that parent
under the law of intestate succession or wills." Wis. STAT. § 851.51(2)(b) (1989-90). The court
stated that Section 851.51(2)(b) creates an exception to Section 48.92(1) and (2) that is available
only to a "limited class of persons, those children whose natural parent has died and who subse-
quently have been adopted by a stepparent." C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 70, 483 N.W.2d at 806
(footnote omitted). Consequently, a child whose birth parent's rights have been terminated by
legal process may not inherit from that birth parent.
124. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 69, 483 N.W.2d at 806 (footnote omitted). Courts will presume
that the legislature enacts a statute with full knowledge of existing statutes. Wood v. American
Faro. Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Wis. 2d 639, 646, 436 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1989) (citation omitted). There-
fore, the court assumes that an exception, rather than a conflict, is created by the enactment of a
new statute. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 70, 483 N.W.2d at 806. Furthermore, courts will avoid a
statutory construction that would make a provision or phrase superfluous. Green Bay Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Redevelopment Auth., 116 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 342 N.W.2d 27, 35 (1983), modified on
reconsideration, 119 Wis. 2d 251, 349 N.W.2d 478 (1989).
125. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 70, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
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child's biological grandparents." '126 Consequently, the court concluded that
Topel now only applies to "cases involving adoptions subsequent to a termi-
nation of parental rights," and not to cases involving the death of a parent,
and that Soergel cannot control when grandparents seek visitation pursuant
to Section 880.155.127
The court further reasoned that to allow an adoptive parent to prevail
over visitation rights granted pursuant to Section 880.155 would be to cre-
ate rights for the adoptive parent that a natural parent would not have after
the death of his or her spouse.1 2 8 In other words, the grandparents could
petition for visitation and, if it were deemed to be in the best interests of the
child, the natural and custodial 29 parent would not have the right to over-
ride Section 880.155. However, if the natural parent remarried and the
stepparent adopted the child from the first marriage, the stepparent could
override the grandparents' visitation rights. The court rejected this result
as logically inconsistent.'
B. Concurrence
Justice Abrahamson concurred with the majority, but would have ex-
pressly overruled SoergeL Abrahamson could "find no basis for concluding
that the legislature intended that the right of adoptive parents to control
who visits their child depends on the manner by which the adoption arises.
An adoption is an adoption."'' The majority had no reason, according to
Abrahamson, to conclude that allowing grandparental visitation pursuant
to Section 767.245(4) would be contrary to the adoption statute's purposes,
when allowing visitation pursuant to Section 880.155 would not be contrary
to the adoption statute's purposes." 2 Abrahamson concluded that the re-
sult in Soergel was reached because of the legal effect of the adoption pro-
ceedings, not the termination proceedings. 3 3 Therefore, Soergel should be
126. Id. at 69, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
127. Id. at 70-71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
128. Id. at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
129. Section 767.001(2) defines legal custody as "the right and responsibility to make major
decisions concerning the child." Wis. STAT. § 767.001(2) (1989-90). Petitioners conceded that an
adoptive parent would have custody of a child after adoption and that the right to decide who may
visit that child would typically accompany that legal status. However, petitioners argued that
Section 880.155 abrogated that right. Petitioners' Brief at 7, C.G.F. (No. 91-0293).
130. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
131. Id. at 72-73, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 73, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 72, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
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overruled, rather than distinguished on the facts and logical
underpinnings.13 4
VI. ANALYSIS
In re Grandparental Visitation of C. G.E. 135 placed Wisconsin among a
large group of states allowing grandparents visitation rights after adoption
by a stepparent, despite opposition by the child's parents. 136 The majority
holding is based, in large part, on its conclusion that Section 880.155 consti-
tutes an exception to Section 48.92, and therefore In re Marriage of Soergel
does not apply. 137 Wisconsin's legislature has deemed the best interests of
the child to be paramount in visitation determinations, whether pursuant to
Sections 880.155, 767.245, or 48.925.138 Thus, although the "best interests"
of C. G.E were not an issue before the CG.E court, the court's holding
implies that a child's need for continued contact with a grandparent is
somehow different if the child's biological parent has died than if there has
been a termination of parental rights by legal process.139 However, whether
visitation is in the best interests of the child is determined by sociological
and psychological factors that do not necessarily turn on the legal circum-
stances under which an adoption occurs."4  Therefore, if C G.F did not
impliedly overrule Soergel, the result is an illogical application of the best
interests of the child standard.
134. Id. at 73, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
135. 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
136. See, eg., CAL. Civ. CODE § 197.5 (Deering 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Michie
1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Bums 1991);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27b (1991); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17-d (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-7.1 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1991);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (Consol. 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Baldwin 1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1770 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
137. The majority held that Soergel would apply to petitions pursuant to Section 767.245.
CG.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 68, 483 N.W.2d at 805. In this circumstance, grandparents would not be
awarded visitation after the grandchild was adopted by a stepparent, even if the visitation was
found to be in the best interests of the child.
138. See In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 390-91, 404 N.W.2d 530, 537 (1987);
Rothstein, supra note 7, at 11.
139. The way in which parental rights are terminated may or may not indicate the quality of
the relationship between grandparent and grandchild. For a discussion of grandparent-grandchild
relationships, see Robinson, supra note 1, at 485-90.
140. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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The concurrence inquired whether Soergel has been impliedly overruled
by the majority.141 This author contends that C. G.F has overruled SoergeL
The C. G.F majority distinguished Soergel because the Soergel court relied
upon Topel. Soergel primarily relied upon Topel for its construction of Sec-
tion 48.92(1) and (2). 142 The Soergel court used the Topel construction of
the adoption statute to conclude that adoption creates an intact family.1
43
Accordingly, once an intact family exists, 1" the court cannot enter into
decisions related to visitation by grandparents. Thus, the Soergel court de-
termined that the adoption statute overrides the visitation statute, Section
767.245(4). As Justice Abrahamson stated in her concurring opinion, the
impact of the adoption proceeding was the primary consideration of the
court in Soergel.
14 5
However, in C. G.F, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that Section
880.155 overrides the effect of Section 48.92(1) and (2).146 That is, despite
the presence of an "intact family" after an adoption proceeding, grandpar-
ents can petition pursuant to Section 880.155 for visitation "regardless of
who the custodian is." 147 Consequently, the majority opinion is inconsis-
tent with and overrules Soergel because it rejects Soergel's "intact family"
analysis of the impact of adoption proceedings. If Soergel has been over-
ruled, adoption of the grandchild will also not bar a grandparent's petition
pursuant to Section 767.245.
If Soergel has been overruled, a grandparent may be granted visitation
with a grandchild who has been adopted after the termination of a parent's
rights, but that same grandparent and grandchild would not be allowed to
inherit from each other under the law of intestate succession or wills. 
14 8
141. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Section
48.925 has overruled Soergel to the extent that it applies to grandparents who have had a parent-
child relationship with their grandchild within two years of petitioning the court. See Wis. STAT.
§ 48.925 (1991-92).
142. See In re Marriage of Soergel, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 572-73, 453 N.W.2d 624, 627 (1990).
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
145. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). This au-
thor contends that an adoption creates an "intact family," regardless of the precipitating
circumstances.
146. See id. at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 806-07.
147. Id. at 71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
148. See Estate of Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 227, 145 N.W.2d 162, 164-65 (1966), limited by In
re Grandparental Visitation of C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
408 (1992). Topel held that adoption cuts off the child's right to inherit via intestate succession
from the child's biological family. Id. After the enactment of Wisconsin Statutes section 851.51,
a child who has been adopted by a stepparent after one of the natural parents has died and the
other natural parent has remarried would be allowed to inherit from the natural parent under the
law of intestate succession or wills. Wis. STAT. § 851.51 (1991-92).
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The C. G.F majority concluded that Topel is now only applicable to "cases
involving adoptions subsequent to a termination of parental rights but not
those involving the death of a natural parent." 149 Therefore, under Topel,
a child who has been adopted by a stepparent after the termination of a
biological parent's parental rights will not be able to inherit via intestate
succession from his biological family. 150 Arguably, if a legislative objective
is to maintain ties between the child and the child's biological family, it is
inconsistent to allow visitation between grandchild and grandparent and
not allow inheritance via intestate succession.' 51 Nevertheless, visits be-
tween grandparent and grandchild are valuable to the child's emotional
needs upon the loss of a parent, regardless of how that loss occurs. The loss
is multiplied if, in addition to the loss of the parent, the child is also denied
visits with grandparents.
When the C.G.F court focused on the differences between the Soergel
situation (adoption after termination of parental rights by legal process) and
the C. G.F situation (adoption after death of a parent), it naturally avoided
the similarity between the situations. That similarity is the best interests of
the child standard.152 Because determining the child's best interests could
foreseeably involve similar inquiries in the C. G.F situation as in the Soergel
situation, this best interests of the child focus would probably have required
the court to expressly overrule SoergeL The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
Weichman v. Weichman, reasoned that grandparent visitation rights do not
derive from parental rights, but are determined on the basis of the best in-
terests of the child. 153 Further, neither the legislature nor the court has
indicated that the best interests of the child standard is different when a
biological parent has died than when the biological parent's rights have
been terminated by legal process.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Grandparent visitation must be granted in accord with the best interests
of the child.'5 4 Social scientists have concluded that the quality of parent-
ing, the economic and emotional stability of the home life after a divorce or
death of a parent, and the presence of parental discord before a divorce are
149. C.G.F., 168 Wis. 2d at 70-71, 483 N.W.2d at 806.
150. Id.
151. Despite the termination of parental rights, grandparents can still choose to include their
grandchild in their wills.
152. Compare Wis. STAT. § 767.245(4) (1989-90) with Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1989-90).
153. 50 Wis. 2d 731, 734, 184 N.W.2d 882, 884 (1971); see supra notes 54-64 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Wis. STAT. § 880.155 (1991-92).
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important predictors of a child's emotional outcome after a divorce or death
of a parent.15 5 Consequently, whether the grandparents' visits will mediate
or exacerbate the child's reaction to the parental loss will be determined by
such factors as consequent family conflict and impact of grandparental vis-
its on parenting and economic stability. Regardless of whether the child
experiences family disruption because of divorce or death of a parent, the
child must grieve the loss. 1 56 Therefore, it is important that a grandparent
be able to support and assist the child in working through the child's grief
reactions. Grandparent visitation is in the child's best interests if the grand-
parents provide emotional security in the child's life and are not obsessed
with their conflicts with the child's parents. 157
Neither Section 880.155 nor C.G.F. specifies factors for determining the
best interests of the child in the grandparent visitation context. The recent
amendment to Section 48.92, Section 48.925, provides that the court may
grant visitation only if the visitation is in the best interests of the child and
the petitioning relative will not undermine either the parents' relationship
with the child or parenting decisions related to the child's welfare." 8 As
implied above, 159 these criteria are reasonable regardless of whether the pa-
rental rights have been severed by death or by a legal process and even if the
grandparent has not had a parent-child relationship with the grandchild as
required under Section 48.925. A grandparent and grandchild may have a
close and meaningful relationship even if there has not been a parent-child
relationship between them. I'
However, it would usually be in the best interests of the child to avoid
subjecting him or her to extraordinary conflict between the parents and the
155. Christopher Tennant, Parental Loss in Childhood; Its Effect in Adult Life, 45 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1045, 1045-50 (1988). Studies have also shown that children who have suf-
fered the loss of a parent by death are not at any greater risk of psychiatric disorders in adulthood
than children who have suffered separation from a parent because of divorce. See Kenneth S.
Kendler et al., Childhood Parental Loss and Adult Psychopathology in Women" A Twin Study
Perspective, 49 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 109, 109 (1992). Exposure to parental discord prior to
the separation or poor parental care after the separation may be more significantly causal of disor-
der in adulthood. See id.
156. See Ernest Rotenberg, Guidance for Judges Hearing Grandparent Visitation Cases, in
GRANDPARENT VISITATION DISPUTES: A LEGAL RESOURCE MANUAL 71, 73 (Ellen C. Segal &
Naomi Karp eds., 1989).
157. See id. at 74.
158. Wis. STAT. § 48.925 (1991-92).
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
160. The social science literature on the importance of grandparents to grandchildren is
sparse. A 1989 study of college students' attitudes about their grandparents revealed that the
students felt strong emotional ties with their grandparents. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 478. Child
psychologists have stressed that continuity of personal relationships is important to a child's
healthy development. Shandling, supra note 1, at 123.
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grandparents. An action to compel visitation is likely to be brought only
when there has been a serious dispute between the custodial parents and the
grandparents. Trial courts often rely upon mental health experts to ascer-
tain when the best of interests of the child would compel visitation by the
grandparents, despite opposition by the custodial parents.16 In many cases
there will not be a clear consensus by the experts about what is in the best
interests of the child and the court will need to decide between competing
theories. 62 A 1989 publication sponsored by the American Bar Associa-
tion recommended several factors for trial court consideration in grandpar-
ent visitation disputes:
1. Can the grandparents provide a safe, responsible and satisfac-
tory atmosphere for the proposed visit?
2. What is the history of grandparent visitation in the past?
3. Is the child emotionally stable? Physically healthy?
4. Are the grandparents physically and emotionally equipped for
handling visitation?
5. Is there an ernest desire on the part of the grandparents and the
grandchild to have a meaningful visitation relationship? Or are the
visits requested for any other reason?
6. What are the wishes of the child?163
If the court decides to award grandparental visitation, a family may find
itself in a highly conflicted situation without the motivation or the tools
necessary to make court-granted visits between the grandparent(s) and
grandchild truly in the child's best interests.164 Just as parents obtaining a
divorce in Wisconsin must participate in mediation when custody disputes
arise, 16 visitation disputes between grandparents and custodial parents also
suggest the use of mediation to try resolving the conflicts leading to the
161. See Rotenberg, supra note 156, at 76. Social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists
often serve as experts in child custody cases. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REV. 1113, 1207.
162. According to one commentator, judges are likely to impose their own values because
there is a lack of information on the effects of allowing or denying grandparental visitation. Sara
Simrall Rorer, Grandparents' Visitation Rights in Ohio: A Procedural Quagmire, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 295, 300 n.39 (1987). Many child psychology experts maintain that a child's best interests
are not served when the visitation would place the child in a hostile situation. See Michael J.
Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their "Bundle of Joy,"
18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533, 555 (1991). However, some courts have refused to use family hostil-
ity as a basis for denying visitation, suspecting that parents have manipulated the litigation by
generating hatred. Id.
163. Rotenberg, supra note 156, at 73.
164. Furthermore, C.G.F. opens the way for more court involvement in parental decisions,
and hence more use of judicial resources.
165. Section 767.11(8) provides in relevant part: "[I]n any action affecting the family,... in
which it appears that legal custody or physical placement is contested, the parties shall attend at
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lawsuit and to lessen the use of judicial resources. 1 16 In visitation disputes,
mediation may produce a better result than litigation does because
"[m]ediation does not focus on who was right and/or wrong in the past but
rather on how the disputants want to reorganize the future."' 167 While the
adversarial litigation process may emphasize the parties' conflicts, media-
tion focuses on their similar concerns. 168 For instance, the parties are likely
to share a love for the grandchild.1
69
Litigation often focuses on the past relationships of the parties.
Although the past relationships between the child and grandparents and the
grandparents and the parent(s) are indicative of whether grandparent visita-
tion is appropriate, a focus on the future relationships is very important to
the resolution of the visitation conflict. Despite past problems between the
parent(s) and grandparents, 70 the parties may be able to come to an agree-
ment about a future visitation arrangement.' 7' The mediator may ask the
objecting parent, "If you could structure the relationship between your chil-
dren and their grandparents, how would it look?"' 172  This question
least one session with a mediator" unless this requirement would cause "undue hardship." Wis.
STAT. § 767.11(8) (1991-92).
166. The effectiveness of mediation depends on one's willingness to participate: you can order
one's body to mediation, but not one's psyche. Cf. Jerold S. Auerbach, Recent Publication: Jus-
tice Without Law?: Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers, 51 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 792, 792 (1983)
(discussing some necessary elements for effective mediation). The question remains: Once the
custodial parents discover that they must still have a relationship with the petitioning grandpar-
ents through their child, will they be motivated to attempt to resolve their difficulties, or at least
make the most of a difficult situation? Or will the court become further emersed in a family's
conflicts through frequent petitions for changes in visitation arrangements?
167. John M. Haynes, The Use of Mediation in Grandparent Visitation Disputes, in GRAND-
PARENT VISITATION DIsPuTEs, supra note 156, at 83.
168. a
169. Id.
170. John M. Haynes discusses the complexities of family problems in grandparent visitation
disputes. Id. at 80. The family problems may involve intergenerational conflicts between the
parent and grandparents, but may also include siblings and extended-family members. Id Conse-
quently, many people who are not parties to the court action are nonetheless important to the
resolution of the family problems and the visitation dispute. Id. The failure of the litigation
process to adequately resolve these conflicts arises from an adversarial focus on past wrongs. See
id. At the conclusion of the litigation, the court renders a judgment either denying or granting
visitation. Regardless of the decision, the family conflicts remain. Haynes discusses the advan-
tages of mediation for avoiding this unsatisfactory result. He cautions, however, that mediation is
not advisable in situations involving criminal activity. Id. Therefore, mediation is usually not
recommended when there are allegations of sexual abuse or domestic violence. See id
171. Rotenberg recommends that divorcing parties anticipate potential visitation disputes
and provide for grandparent visitation by written agreement. Rotenberg, supra note 156, at 72.
This would require the divorcing parties to plan for visitation in the event of death of either of the
divorcing spouses, either spouse's incapacity, or an out-of-state move by either spouse. Id.
172. Haynes, supra note 167, at 82. Granted, some parents may respond, "I do not want the
grandparents to have any relationship with my child."
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presumes that there will be a relationship and, therefore, may invoke con-
structive problem solving.17
3
The best interests of the child standard requires a fact-intensive inquiry.
Mediation can be used to elicit facts about the parties' willingness to work
together toward the child's best interests. If mediation does not produce a
visitation agreement, the court is still left with a difficult dilemma: whether
to order visitation despite the likelihood of great conflict between the parties
or to deny the grandparents visitation at the risk of acquiescing to parental
manipulation of the mediation process. 174
VIII. CONCLUSION
In re Grandparental Visitation of C. G.F. 175 resolved whether grandpar-
ents have the right to petition the courts for visitation of their adopted
grandchild who had lost a parent by death. Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decided that an adoption proceeding will not necessarily terminate
the rights of the biological family even when a biological parent is dead.
Even if the denial of visitation comes from the grandparents' own child, the
grandparents can petition the court pursuant to Section 880.155 of the Wis-
consin Statutes so long as their child's former spouse has died.
Parents do not always consider the best interests of their children when
deciding whether to allow visitation by grandparents. A judge may exercise
discretion to grant grandparental visitation, despite the parents' opposition,
when the visitation would be in the child's best interests. Because of the
high potential for family disruption, judges should be very cautious in
granting grandparental visitation in these situations. For reasons of judicial
economy and more satisfactory resolution of family conflicts, judges should
utilize mediation to resolve many of these conflicts.
ROBIN L. LEWIS
173. See id
174. See Minerva, supra note 162, at 555.
175. 168 Wis. 2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803, cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, sex without reproduction has become common and
widely accepted, and more recently medical science has made it increas-
ingly possible to have reproduction without sex. The former is much more
enjoyable than the latter for most of us and, while it does entail some moral
and legal issues, is a great deal less complex than the latter.1 A major cause
of the complexity of the issues associated with noncoital reproduction is
that, while "science [tends to] look... forward to anticipate new and un-
foreseen possibilities, the law looks backward, drawing its support from pre-
cedent."2 Our society seems to first develop and perfect medical and
scientific techniques, and only later consult experts in ethics and law to
determine if we should be doing that which in fact we already are doing.
Meanwhile, we try to resolve disputes arising from new reproductive tech-
nologies by using "old legal codes of paternity, maternity, baby-selling,
adoption, and contracts."3
This Article proposes a new approach to an aspect of noncoital repro-
duction-"gestational surrogacy"-that is gaining rapidly in popularity
and seems to hold great promise for the future. Gestational surrogacy is an
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D. 1966,
John Marshall Law School.
I acknowledge with thanks the help and contributions of my very capable research assistants,
Heather Brooks, Patricia Holland, and Christina Lazich, and of my equally capable former re-
search assistants (now attorneys), Shari Kalik and Ann Lawrence. The views expressed in this
Article are mine and not necessarily theirs.
1. Alexander M. Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges, 20 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 679, 686 (1987).
2. Warren A. Kaplan, Fetal Research Statutes, Procreative Rights, and the "New Biology":
Living in the Interstices of the Law, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 723, 723 (1987).
3. Laura R. Woliver, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Policy Concerns for Women,
8 POL. & LiFE Sci. 185, 185 (1990).
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arrangement whereby the sperm and ovum of a couple, who wish to raise a
genetically related child, is used to create an embryo through in vitro fertili-
zation.4 The embryo is then implanted in the uterus of another woman who
subsequently gives birth to the child. The child is then given to the genetic
parents to raise. Gestational surrogacy has the potential to benefit both the
creating genetic parents who will raise the child and the surrogate who will
bear and give birth to the child. To achieve the full potential of this unique
opportunity we must develop new ways of viewing and resolving the issues
and problems involved.
II. WHY SURROGACY?
The idea of "surrogate6 motherhood" dates back to at least the Old
Testament stories of the apparently infertile Sarah7 and Rachel,8 who in-
structed their husbands to impregnate their maid-servants so that they
might have children. In more recent years, the pregnancy of the surrogate
mother has been accomplished by artificial insemination, or in vitro fertili-
zation, rather than by physical intercourse. In any case, the objective is for
the surrogate to take the place of a woman who cannot conceive a child or
cannot carry it to a live birth.
Although many people are aware of surrogate motherhood, many of
them, unfortunately, know about it only because of a few highly publicized
contests between the surrogate mother and the parents who intended to
raise the child. In recent years, less than one percent of surrogate births
have created contests over custody of the child.9 However, it is these few
battles that produce headlines and come to public attention.1"
Approximately two to three million couples in the United States, consti-
tuting eight to ten percent of married couples with a wife of child-bearing
age, are infertile.11 Although some people think that infertility has greatly
4. "In vitro" means "outside the living body and in an artificial environment." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 617 (10th ed. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In this case, however, the gestator,
Anna Johnson, attempted to keep and raise the child as her own.
6. A surrogate is "one appointed to act in place of another;... one that serves as a substi-
tute." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1187 (10th ed. 1983).
7. Genesis 16:2.
8. Id. 30:3.
9. Barbara S. Parish, Test Tube on Trial: Let California Blaze the Trail to the Legitimation of
Surrogacy, 9 GLENDALE L. REv. 56, 56 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
11. Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered:A Proposed Regulatory Frame-
work for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625, 631 (1991); Parish, supra
note 9, at 56.
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increased in recent decades, 1 2 it has actually remained fairly constant. 13
However, due to sociological and environmental factors, such as postpone-
ment of parenthood for financial and career reasons, pollution in the atmos-
phere, and disease, individuals are less fertile when they try to have children
after reaching thirty or forty. 14 Thus, the incidence of infertility among
couples who are trying to have children today is higher than in the past.
Through the years, adoption has been viewed as an acceptable alterna-
tive for many infertile couples. However, because of the widespread use of
contraceptives, availability of abortion, and growing willingness of single
mothers to keep their babies, the supply of desirable 5 children available for
adoption has dwindled greatly. 6 For most couples, adoption is "a long and
arduous process."' 7 The judge in the Baby M case "found that in 1984, two
million couples contended for the 58,000 children placed for adoption"' 8
and that the waiting period was three to seven years.19 Many couples seek a
better solution.
That better solution has sometimes involved the use of a surrogate
mother, and use of surrogacy seems likely to increase in the years ahead. It
is quite possible for a child born through a surrogacy arrangement to be in
the welcoming arms of his parents within a year of the beginning of the
process. Although surrogacy involves substantial expense, it may be less
costly than adoption,20 especially when the latter is expedited by the use of
the gray or black market.
Even more important, many couples are quite willing to invest more
time and money than that required for adoption in order to have a child
who is genetically related to one or both of them. This is clearly evidenced
by the great increase in infertility treatment, the widespread use of artificial
insemination and in vitro fertilization, and the growing interest in surrogate
12. Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of
Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 865, 875-76 (1985).
13. Janna C. Merrick, Selling Reproductive Rights: Policy Issues in Surrogate Motherhood, 8
POL. & LIFE Sci. 161, 161-62 (1990).
14. Parish, supra note 9, at 56; Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adop-
tions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59, 61 (1987).
15. For most potential adoptive parents, "desirable" means a healthy Caucasian baby.
16. Christopher P. Litterio, Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization, and Surrogate
Motherhood: Breeding Life and Legal Problems in the United States and Great Britain, 10 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 533, 537 (1986).
17. Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 4 (1986).
18. Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1802 (1988).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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birth arrangements.21 In our society there is a powerful and pervasive "de-
sire to reproduce [and] ...connect to future generations through one's
genes." 22
III. WHAT IS SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD?
Generally, most people use the phrase "surrogate mother" "to designate
a woman who gives up a child she has borne to be raised by another woman
and her husband, [the latter being] the child's biological father. ' 23 This
arrangement is often called "partial surrogacy," because the "surrogate" is
the genetic mother of the child, while the woman who will raise the child as
its mother has no genetic relationship to it. In its purest form, however,
surrogacy involves the creation of an embryo from the sperm and ovum of
the couple who intend to raise the child. This embryo is then implanted in
the womb of the surrogate, where it develops until birth. This arrangement
is often called "full surrogacy," since the surrogate has no genetic relation-
ship to the child, but simply provides a womb for the development of the
child.24
The remainder of this Article discusses only full surrogacy and the is-
sues and opportunities pertaining thereto. Although there are problems
and objections with any form of surrogacy, many do not apply to full surro-
gacy at all, and others apply to a much lesser degree. Moreover, full surro-
gacy has the potential to provide great opportunities and rewards to both
the rearing parents and the gestator.
For purposes of this Article, I will avoid using the word "mother" for
either of the women involved. Instead, I will refer to the couple who are the
genetic creators of the child as the "parents" and the woman who bears and
gives birth to the child as the "gestator." In so doing, I hope to avoid the
confusion that often surrounds the word "surrogate," and the emotional
and traditional connotations of the word "mother." I will refer to the en-
tire process as "gestational surrogacy."
21. John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 389 (1991).
22. Hollinger, supra note 12, at 874.
23. Capron, supra note 1, at 679 n.1.
24. Laurence E. Sweeney, "Chilling" the Procreational Choice: Frozen Embryos-Who Gets
What When the Donor Couple Divorce, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 367, 370 n.21 (1990); Sharon L.
Tiller, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrange-
ments, 72 IOWA L. REV. 415, 416 n.5 (1987).
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IV. POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
A. Parents
Many couples who are involuntarily childless are not infertile. They
are, in fact, capable of producing healthy ova and sperm. For some women,
pregnancy is difficult or dangerous because of some physical condition, such
as diabetes or high blood pressure.2" In other cases, a woman with ovaries
may have undergone a hysterectomy.26 A woman also may elect to use a
surrogate gestator rather than bear her own child simply for convenience,27
for reasons relating to her career, leisure, or lifestyle.28
B. Gestators
Women choose to be gestators for many reasons. Some women enjoy
being pregnant and like the feeling that comes from creating a new life.29
Others get great satisfaction from being able to help another couple have a
much-wanted child.3" Most women, however, including many of those in-
fluenced by the above reasons, are motivated by the desire for financial re-
ward. For some, this means being able to buy things, such as a second car,
a better house, or an education that they could not otherwise afford. For
those less economically privileged, it means an opportunity to be self-sup-
porting or to contribute to the basic budget of one's family. For women
who find it difficult to obtain employment that pays well, being a gestator
may be the ideal job, since it can be done in their "spare time at home with
little training. ' 31 A gestator can bear children for others in between and
after the births of her own children, "allowing [her] to stay at home to raise
[her own] children while still making money to support the family."'3 2
25. John L. Hill, The Case for Enforcement of the Surrogate Contract, 8 POL. & LIFE Sci.
147, 148 (1990). Another medical problem would be cancer of the uterus requiring radiation
treatment. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 1012 n.243 (1986).
26. Robertson, supra note 25, at 1012.
27. Katz, supra note 17, at 3.
28. Some women may wish "to avoid ... morning sickness, a bulky torso .... or the discom-
fort of childbirth." Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65
N.C. L. REv. 127, 132 (1986).
29. Jamie Levitt, Biology, Technology and Genealogy: A Proposed Uniform Surrogacy Legisla-
tion, 25 COLutM. J.L. & SOC. PROnS. 451, 461 (1992). Many women feel more content, more
attractive and feminine, and enjoy the extra attention they receive while pregnant. Stephen G.
York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed Solution, 24 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 395, 399 (1991).
30. Levitt, supra note 29, at 461.
31. Ellen Goodman, The Business of Surrogacy, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1990, § 5, at 8.
32. Woliver, supra note 3, at 189.
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C. The Host Uterus Program
Gestational surrogacy is not revolutionary. The Division of Reproduc-
tive Endocrinology and Fertility at George Washington University Medical
Center started its "host uterus" program in the late 1980s, and eighty or
more such births have been reported in recent years.33 The next logical step
is to have the sponsors of host uterus programs assume responsibility for all
aspects of gestational surrogacy: matching parents and gestators, collecting
and paying all fees and compensation, providing medical facilities and bene-
fits to the gestators, and enforcing all provisions of the agreement among
the parties.34 Each gestator would become, at least during her pregnancy,
an employee of the host uterus program, subject to its rules and regulations,
and assured of full payment for performance of her duties. The parents, on
the other hand, would be clients of the host uterus program. Thus, they
would be able to rely on its past performance and its interest in future good
will and reputation. In this way, they are less likely to encounter a dispute
than if they dealt directly with the gestator.
There is every reason to believe that, over a period of time, the position
of gestator will be viewed as an honorable and desirable profession, which
gives many women the opportunity to earn money by providing a service
that society values. But before this will materialize, we must recognize the
objections that have been raised to surrogate motherhood, including gesta-
tional surrogacy. We must then demonstrate that these objections are ill-
founded and far outweighed by the benefits of a well-conceived host uterus
program.
V. OBJECTIONS AND THEIR REBUTTAL
A. Commercialization
The following article describes New York's ban on surrogate-parenting
for profit:
Albany, N.Y.-[July 23, 1992] Gov. Mario Cuomo signed a bill
Wednesday making New York-where an estimated 40 percent of
the nation's surrogate-parenting deals are arranged-the 18th state
to ban surrogate parenting for profit. The Legislature, pushed by an
unusual coalition that included the National Organization for Wo-
men and the New York State Catholic Conference, approved the
ban last month. It takes effect in one year. New Yorkers will still be
33. Levitt, supra note 29, at 459.
34. See infra part VII.
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allowed to act as surrogates for friends or relatives, but no contracts
or broker fees will be allowed.
"[S]urrogate parenting contracts of a commercial nature are void and
against public policy, and you cannot use the courts to enforce them," said
Helen Weinstein, a chief sponsor of the new legislation. 36 Moreover, Wein-
stein believes that "[s]urrogate parenting denigrates human life and turns
reproductive rights into something that you can buy and sell, and turns
children into commodities. '37
In response, Betsy Aigen, a clinical psychologist who became interested
in the issue after she discovered that she was infertile, said "the proposed
legislation would do more harm than good."38 According to Aigen, "Anti-
surrogacy bills don't prevent surrogacy, [but rather] leave [the] participants
without any protection."39 Aigen warns that "eliminating trained, account-
able professionals would lead to a proliferation of Baby M stories. '
Although most people apparently do not object, in principle, to surro-
gate motherhood, considerable opposition to paid surrogacy exists. It is,
however, difficult to find any logic in such a distinction. Perhaps the oppo-
sition to commercial surrogacy is derived from our "historical failure to
value [the] domestic work of mothers and housewives [, which contributes]
to the sense that gestation has no value[,] as a form of productive labor."41
But this overlooks the value of the services that the gestator provides to the
parents. She should be paid for her time, energy, physical discomfort, and
risk. If society is comfortable with allowing payment to doctors who aid in
the creation of children through in vitro fertilization, and with compensat-
ing those who contribute their sperm or ova, it certainly should be accepta-
ble to pay a gestator who contributes the temporary use of her womb.42
Why is using a body to produce a baby for someone else any different from
using a body to produce blood, sperm, ova, or any other regenerative sub-
stance for someone else's use?
Throughout American history, we have readily accepted the use of sur-
rogates to perform various roles of parenthood, such as wet nurse, govern-
35. Helen Weinstein, N. Y Outlaws Surrogate-Parenting Profits, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1992,
§ 1, at 11.
36. George E. Curry, New York State May Bar Mothers for Hire, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992,
§ 1, at 17.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 200 n.51 (1986).
42. Hollinger, supra note 12, at 893.
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ess, day-care worker, and boarding school teacher. Prebirth surrogacy is
merely a modem extension of postbirth surrogacy, made possible by ad-
vances in science and medicine.43 No one has ever questioned that
postbirth surrogates should be paid for their services. Ours is a commercial
society, and most of our needs are satisfied by the use of commercial trans-
actions. Only a fair financial return will induce most potential gestators to
allow others to use their reproductive capacity.' Allowing surrogate moth-
erhood but prohibiting payment for the gestator's services would be compa-
rable to allowing doctors to perform abortions but prohibiting payment for
the doctors' services. Such a prohibition would "erect a major barrier to
access to the procedure."45 Bearing and giving birth to a child is perhaps
the finest and most valuable service a woman may provide. We should al-
low women to place an economic value on this service so that they may be
properly compensated if they wish to provide this service to others.46
B. Baby-Selling
All states prohibit the selling of children,47 and most have statutes
aimed at eliminating black market adoptions.48 Some people feel that these
statutes should apply to surrogacy arrangements. However, surrogate
motherhood did not exist when the baby-selling statutes were enacted.
Such legislation was established to protect a mother and child in an adop-
tion situation from falling prey to unscrupulous people operating in the
adoption black market. In most cases, the child involved was unplanned,
unwanted, and illegitimate, and the mother could not find an alternative to
giving up her baby to the highest bidder4 9 Generally, the adopting parents
were not biologically related to the child, their suitability as parents was not
usually investigated, and the child's best interests were rarely considered.5 0
In a gestational surrogate parenting arrangement, however, the agree-
ment to bear a child and give the child to its genetic parents is entered into
43. Harry D. Krause, Arificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 201
(1985).
44. Noel P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, 156.
45. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 72, 76 (1988).
46. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (holding that women are competent to
enter into binding contracts).
47. Merrick, supra note 13, at 163.
48. Katz, supra note 17, at 8-9 n.34.
49. Margaret D. Townsend, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a
Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 467, 478 (1982).
50. Karen M. Sly, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb"
for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539, 550 (1982-83).
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before conception. The gestator is "not avoiding the consequences of an
unwanted pregnancy or fear of the financial burden of child rearing."51
Rather than being unwanted, the pregnancy is actively sought by a gestator
who knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any claim she may have to the
child before she becomes pregnant. Since the child will be reared by his
genetic parents, his best interests will be as well protected as if his birth had
resulted from normal coital conception and his genetic mother's
pregnancy.52
If the child is deemed to be, from conception, the child of his genetic
parents, there is no sale of the child. The gestator is not a parent, and thus
has no parental rights to relinquish. Payments to the gestator are for her
services in bearing and giving birth to the child and delivering the parents'
child to them. Moreover, the payments compensate her for her foregone
opportunities (employment, travel, birth of own child) and limitations on
activities (recreation, diet, sexual relations).53
The most that can be reasonably argued is that part of the gestator's
compensation is for her preconception relinquishment of any possible claim
to parental rights she might have under existing state law. For many years,
we have allowed the preconception sale of a man's possible parental rights
when he provides sperm for artificial insemination. If that is permissible, it
should not be objectionable to allow a gestator, who will have no genetic tie
to the child, to do the same. In divorce cases, for example, we routinely
allow a party to relinquish or limit his right to custody of a child in ex-
change for some other benefit in the overall divorce agreement.
C. Exploiting Poor Women
Some are concerned that most surrogates will be poor women who will
offer the use of their bodies to the well-to-do as an addition to their present
services of housekeeping and childrearing.54 First, there is no reason to
think that only poor women will want to become gestators. Despite the
long-standing view that women work only because of either stark economic
necessity or to earn some "pin money," many middle-class women work,
and would become gestators, to improve their standard of living.55 These
51. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986)
(emphasis omitted).
52. Levitt, supra note 29, at 475 & n.141.
53. Nichole M. Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements Under California
Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 116 n.115 (1991).
54. Robertson, supra note 25, at 1022.
55. For example, a woman may wish to buy or remodel a house, buy a car, pay for her own or
her children's education, or travel.
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women are certainly not being exploited any more than a man would be if
he took a second job for the same purpose.16
The exploitation argument is most often raised in connection with gesta-
tional surrogacy because the racial, genetic, and educational background
are no longer of much concern to the child's genetic parents. Some argue
that African-American and Hispanic women, who have fewer economic
choices than Caucasian women, will be hired as gestators because they will
accept lesser fees than Caucasian women.17 But the well-to-do are presently
employing these same women at very low wages for childcare and house-
work that takes them away from their own families. Why is it "exploita-
tion" to give these women the free choice of opting to earn money while
remaining at home, or perhaps earning more money while performing their
previous jobs and, at the same time, also serving as a gestator? Rather than
exploiting women, commercial surrogacy will liberate many women by al-
lowing them to engage in employment that is less distasteful and more re-
munerative than their present choices. 8
The other exploitation argument is that "[t]he lure of a very large sum
of money, perhaps larger than the woman could get any other way, may
lead her to commit herself to a decision that she may very deeply regret." 9
This problem is certainly not limited to surrogate motherhood. Many peo-
ple who commit themselves to long-term activities later wish they had not.
In many cases, they must complete their obligations because they have no
alternatives. Examples that readily come to mind are undertaking polar or
space expeditions, military combat, or an ocean voyage; performing a long
and delicate operation; or caring for children in the parents' absence. In
such instances, as with a surrogate gestator, the appeal of the offered re-
wards may fade as the task becomes more onerous and seemingly never-
ending. However, the task must be completed. Generally, we do not con-
sider it exploitive to expect people to perform difficult and dangerous as-
signments that they have willingly and knowingly undertaken.
D. Surrogacy Degrades Women
Some people, especially some feminists, believe that surrogate arrange-
ments "demean[ ] motherhood by reducing it to a type of farming; it rele-
56. Andrews, supra note 45, at 76.
57. Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An Argument
Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 525, 542-44 (1992).
58. David Orentlicher, Does Mother Know Best?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114-15 (1989)
(reviewing MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988)).
59. Martha Field, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1589, 1590 (1992).
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gates [these] women.., to their biological function as reproducers, thus
degrading and objectifying them as 'mother machines.' "6 An additional
concern is that, because gestators will be valued in the marketplace by their
physical and psychological characteristics, some will have Saks Fifth Ave-
nue price tags while others will have K-Mart price tags.61 Some consider it
degrading that a woman's body can be rented for a price determined by her
reproductive capabilities, rather than for her intrinsic worth and
achievements.
However, most people readily accept the fact that, for many purposes,
their worth is determined by their personal characteristics, including physi-
cal, psychological, and other attributes. While many of us wish our per-
sonal characteristics were of a higher quality, we do not consider it
degrading to be judged on that basis. Perhaps the resistance to allowing
women's bodies to be treated as marketable objects is derived from the sex-
ism associated with Playboy bunnies and Miss America.62 But to let that
stand in the way of a woman's right to engage in gestational surrogacy is
paternalism at its worst. Women are not second-class citizens and do not
need to be protected from themselves. They are fully capable of making
their own decisions and accepting responsibility for them.
Far from being degrading, gestational surrogacy has the potential to
open up new opportunities for women that might not otherwise be economi-
cally possible. It may provide temporary employment to fulfill the short-
term needs of many women. For example, a young woman could finance a
year of school, save for the down-payment on a house, travel, or study
abroad.63 And for the mother-to-be who will raise the child, the potential
for opportunity and liberation is equally promising. Freed from the need to
take time out for bearing and giving birth to children, women will truly be
free to compete equally with men in business and professional life. Because
the role of gestator will be left to those who choose it, how can it be degrad-
ing for a woman to willingly bear and give birth to a child?
E. Surrogacy Will Reduce Demand for Adoption
A further objection to surrogate arrangements is that they will reduce
the demand for adoption at a time when there are many handicapped,
older, and non-Caucasian children in need of good adoptive homes.
60. Antoinette S. Lopez, Privacy and the Regulation of the New Reproductive Technologies: A
Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173, 192 (1988).
61. Merrick, supra note 13, at 166.
62. Healy, supra note 53, at 115 n.112.
63. Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1763 n.17
(1988).
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Martha Field argues that "[i]t would be a real social harm for surrogacy to
substitute for adoption. '"64 While it is indeed difficult "to adopt the healthy,
white infants that many desire," the shortage of the latter "has resulted in
many children being adopted who once would have been hard to place."
65
While I do not question the social desirability of placing these "less de-
sirable" children in adoptive families, I do question whether the availability
of gestational surrogacy will have much effect on the adoption of hard-to-
place children. Relatively few couples will engage in gestational surrogacy,
but those who do need to be fairly affluent to afford the substantial costs
involved. If surrogacy is not available to these couples, they will most likely
enter the black or gray market to adopt a Caucasian baby. Hard-to-place
children will continue to be adopted primarily by couples who lack the
means to pursue other alternatives.66
Moreover, there is no reason to burden one small group of potential
parents with a special duty to adopt hard-to-place children. If we are deter-
mined to find homes for these children, we should require that all couples
who already have two genetically related children must adopt one hard-to-
place child before they may have another child by natural birth. Failure to
adopt before the arrival of a third child would subject the couple to a sub-
stantial fine. Perhaps my suggestion seems facetious, but it illustrates how
unfair it is to limit the opportunities of a group of people who did not cause
the social problem that we wish to cure.
It must also be noted that, to the extent that surrogate arrangements
result in a small decrease in the demand for adoption, it will make it possi-
ble for some eager adoptive parents to raise a child who would not other-
wise be available to them or whose availability would at least be long
delayed.
F Effect on Gestator's Own Children
Most host-uterus programs will require that a gestator have at least one
child of her own before entering into a gestational surrogacy arrangement.67
Because of this, some writers suggest that the gestator's own children will
experience feelings of abandonment, fear, and anxiety when they see their
mother go through nine months of pregnancy, and they then observe that
64. Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts-Gestational and Traditional. The Argument for
Nonenforcement, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (1991).
65. Id.
66. Cynthia A. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 107, 114-15 (1982).
67. See infra part VII.A.
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the baby does not join their family.6" The rather obvious solution to such a
problem is for the gestator to honestly and fully explain to her children
exactly what she is doing and why. It should be no different from the situa-
tion in which a woman provides day care for other people's children, or
serves as a temporary foster parent. Bearing and giving birth to another
couple's child is her "job." Because this is an honorable and useful service,
she should be quite comfortable explaining it to her children and expecting
them to be proud of her "work." If her children know from the beginning
that the baby-to-be is the child of the parents-to-be, and not a part of the
gestator's family, they will have no reason to fear that they will be aban-
doned or given away.
There is concern that the gestator's children will suffer embarrassment
when their peers learn of their mother's arrangement.69 Perhaps they will,
as is sometimes the case with children whose parents are members of reli-
gious sects or children whose parents advocate unpopular causes. We
surely do not want to let social intolerance and bigotry determine what
activities are permissible. It is the gestator's right to determine if her surro-
gacy arrangement is good for her family. Moreover, it is her responsibility
to help her children understand the importance of doing what they think is
right, even when that does not coincide with the views of others.70
G. Maternal Bonding
There is evidence that "a deep attachment or bond develops in the
course of the prenatal and postnatal relationship between mother and
child."7" Because of this, some people feel that a gestator will experience
mental anguish and depression when she "gives up" the baby. However,
although this is a common experience for women who give up their children
for adoption, there is little danger that this will occur with a gestational
surrogate. The latter knows before conception that the child is not hers,
and that her role in the child's life will end shortly after birth. The relation-
ship of gestator to fetus is analogous to that of many nannies and house-
keepers to their charges. They provide loving care for a time and often
develop close ties, but they always know that the child's tie to his parents is
paramount. The very low risk of unyielding "maternal bonding" on the
part of a gestator is evidenced by the fact that, while seventy-five percent of
biological mothers who give up a child for adoption later change their
68. Merrick, supra note 13, at 167.
69. Id
70. Andrews, supra note 45, at 78.
71. HMi, supra note 21, at 394-96 & nn.219-25.
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minds, only about one percent of surrogates have similar changes of heart.7 2
Furthermore, most surrogates who have a change of heart are the genetic
mother of the child, not just a genetically unrelated gestator.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SURROGATE ARRANGEMENTS
The force of law over surrogacy, in the form of statutory regulation,
should be employed only to: (1) provide a back-up for situations when the
parties directly involved have not made their own contractual arrange-
ments; (2) expressly authorize arrangements that may have been considered
illegal in the past;73 (3) relieve involved parties from parental or other re-
sponsibilities, when appropriate; and (4) provide for problems of inheri-
tance, custody, and financial support.
A statute should expressly require that the parties directly involved in
gestational surrogacy-the parents, the gestator, and the clinic or other
medical facility (host uterus program)-must enter into a complete and
binding agreement covering every foreseeable issue.74 The parties should be
free to make any provisions they wish unless those provisions are clearly
contrary to public policy. No provision should be deemed contrary to pub-
lic policy merely because it offends some people's beliefs. The agreement
should specifically state that advance provisions concerning surrogacy will
be legally binding and enforceable. As a result, all concerned will "know
with reasonable certainty" what will happen "if certain contingencies oc-
cur."75 Those who are involved in gestational surrogacy must be able to
rely on the agreements they made.76 And, the certainty that provisions
72. Andrews, supra note 45, at 74.
73. Some states impose criminal penalties. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(7) (West
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.020 (West 1988).
Other states merely make surrogacy contracts unenforceable. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-218 (1991).
74. See infra part VII.
75. Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We
Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1299, 1345 (1991).
76. Without enforceability, surrogacy contracts could easily become tools for blackmail. A
gestator might seek to extort additional payments from the parents by either threatening to abort
or keep the child. Krause, supra note 43, at 203. In connection with the widely publicized case of
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991), the intended father, Mark Calvert, stated
on ABC-TV's The Home Show, on February 11, 1993, that the gestator (Anna Johnson) had
offered to give up her claim to custody of the child for $50,000.
Also, as Judge Posner points out, surrogacy becomes less valuable to the gestator because she
loses part of her bargaining power. If surrogacy contracts are enforced, the gestator can com-
mand a higher fee because the outcome is more certain. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and
Economics of Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 22
(1989).
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made in advance will be binding and enforceable will "minimize the fre-
quency and expense of dispute resolution."77
Undoubtedly, one of the worst ways to start a child's life is with a cus-
tody contest.78 To avoid this undesirable possibility, statutory law should
make clear that the couple who genetically create the child and intend to
rear the child are the child's legal parents and are entitled to custody of the
child from the moment of birth. The statute should also clearly state that
the gestator is not the mother of the child and has no parental rights or
obligations in relation to the child.7 9 We have traditionally defined father-
hood by the genetic link. There is every reason to define motherhood in the
same way. If the right to custody of the child is clearly established and
legally enforceable, even the very small percentage of disputes that have
occurred will be largely eliminated.80
VII. PROVISIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The agreement among the parents (the couple who will genetically cre-
ate the child), the gestator, and the host uterus program should anticipate
and provide for as many future contingencies as possible. The agreement
must be binding on all involved parties and subject to modification only if
all parties agree. By now, we have had enough experience in this field to
foresee most of the issues and problems that may arise.
As stated in Part IV.C, the host uterus program will find and employ
gestators. Because each program will expect to provide services for many
years to come, it will have a strong incentive to set high standards and build
an excellent reputation. It is quite possible that, as the popularity of such
programs increases, some programs will have their own medical facilities to
assure quality and to achieve economies of scale.
A. Compensation of Gestators and Fees Charged Parents
In gestational surrogacy, the race and ethnicity of the gestator will be
irrelevant. The primary qualifications will be her present health and medi-
cal history, her willingness to conform her activities and lifestyle to the op-
timum conditions for pregnancy, and her willingness to relinquish custody
77. Alnen, supra note 75, at 1345.
78. Field, supra note 64, at 5.
79. This should eliminate any possible argument about "baby-buying or selling." Hill, supra
note 21, at 356-57.
80. Only one percent of surrogate birth mothers, most of whom have a genetic link to the
child, have attempted to rescind their agreement to relinquish the child. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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of the child immediately after birth. A well-run program will subject poten-
tial gestators to psychological and physical tests to determine their health
and emotional stability. It also seems wise to require that a gestator must
be living with at least one natural child of her own. This will assure that
she is physically capable of bearing and giving birth to a child. Moreover, it
will establish that she can accurately predict her own feelings about relin-
quishing the parents' child at birth and that she understands the medical
and emotional consequences of pregnancy and birth.81
The gestator's compensation will be determined by market forces-the
law of supply and demand. Over time, some gestators may be able to com-
mand a premium price because of their successful record in prior surrogate
births. First-timers will necessarily be judged largely by the results of the
program's testing. However, the rules of economics also dictate that the
opportunity costs of gestators will play a major role. Although a woman is
pregnant twenty-four hours a day for nine months, she may do many other
things during pregnancy. Women commonly work right up to the day of
delivery. In any case, many gestators will probably be women who have
low opportunity costs because their other earning opportunities are
limited.82
In addition to receiving compensation for opportunity costs, a gestator
should also be compensated for (1) any medical expenses not covered by the
program's own facilities or her own insurance; (2) her discomfort, pain, and
risk during pregnancy and birth; and (3) interruption of her sexual activ-
ity. 83 The program should also compensate the gestator, her family, or both
in the event of her death or disability during the period of employment.84
The host uterus program would recoup the gestator's compensation and
its other costs by charging fees to the parents who contract for its services.
Among these costs would be: (1) the expenses of any medical facilities and
personnel it maintains or contracts; (2) the expenses of locating and screen-
ing qualified gestators; (3) the fees of attorneys and other consultants; and
(4) the cost of any guarantees the program may give to provide institutional
or other care for children born with impairments.
8 5
81. Levitt, supra note 29, at 476-77.
82. J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 346-47 (1984).
83. If the gestator is married, which will usually be the case, her husband should be a party to
the agreement with the program and should be compensated for interference with his normal
consortium with his wife.
84. This likely could be provided by insurance, perhaps on a group basis.
85. This may also be covered by insurance. See infra part VII.B for further discussion of this
topic.
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Obviously, the fees charged to parents will be quite substantial, often
ranging from $30,000 to $50,000.6 While this will limit the potential de-
mand for gestational surrogacy, it will be partially offset by the parents'
opportunity cost savings. The genetic mother-to-be will be relieved of un-
dergoing pregnancy and childbirth herself. Thus, she can avoid taking time
out from her career and can avoid all the discomfort, inconvenience, and
risk of giving birth to her own child. For many, the net cost will be very
attractive, especially when compared to the present high cost and delay in
adopting a child who would not be genetically related. 7
B. The Agreement
A number of articles list and discuss the specific provisions that should
be included in the agreement among the parents, the gestator, and the host
uterus program."" Because it would serve no purpose to repeat all of that in
this Article, the instant discussion will- be limited to the key issues where
controversial questions will arise and where breaches of the agreement are
most likely to occur.
1. Activities of the Gestator
The agreement will usually provide that the gestator agrees to: (1) visit
the treating physician, chosen by the program, according to a specified
schedule; (2) follow the medical instructions of that physician, including
tests and screening; (3) not smoke tobacco products, drink alcohol, use ille-
gal drugs, or take any medication without the physician's consent; and (4)
submit to medical care or treatment prescribed by the physician. 9 The
agreement should affirmatively list the tests and procedures permitted90 or
list those to which the gestator need not submit. There must be a clear
understanding of this before conception because thereafter the interests of
the parents and the gestator will often conflict. The parents' interest will be
86. Merrick, supra note 13, at 163.
87. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323, 340 (1978).
88. See, e.g., Katie M. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L.
263 (1982); James T. Flaherty, Enforcement of Surrogate Mother Contracts: Case Law, the Uni-
form Acts, and State and Federal Legislation, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 223 (1988); John J. Mandler,
Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73
GEo. L.J. 1283 (1985); David K. Martin, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies
Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601 (1984).
89. Thomas W. Mayo, Medical Decision Making During a Surrogacy Pregnancy, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 599, 620 (1988).
90. Such procedures might include amniocentesis, ultrasonography, drug therapy, blood
transfusions, fetal surgery, and Cesarean delivery. Id. at 627.
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almost exclusively in the child's well-being; they will be interested in the
gestator's health only to the extent that her health will affect the delivery of
a healthy child. While the gestator will want to deliver a healthy baby and
successfully complete her contract, she will not be eager to risk her own life
and health to reduce the chances of the child's death or disability.91 Once
there is a voluntary and knowing agreement on the part of the gestator, any
deviation from or refusal to submit to the prescribed regimen will be prop-
erly treated as a breach of contract.
In most cases, gestators will be willing to follow the requirements of the
agreement, especially if they hope for future employment as a gestator.
When a breach is threatened, or occurs, a court is unlikely to affirmatively
order the gestator to undergo a test or procedure that involves more than a
minimal invasion of her body.92 However, courts are usually much more
willing to issue prohibitory injunctions 93 and might well order the gestator
to stop smoking, drinking, or engaging in other activity that is potentially
harmful to the fetus. In addition to any monetary consequences provided
for in the contract or awarded as damages by a court, any subsequent viola-
tion of the injunction would subject the gestator to sanctions for contempt
of court.
2. Confidentiality
Because the gestator will be an employee of the program, and the par-
ents will be clients of the program, the gestator and parents need not know
each other's identity or ever meet. Parties may be matched by the program
according to their wishes on this subject. Some will be eager to share the
experience of pregnancy and birth and perhaps will have a continuing rela-
tionship thereafter. Others will want total or partial confidentiality and pri-
vacy. There is no right or wrong. The critical thing is to have a clear and
binding agreement, which cannot be modified later without the consent of
all parties.
3. Miscarriage or Stillbirth
In order to receive the full contractual compensation for her services,
the gestator will presumably have to bear and give birth to the child and
deliver the child to the parents. It is sometimes argued that the gestator
91. Id. at 627-28.
92. For example, ordering a cesarean delivery would arguably involve more than a minimal
invasion of the gestator's body.
93. E.g., Lumley v. Wagner, 42 ENG. REP. 687 (Ch. 1852) (enjoining opera singer who re-
fused to perform pursuant to her contract from singing elsewhere; court acknowledged that it
could not compel her to sing).
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should receive a partial or pro-rata payment in the event of miscarriage or
stillbirth. The rationale for this is that she has performed a service by car-
rying the fetus for that period of time. It is further argued that if no pay-
ment is made unless a live baby is delivered to the parents, the transaction is
tantamount to illegal baby-selling. 94 However, as stated earlier, baby-sell-
ing cannot occur in gestational surrogacy because the baby is at all times
the child of the parents. The gestator is being paid to bear and give birth to
the child, deliver the child to the parents, and waive any possible claim to
custody. Under this reasoning, the gestator might logically be denied any
compensation in the event of miscarriage or stillbirth, and the parents may
have no liability. The marketplace often compensates people only for pro-
ducing a desired result, regardless of the time and labor spent. Examples of
this include the farmer whose crop is destroyed by hail just before the har-
vest, the artist whose watercolor is washed out by a flood, and the Ph.D.
candidate whose almost-finished thesis is thrown out by a janitor. All have
expended labor over a long period of time, but will receive no reward. The
potential buyer will not have to pay anything for the fruits of their labor.
Of course, the program may contract to compensate a gestator in case of
miscarriage or stillbirth, especially if it wants to build good will and en-
hance its reputation as a quality operation. The program may either incor-
porate such costs into its overall fee structure or require the parents whose
baby is miscarried or stillborn to pay all or part of the normal fee.
4. Abortion: Permitted? Required?
In most agreements, the gestator will agree not to have an abortion un-
less her treating physician determines that it is necessary for her physical
well-being or that the child is impaired. She will also agree to have an
abortion in the event of either of these two contingencies. Of course, the
agreement may provide that the gestator is not required to abort, if that is
what the parties wish. It also seems wise to give the parents the right to
require an abortion if one of them dies or they become divorced.
While Roe v. Wade9 5 protects a woman's right to have an abortion, that
right may be voluntarily and knowingly waived, just as other constitutional
rights may be waived.96 Having an abortion when prohibited, or refusing to
94. Hill, supra note 25, at 158-59.
95. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
96. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (right to be free from unreasonable
search); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to consult attorney before being ques-
tioned); State v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473 (Ariz. 1969) (right to jury trial), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966
(1970).
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have one when required, will constitute a breach of contract. The gestator
may not change the rules any more than an astronaut may quit during a
mission or a surgeon may walk away during an operation. It is not uncom-
mon for a party to a contract to regret having entered into the agreement,
but the law still provides that contracts voluntarily entered into will be
enforced. 9
7
If the gestator decides to have an unauthorized abortion, the agreement
will probably provide that she will forfeit some or all of her compensation.
It would also seem proper for the parents to be relieved of their financial
obligation and perhaps to also receive some compensation from the pro-
gram for the delay and mental suffering that may ensue.98 Conversely, if
the parents and program want the gestator to have an abortion and she
refuses, the parents should be relieved of any financial and legal obligation
to the child. Custody of the child at birth should vest in either the gestator
or the program, as provided in the agreement. The agreement may also
provide for the child's placement for adoption, or for institutional care, if
necessary. The expenses involved, both present and future, will become
part of the program's overall budget. The expenses will be reflected in com-
pensation and penalties to the gestator and fees charged to satisfied parents.
If the parents, the program, or both determine that an abortion is desir-
able, and the gestator aborts as requested, she should certainly be entitled to
substantial compensation to cover her services for her time involved, her
lost opportunity costs, and her risk and discomfort. The fees charged to the
parents should logically cover this because the parents are exercising a right
to abort in the same way as if the female parent was herself pregnant and
carrying the fetus.
5. Death or Divorce of the Parents
If one parent dies before the child is born, the surviving parent will still
have full custody of the child, just as with the child of a coital conception
and normal birth. If both parents die before the child is born, the parents
should provide for the child's custody and care just as they would for any of
their other children. Of course, if the parents wish, the agreement could
provide for custody of the child to pass to the gestator, or to the program,
which would make the child available for adoption.
97. Hill, supra note 21, at 407.
98. A court is unlikely to award damages for breach of contract, since in purely monetary
terms "not having to raise a child is a financial benefit, not a loss, and intangible values of
parenthood are very difficulty to 'price.'" Natalie Loder Clark, New Wine in Old Skins: Using
Paternity-Suit Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. L. 483, 494 (1986-87).
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The parents should also make a provision in the agreement in case they
are separated or divorced during the pregnancy. They may prefer an abor-
tion in the early months of pregnancy. Further along, the likely options are
that one parent will take custody of the child and relieve the other parent of
all responsibility or that custody will pass to the gestator or the program, as
in the case of death of the parents.
6. After Birth of the Child
The agreement should provide that the gestator and her husband, if any,
agree that they have no parental or custodial rights or obligations to the
child and that the parents will be entitled to immediate physical custody of
the child upon birth.99 The agreement should provide that either the par-
ents or the gestator will be entitled to specific performance, "that is, the
right to have the court order and enforce the delivery of the child [by the
gestator] to the... [p]arents."1 The situation is analogous to commis-
sioning a work of art. While the artist cannot be forced to create the work,
"once it is completed" it belongs to the commissioning party, and the artist
"cannot refuse to deliver it... merely because he wants to keep it. 101
7. If Parents Refuse to Accept the Child
If a healthy child is born, but for some reason the parents refuse to
accept custody, they should certainly be required to pay all fees provided
for in the agreement and other expenses that are incurred until someone
else assumes custody of the child. As in the case of death or divorce of the
parents, the agreement could provide for custody to pass to the gestator or
to the program so that the child may be placed for adoption. There is no
reason to force a healthy child on unwilling parents when others would be
very happy to raise the child.
If the child is impaired in some way, however, the situation is more
difficult. If the impairment is genetic or otherwise not attributable to the
gestator, custody should remain in the parents, just as it would with a child
born naturally to the female parent. As with a natural child, they would
have full legal and financial responsibility for the child. If appropriate, they
would also have to arrange for institutional care.
On the other hand, if the child's impairment results from actions of the
gestator, such as smoking, drinking, or failing to conform to the medical
99. Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L.Q. 123, 130 (1988).
100. d at 133.
101. Lori A. DeMond, The Ongoing Uncertainty of Surrogacy, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 685, 689
n.15 (reviewing FIELD, supra note 58).
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regimen, an instinctive reaction might be that she should be legally and
financially responsible for the child. However, this is not a wise solution.
The gestator has made it clear from the beginning that she does not want or
intend to raise the child even if the child is healthy. Furthermore, she is
unlikely to be in an economic position to provide for an impaired child.
The agreement could certainly provide that the parents assume the risk of
gestator-caused impairments and will accept custody and responsibility in
any case. However, that might create a very resentful atmosphere in which
the child would be raised. It might be best in this situation to provide for
custody to pass to the program, to seek adoption of the child, or to provide
institutional care. Any costs involved would be borne by the program as
part of its overall cost of doing business.
The parents should be allowed to renounce custody of the child only if
the gestator-caused impairment is "serious." The agreement should at-
tempt to define "serious." If either the seriousness of the impairment or its
cause is disputed, the agreement should provide for the issue to be decided
by a medical arbitration panel.
VIII. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. If There Is No Surrogacy Agreement
Even though a statute may require that no surrogacy arrangements may
be undertaken without a written agreement among the parents, gestator,
and host uterus program,1"2 people will violate the law. Thus, it will be
necessary to determine the custody of the child and financial responsibility
for the child when the parties themselves cannot agree. As suggested in
Part VI, a statute should provide that the parents are the legal parents of
the child and are entitled to custody from the moment of his birth."0 3 The
statute should also state that the gestator is not the mother of the child" 4
and has no parental rights or obligations relating to the child. These simple
statutory provisions will eliminate almost all of the disputes that might
otherwise occur. Because the parents will be indisputably entitled to cus-
tody of the child, a court should not hesitate to order the gestator to deliver
102. See supra part VI.
103. See Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-79 (Ct. App. 1991), affid sub nor.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
104. The presumption that the mother of a child "was the one from whose womb the child
came" has been so strong that the law has never felt it necessary to define the word "mother."
Stumpf, supra note 41, at 187 & n.1.
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the child to the parents, just as would be the case in a divorce or other child
custody proceeding in which a court orders someone to deliver a child to
the person(s) having a right of custody.
B. Statutory Provisions Needed to Support a Surrogacy Agreement
1. Inheritance
Probate law generally permits a person conceived before but born after a
parent's death to inherit by will or intestacy."15 Inheritance by a posthu-
mous child born as a result of gestational surrogacy should provoke no
more societal objection than inheritance by a child conceived coitally and
given birth by his genetic mother.
2. Relief from Parental Responsibility
Just as the law imposes no obligation of financial support on a sperm or
egg donor, 10 6 a gestator who makes her womb available to produce a child
for others to raise should be relieved of any financial obligation to the child.
This may be accomplished by so providing in the surrogacy agreement and
by enacting statutes that make such agreements legally binding and enforce-
able. While this will leave a gestator who does not have a formal agreement
exposed to possible financial liability, it is consistent with the strong public
policy requiring formal surrogacy agreements to reduce or eliminate
disputes. 107
3. Confidentiality
Just as in cases of adoption, the parties will usually want confidentiality
in the surrogacy arrangements to protect the child from learning about his
origin from someone other than his parents. The parents should be able to
control "the time and manner in which their child learns of the circum-
stances of [his] birth," when the child is deemed "ready to understand and
benefit from this information."' 018 By the same token, while most gestators
will not try or be able to hide their pregnancy and the fact that they are
serving as gestators, many will want to be sure that they cannot be linked in
105. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150(c) (West 1991).
106. See, eg., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973).
107. See supra part VI.
108. Pamela Smith, Regulating Confidentiality of Surrogacy Records: Lessons from the Adop-
tion Experience, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 65, 95 (1992-93).
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any way to the parents and the child after the birth.10 9 Statutory law
should recognize the general acceptance of a right to privacy in reproduc-
tive matters. The law should provide that all records and documents relat-
ing to a surrogacy arrangement shall be confidential and that only the
parents shall be listed on the birth certificate.
IX. CONCLUSION
The fact that an occasional gestator may regret having to surrender the
child to the parents is not a valid reason to ban the practice or to make such
agreements unenforceable. People often make agreements that they later
regret-marriage, divorce, relinquishment of children for adoption-but so-
ciety continues to permit such practices and enforce such agreements." 0
The law should recognize as legal parents the couple who really want to
have and raise a child because they are as likely to perform well the task of
parenting as any other couple whose child was born in the usual way.
Banning surrogacy will not end the practice; it will simply force it un-
derground, as was the case with abortion in many states prior to Roe v.
Wade."' Gestational surrogacy may be beneficial to all parties involved
and to society. Some states will almost surely allow surrogacy arrange-
ments. Thus, banning the practice in other states will be largely futile be-
cause potential surrogate parents will usually have the means to travel to
and make arrangements in another state."12
Society not only allows women to bear and give birth to children with-
out compensation, it lauds and honors them for doing so. Why should we
deny women the opportunity to earn fair compensation for voluntarily pro-
ducing children for others? Is cleaning houses and offices, providing child
day care, clerking, and waitressing more honorable than bearing and giving
birth to children? Do we prefer to keep women economically dependent
when they could be earning substantial sums doing something that they
want and prefer to do over the other choices available to them? How can it
logically be argued that using one's body to clean bathrooms for pay is
morally permissible, but using one's body to produce a child for others for
pay is not?113
109. Id. at 97.
110. Merrick, supra note 13, at 166.
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
112. Book Note, Selling One's Birth-Rights, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1074, 1076 n.11 (1989) (re-
viewing FIELD, supra note 58).
113. Hill, supra note 21, at 411.
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The benefit of gestational surrogacy to the parents is clear and largely
undisputed. The benefit to the gestator should be just as clear. We should
allow gestational surrogacy to become an accepted and honored profession.

ABORTION, ETHICS, AND THE COMMON
GOOD: WHO ARE WE? WHAT DO WE
WANT? HOW DO WE GET THERE?
ROBERT J. ARAUJO, S.J.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In truth, I am as distressed as the Court is-and expressed my
distress several years ago [in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices] about the "political pressure" directed to the Court: the
marches, the mail, the protests aimed at inducing us to change our
opinions. How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens (good
people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on
various sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should
properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged
not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of
social consensus. The Court would profit, I think, from giving less
attention to the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and more atten-
tion to the cause of it. That cause permeates today's opinion: a new
mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and
traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court
calls "reasoned judgment" .. . which turns out to be nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition.1
"For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today,
the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies.
But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."2
[A]lthough pro-life forces prevail in some states, pro-choice
forces in others, there is no sense in which one can say that the two
sides are holding a dialogue. Because they can see no common
ground, then, there is a political void to match the void in scholar-
ship.... The implication is that the two sides in this battle should
* Lecturer in law at Boston College Law School; A.B. 1970 and J.D. 1973, Georgetown
University; LL.M. 1990 and J.S.D. 1992 Columbia University; M.Div. and S.T.L. 1994, Weston
School of Theology.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
2. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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be talking to each other rather than at or past each other, a lovely
vision of the role of public moral dialogue in the liberal state.'
The starting point for a discussion about abortion ought to be the
frank recognition that the issue is life or death. To abort a fetus is to
kill; to prevent the realization of a human life. But to say that much
is not to answer the moral question involved. We (Americans) have
just completed a war in which we killed many thousands of people,
some of whom were civilians, others of whom were exposed to dan-
ger against their will. That we choose to kill does not make it wrong
on that score alone; but we surely need a vocabulary for talking
about life and death issues in moral terms that underscore the seri-
ousness of any choice for death. Our experience with abortion, and
perhaps with war, suggests that the lack of such a vocabulary will
lead inevitably to excess. Religion has served for many hundreds of
years to offer some hope in the face of despair, to offer life in the face
of inevitable suffering and death. We discard those traditions at our
peril.4
Although the previous remarks originate from different sources, each
involves the issue of human life and the question of abortion in American
society. Each statement also reveals something about different perspectives
concerning the subject of abortion. I believe that each of these statements
provides a different approach for assessing two major components of the
abortion issue. These components are: (1) the ethical issues and (2) the
question of the common good.
Almost twenty years ago in Roe v. Wade,' the American legal and judi-
cial communities, as well as the American public at large, became engaged
in the public debate about the legality of abortion. This debate has not
abated. The subject of abortion continues to raise many critical issues mer-
iting investigation and discussion (for example, whether the fetus is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the U.S. and state constitutions). I shall
examine two areas involving ethics and the common good in the context of
a particular state control on abortion rights. This legislative effort imposes
the modest restrictions of a twenty-four hour waiting period and informed
consent requirements.
In Part II of my investigation, I shall address the medical matters in-
volved. Part III will frame the investigation in the context of the legal is-
3. Stephen L. Carter, Abortion, Absolutism, and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J. 2747, 2749,
2765 (1991) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).
4. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology, and Abor-
tion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1137-38 (1991) (emphasis added).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818
(1992).
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sues. Part IV will investigate the legal questions in the context of principle-
based ethics. Since I find the principle-based ethical approach insufficient, I
will proceed to re-examine the ethical questions in the context of a virtue-
based ethics in Part V. At this stage, I suggest to the reader that a virtue-
based ethics approach effectively raises the subject of the common good that
principle-based ethics do not. Consequently, Part V will look at the ques-
tion of the common good as it relates to informed consent laws regulating
abortion.
II. THE MEDICAL ISSUES AND THEIR EVALUATION
The issue of abortion will often raise questions about the medical status
of the human fetus. An episode of the popular and thought-provoking tele-
vision series Star Trek- The Next Generation6 has Lieutenant Commander
Data, the android science officer, inquiring of the ship's physician, "Doctor,
what is life?" This question is raised when Data discovers that a small,
robotic device has developed the ability to think, reproduce, and protect
itself. We can apply a parallel question to this inquiry emerging from the
investigations of medical ethics and the common good: What is fetal life?
In answering this question, it is helpful to obtain a fundamental under-
standing of human development that begins with the reaction between the
sperm and the ovum. Once the sperm encounters the ovum, the process of
fertilization begins. Fertilization does not take place immediately when the
sperm penetrates the surface of the ovum; it is the beginning of the process
called syngamy during which the sperm completes its penetration and ex-
change with the ovum.7 That stage takes approximately twelve to twenty-
four hours to complete.' At the syngamy stage of development, the result-
ing entity is called a zygote. 9
According to authors Shannon and Wolter, fertilization accomplishes
four things in human embryonic development: (1) It gives the pre-embryo
its own complete set of forty-six chromosomes, (2) it determines chromo-
somal sex, (3) it establishes genetic variability, and (4) it initiates the cell
division of the zygote that is now called the pre-embryo.10 As cell division
6. Star Trek. The Next Generation: The Quality of Life (Syndicated television broadcast, fall
1992).
7. See Thomas A. Shannon & Allen B. Walter, Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-
Embryo, 51 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 603, 607 (1990); see also Bev Rosenwaks & Owen K. Davis, In
Vitro Fertilization and Related Techniques, in DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 821,
831-32 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Shannon & Walter, supra note 7, at 607.
9. Id
10. Id. at 606-07.
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occurs, the pre-embryo travels through the fallopian tube and reaches the
uterus around the sixth or seventh day where it commences the implanta-
tion process.I On or about day fourteen, the implantation process is com-
pleted upon the initiation of "primitive utero-placental circulation."12
Shannon and Wolter also note that the pre-embryo at this stage is still "ca-
pable of dividing into multiple entities," i.e., it can divide into human twins,
triplets, etc. 13 At some point during the third week, the possibility of divi-
sion into multiple entities ceases, and the layering process that results in the
development of tissues and organs of a distinct human entity (the embryo)
begins.14 Moreover, in the third week of development the embryo's "car-
diovascular system reaches a functional state."'15
I return to my variation of Commander Data's question and rephrase it
into the related question: When does human life begin? While recognizing
that disagreements exist among scholars, Shannon and Wolter argue that
once biological development results in the formation of the zygote, there is
"a living entity which has the genotype of the human species." 16 Moreover,
the zygote is the "precursor of all that follows."17 Richard McCormick
acknowledges that the zygote is "a new hereditary constitution" that has
"the potential to become an adult."1" In agreeing with the view of Shannon
and Wolter, McCormick concludes that "developmental individuality or
singleness" is established once the attachment to the uterine wall is com-
pleted.' 9 Shannon, Wolter, and McCormick concur that a distinction must
be made between genetic individuality (the fertilized ovum) and develop-
mental individuality.20 There is some chance that the genetically unique
life implanted on the mother's uterine wall may further divide so that twins,
triplets, or other multiple births will result. However, once human develop-
ment reaches this stage (usually in the third week), when the possibility of
11. Id.
12. Id. at 608 (quoting KEITH L. MOORE, ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 14 (1988)).
13. See id. at 608 (relying on BRUCE CARLSON, PATTEN'S FOUNDATIONS OF EMBRYOLOGY
35 (1988)).
14. Id. at 609 (relying on CARLSON, supra note 13, at 186).
15. Id. at 609 (relying on MOORE, supra note 12, at 24).
16. Id. at 611.
17. Id.
18. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Who or What Is the Preembryo?, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS
J. 1, 3 (1991).
19. Id. at 4.
20. See id. at 4; Shannon & Wolter, supra note 7, at 612-14.
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multiple births ceases, the ontological unity (developmental individuality) of
a distinct human being is established.2"
The reasonable response to the question "when does human life begin?"
is consequently bifurcated: (1) genetically unique human life begins with the
completion of fertilization of the ovum by the sperm (about eighteen to
twenty-four hours after the sperm's initial penetration of the ovum), and (2)
ontologically unique human life begins during the third week after comple-
tion of fertilization. With the completion of fertilization (day one), it may
be said that a genetically unique human entity, distinct from the genotype
of the mother and father, exists. At the conclusion of the third week after
fertilization, there exists an ontologically unique human being who will re-
main distinct from any sibling who may join this human in a multiple birth.
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
The questions of ethics and the common good arise in the context of the
State of Pennsylvania's legislative efforts to impose the modest restriction of
a twenty-four hour waiting period and informed consent requirement on
women who seek an abortion. This legislation was at the center of one of
the major legal issues in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.22 Planned Parenthood challenged the legality of the
informed consent requirement in the Pennsylvania statute on the basis that
it placed illegal burdens on a woman seeking an abortion.23 Justices
21. See Shannon & Wolter, supra note 7, at 612, 622 (relying on NORMAN M. FORD, WHEN
DID I BEGIN?. CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL IN HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCI-
ENCE 158, 212 (1988)).
22. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
23. Id. The relevant portions of the statute read in part:
(a) General Rule.-No abortion shall be performed or induced except with the volun-
tary and informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or
induced. Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion is voluntary
and informed if and only if-
(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the
abortion or the referring physician has orally informed the woman of:
(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and the risk and
alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider mate-
rial to the decision of whether or not to undergo the abortion.
(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abor-
tion is to be performed.
(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.
(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the
abortion or the referring physician, or a qualified physician assistant, health care practi-
tioner, technician or social worker to whom the responsibility has been delegated by either
physician, has informed the pregnant woman that:
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O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter24 along with Justices Scalia, White,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist25 agreed that the informed consent
requirement was valid, and voted to uphold it. Only Justices Stevens and
Blackmun believed that the informed consent provision constituted an "un-
due burden" on the pregnant woman, and therefore should have invalidated
the provision.26 Until new Justices are appointed to the Court, it is unlikely
that the present Court will revoke a similar informed consent require-
ment.27 In order to assess the ethical questions and the subjects of the com-
mon good that evolve from the Casey decision, it is essential to obtain a
general understanding of Roe v. Wade,28 the abortion case that paved the
way for virtually all legal discussion on this topic for over the last twenty
years.
(i) The department publishes printed materials which describe the unborn
child and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to
review the printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of charge if she
chooses to review it.
(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, child-
birth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such
assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the department.
(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her
child, even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape,
this information may be omitted.
(3) A copy of the printed materials has been provided to the woman if she
chooses to view these materials.
(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing, prior to the abortion, that the infor-
mation required to be provided under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) has been provided.
(b) Emergency.- Where a medical emergency compels the performance of an abor-
tion, the physician shall inform the woman, prior to the abortion if possible, of the medical
indications supporting his judgment that an abortion is necessary to avert her death or to
avert substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily functions.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West Supp. 1990).
In the definitions contained in § 3203, a "medical emergency" is defined as:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so com-
plicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abor-
tion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West Supp. 1990).
24. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
25. Id. at 2855, 2868 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 2843, 2852 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 8, 1992, at A22. A group of Mississippi physicians challenged their state's informed consent
statute, which paralleled the Pennsylvania statute reviewed in Casey. Id. In the Mississippi case,
Barnes v. Moore, No. 92-588, the physicians alleged an "undue burden" existed because the rural
nature of Mississippi and the location of abortion clinics in only two counties presented "logistical
problems" that exacerbated the requirements of the waiting period. Id.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
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Under the framework of Roe, the legal questions of abortion in the
United States are usually framed by two main issues: (1) the privacy right of
the individual woman29 to bodily and reproductive autonomy and (2) the
state's interest to protect developing (fetal) human life.30 Although I shall
examine more fully the competition between these two positions in my sub-
sequent discussion of the common good in Part VI, it is important to re-
count what the Supreme Court actually said about abortion rights in Roe.
The majority31 of the Court constructed a compromise position giving "the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient," the right to terminate
the pregnancy during the first trimester without "regulation by the state."'32
The majority's recognition of the physician-patient consultation reveals
some understanding about the process of informed consent pertaining to
abortion.
The majority did not accept the argument of the appellant Roe (Norma
McCorvey) 33 that "she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses."34 Roe
established the rule that the qualified right to abort the fetus during the first
trimester belongs to the pregnant woman's physician, not to the woman
herself. If the woman has a right to an abortion, it is based on the physi-
cian's right, which in turn is established by the physician's medicaljudg-
ment that an abortion should be performed. The woman's right, in short, is
qualified by the physician's right; her right is conditioned by and dependent
on the physician's right. Under Roe, the woman has no right to an abortion
that is independent of the physician's determination as based on his or her
"medical opinion."
Curiously, as the subject of abortion rights continued to be litigated in
succeeding cases, this crucial holding in Roe (i.e., the legality of an abortion
is "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision" for which the basic re-
sponsibility "must rest with the physician") began to blur.35
29. Under Roe, the right is actually that of the doctor; however, it has been extended to the
woman in other cases. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
31. The majority opinion was subscribed to by Justices Blackmun (who wrote the opinion),
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented.
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
33. See E.J. Dione, Jr., On Both Sides, Advocates Predict a 50-State Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1989, at All.
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. To put any doubt of this to rest, Chief Justice Burger, who joined
the majority in Roe, stated in his concurring opinion in the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 208 (1973), that "[p]lainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution
requires abortions on demand."
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
19931
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
By the time Webster36 and Casey were decided, Justice Blackmun had
departed from the original premise upon which judicially declared abortion
rights had been established. In Webster, Justice Blackmun opined in the
first paragraph of his separate opinion (joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall) that "[tioday, Roe v. Wade, ... and the fundamental constitu-
tional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive
but are not secure."37 One earlier indication that some members of the
Court were gradually expanding the qualified abortion rights established in
Roe came in 1986 in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists.3" As he did in Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority
of the Court. In his Thornburgh opinion, he stated, "Again today, we reaf-
firm the general principles laid down in Roe."'39 And what might those
principles be? Justice Blackmun redefined them as including "the constitu-
tional principles.., for recognizing the constitutional dimensions of a wo-
man's right to decide whether to end her pregnancy."' Although he joined
the majority in Roe, Chief Justice Burger noted the substantive change in
what the Court held in Thornburgh to be the woman's right-a right that
became more distant from the one in Roe because it became independent of
the physician's limited right.
The Chief Justice, noting this significant development and departure
from Roe, dissented in Thornburgh:
I based my concurring statements in Roe... on the principle ex-
pressed in the Court's opinion in Roe that the right to an abortion
"is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." In short, every Member of the Roe Court
rejected the idea of abortion on demand. The Court's opinion today,
however, plainly undermines that important principle ......
In spite of this acknowledgment of what Roe stood for-and, perhaps more
important, does not stand for-Justice Blackmun complained that the plu-
rality decision in Webster sympathized with those individuals who "would
do away with Roe explicitly."'42 A major part of Justice Blackmun's con-
cern was that the Webster plurality is "oblivious or insensitive to the fact
36. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
37. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
38. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2823 (1992).
39. Id. at 759.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55).
42. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 76:701
ABORTION, ETHICS, AND THE COMMON GOOD
that millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives around
the right to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the
full participation of women in the economic and political walks of American
life "' Justice Blackmun also exemplified the altered understanding of Roe
when he concluded the dissenting portion of his opinion with a warning:
"For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the
women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the
signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."" Justice
Blackmun, in short, took the dependent right of the woman and made it
independent of the physician's right. This was an unwarranted extension of
the Roe compromise about which Chief Justice Burger warned in his
Thornburgh dissent.
But the legal turmoil about what was decided in Roe and what rights
that decision conferred did not stop in 1989 with Webster. It continued in
Casey.4 While my principal examination and analysis of the Casey decision
involving the informed consent requirement will occur in Part V, I raise
here the highlights of this case that are relevant to the discussion thus far.
In Casey, Justice Blackmun initiated a new line of discussion in the Roe
context when he presented his "steadfast... belief that the right to repro-
ductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before
Webster."'  He pointed out that the Court reaffirmed "the long recognized
rights of privacy and bodily integrity" with judicial precedent dating back
to 1891. 47 But Justice Blackmun again departed from the discussion of the
attending physician's rights of Roe when he argued in Casey that "continua-
tion of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity" and
that the restrictions on terminating a pregnancy imposed by the Penn-
sylvania informed consent law "deprive[ ] a woman of the right to make her
own decisions about reproduction and family planning."48 Conspicuous by
its absence from Justice Blackmun's discussion was any reaffirmation of the
attending physician's exercise of medical judgment, which constituted the
heart of the legality of a first trimester abortion under Roe.
Justice Stevens made an interesting observation at the outset of his con-
curring and dissenting opinion in Casey when he stated that "[tihe societal
costs of overruling Roe at this late date would be enormous. Roe is an
integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and
43. Id. at 557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the basic equality of men and women."4 9 Absent from his discussion was
the crucial language establishing that the woman's abortion rights were de-
fined by and dependent on the qualified physician's rights, which had to be
substantiated by the physician's medical judgment, not by concern for gen-
der equality or "reproductive autonomy."50 The fundamental holding of
Roe that the permissibility of a first trimester abortion is based on the at-
tending physician's professional medical judgment has, in the understand-
ing of some of the Justices (and many abortion advocates), been supplanted
by a new doctrine: "[A] woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is
nothing less than a matter of conscience."51
As an aside, it should be noted that matters of conscience that emerge
from religious belief are, in the minds of Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
inappropriate because of the Establishment Clause prohibition of the First
Amendment. 2 It can, of course, be argued that the kinds of activities or
beliefs that concern these two members of the Court could well be protected
by the Free Exercise Clause. I submit that the concern of these two mem-
bers of the Court about the establishment question is unfounded. Religious
as well as secular members of American society share moral views on im-
portant topics such as abortion, war, the environment, discrimination, and
health care. Laurence Tribe,5 3 Michael Perry,54 Ruth Colker,55 and Eliza-
49. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Justice Stevens opined that the adoption of views which parallel those of religious groups
would constitute an unlawful establishment of religion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2839 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
568 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
53. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990).
54. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 116-19 (1991).
55. See generally Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989). While I do not agree with all of Colker's positions, I
join her concern about the need for dialogue among those who hold opposing views on the subject
of abortion. Neither the bombing of clinics nor the persecution of peaceful pro-life demonstrators
helps the cause of rational and civil discourse that is sorely needed to protect all human life. Such
discourse is essential, I believe, to moral resolution of the questions surrounding abortion. I note
with both sadness and concern that Colker has expressed certain opinions about some of my own
views published elsewhere. In her article An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproduc-
tive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 328 n.15, she argues that I
have offered "an especially insensitive account of the impact of reproductive decisions on women's
lives." In writing my article Fetal Jurisprudence-A Debate in the Abstract, 33 CATH. LAW. 203
(1990), I wrote about the subject of abortion from the perspective of fetal interests. Considering
the plethora of articles addressing the subject from a woman's perspective, I considered it respon-
sible then, as I do now, to contribute to the debate arguing fetal interests, which have been
presented less frequently. It should be kept in mind that the views of some pro-abortion advo-
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beth Mensch and Alan Freeman56 generally agree that involvement by reli-
gious groups in the public debate on abortion and other important issues,
and the government's adoption of some of their views, do not automatically
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.17 I maintain, as do these
authors, that individuals and groups who speak out of their religious con-
victions permissibly contribute to the formation of the public conscience on
questions containing moral implications.58 It is the "matter of conscience"
raised by Justice Stevens that prompts an investigation at this stage into the
ethical questions surrounding the informed consent provision. I propose to
examine initially the ethical questions associated with the issue from the
basis of principles. These principles are four in number: (1) autonomy,
(2) nonmaleficence, (3) beneficence, and (4) justice. Ultimately, I conclude
in Part IV that these principles fail to adequately address the ethical issues
concerning abortion. They leave a void in the discourse of the ethical con-
siderations about abortion. Consequently, I re-examine in Part V these eth-
ical questions about abortion-in light of the specific issue of informed
consent-within the framework of virtue ethics. I shall find that an ethics
cates, while sensitive to the interests of women, can be construed as being "insensitive" to the
fetus. I do not find that tacking this or any label on those with whom Colker or I do not share
outlooks productive in reconciling the opposing views involved in the debate about human abor-
tion. To suggest that I am "insensitive" comes as an unwelcome and unjustified surprise. The
remark that my article may be "insensitive" fails to acknowledge that, in addition to presenting
the interests of the fetus, I also addressed the interest of the woman. I pointed out that "there is a
second entity who shares with the woman the interest of self-preservation and further develop-
ment." Id. at 230. I would not want any reader of Colker's work or mine to forget that I raised
the obligations that our society has to care for both the woman and the fetus. Many of the
problems surrounding this difficult question have devastating consequences for both the mother
and the fetus. Moreover, these problems contribute to the tragedy
which has much to do with the ability or inability of our society to treat its current and
future members in a humane way that guarantees all members of the human race those
essentials of a productive human life.... The solution to the problem is not the taking of
life. Rather, the solution is making available that which life needs, the essential goods and
services that cultivate productive lives and promote human flourishing.
Id. at 233 (emphasis added). My position is that the life and flourishing interests of the woman
are important, as are those of the fetus. Colker's further remarks about the "abstract" argument
and my hiding behind "a veil of ignorance" are misplaced. The use of the word abstract in the
title was chosen to indicate that the debate between two advocateswas abstract, Le., it really did
not take place; however, the issues that they discuss and debate are real. The suggestion that I am
"hiding behind a veil of ignorance" is unfortunate, particularly in view of my recognition that the
question of life and human flourishing extends to both the woman and the child she bears.
56. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1102.
57. I have treated this subject in much greater detail elsewhere. See Robert Araujo, S.J., A
Dialogue Between the Church and Caesar: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Religion Clauses,
34 B.C. L. REV. 493 (1993).
58. See also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6,
227-28 (1988).
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based on virtue rather than principles leads to a fuller, better understanding
of moral concerns associated with the informed consent regulation of abor-
tion. Moreover, it is from the context of virtue ethics that we begin to see
the subject of the common good as it surfaces from the legal and moral
questions that extend from informed consent regulations.
IV. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE REGULATION OF ABORTION
At the outset of this portion of the discussion, I acknowledge that there
are attractive elements of a principle-based ethical theory. Specific attrac-
tions will emerge from the examination of the four principles that I have
outlined at the conclusion of Part III. Both principle-based and virtue-
based ethical theories generally share a common element: justice. I suggest
at this point in my discussion that the component of justice in ethical theo-
ries, as well as the search for justice in practice, brings us to a more effective
understanding of how virtue-based ethics can raise our consciousness about
the common good. In turn, an examination of the common good can pro-
vide American society of the late twentieth century with a desirable means
of minimizing the entrenched, absolute positions that emerge from many
ardent pro-choice and pro-life proponents. In short, I suggest here that a
virtue-based ethics theory applied to informed consent abortion regulation
can, at this stage in the national debate of a difficult issue, provide hope not
only for minimizing conflict but also maximizing the opportunity of achiev-
ing the good for all concerned with the question of abortion. I now turn to
my examination of the first ethical principle: autonomy.
A. The Principle of Autonomy
The principle of autonomy can theoretically be defined as "self rule."
The notion of autonomy is based on the Greek roots autos (self) and nomos
(rule).5 9 In the context of biomedical ethics, autonomy can be viewed as the
principle based on "reflective individual choice" that is sometimes qualified
by an authority (e.g., a combination of professional medical advice and legal
responsibilities, or by "tradition, or social morality").6" In general, author-
ity does not constrain autonomous decision-making.6 It is important to
recognize that informed consent is a crucial component of the exercise of
autonomy by individuals making medical and health care decisions.62 A
59. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67
(1989).
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id. at 74.
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decision made by a patient is not considered to be autonomous if compre-
hensive disclosures about medical procedures and their known effects are
not made, if there is inadequate understanding about the information de-
rived from these disclosures by the person making the autonomous deci-
sion, if the decision is not voluntary, and if the person lacks the requisite
competence to make the decision.63 In the context of abortion, a variety of
attitudes about autonomy prevail.
In Roe, while there was some discussion about the relationship between
the woman and the attending physician (which may suggest the need for
informed consent before an abortion can be performed), the privacy lan-
guage that permeates the decision can insulate the woman's autonomy from
review by those people (for example, the state) who see a need to protect the
interests of the fetus and balance them against those of the pregnant wo-
man." If we see a need to question the woman's autonomous decision to
have an abortion and this autonomy's independence from the fetus's inter-
ests, we need only re-examine some of the judicial discussion in Casey65 or
Webster66 in which the woman's autonomy is insulated from most external
controls. In reviewing the nature of a woman's autonomy to abort her
child, investigators have arrived at a variety of conclusions about the nature
and extent of her autonomy.
James Gustafson, while generally favoring protection of human fetuses
from abortion,67 is willing to grant the pregnant woman who is the victim of
"sexual crime" the right to abort the fetus if she is "convinced" that it is
"right" to do so.68 Gustafson believes that moralists must honor a woman's
"personal responsibility"; consequently, in his estimation, she cannot be co-
erced into making a decision that contravenes her own sense of responsibil-
ity. Any concern about the extent to which the woman's autonomy can be
detrimental to the genetic and ontological existence of the fetus is elimi-
nated in the absolute case made for a woman's autonomy by Mary Anne
63. Id. at 78-79. Beauchamp and Childress organize the informed consent process by group-
ing the components under three categories: (1) Threshold element concerns competence, (2) in-
formation elements include (a) disclosure of information and (b) the understanding of that
information, and (3) the consent elements consist of (a) voluntariness and (b) authorization. Id. at
79.
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
65. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, Brennan, &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. James M. Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION:
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 101, 112 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
68. Id. at 116.
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Warren. 69 By excluding the fetus as a member of the human community,
Warren argues that the pregnant woman has the moral ability and auton-
omy "to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life, by termi-
nating an unwanted pregnancy" and that this right "will always override
whatever right to life it may be appropriate to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully
developed one." 0
So far, the concerns about autonomy focus on its exercise by the preg-
nant woman. However, the Catholic Church, through its Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), has addressed the principle of autonomy
in a different way. The CDF views this issue quite broadly by looking at
every human's autonomy-the pregnant woman or the fetus. The Church
constructs its understanding about human autonomy in the context of the
human right to life. The right to life is, for the Church, a fundamental
principle, the "condition of all others," because:
It does not belong to society, nor does it belong to public authority
in any form to recognize this right for some and not for others: all
discrimination is evil, whether it be founded on race, sex, colour, or
religion. It is not recognition by another that constitutes this right.
This right is antecedent to its recognition; it demands recognition
and it is strictly unjust to refuse it.71
With the exception of the CDF's understanding of autonomy in the con-
text of abortion, each of the other views already mentioned looks at the
subject from the perspective of the woman and--depending on the sur-
rounding circumstances-her autonomous choice to abort a pregnancy with
little or no objection from anyone else. On the other hand, the CDF's view
can, even in situations when the mother's life is threatened by the fetus,
allow the "autonomy" of the fetus to trump the "autonomy" of the mother.
We begin to see how the exercise of autonomy can adversely affect the inter-
ests of others. For example, the absolute exercise of the woman's auton-
omy, which Warren is willing to grant, can bring great harm to the fetus by
prejudicing its right to live. On the other hand, the CDF's position does
not address the difficult case of the harm that the pregnant woman faces
when her health is prejudiced by the continued presence of the fetus.72
69. Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43 (1973),
reprinted in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 464-69 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty eds, 2d ed.
1986).
70. Id. at 469 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Quaestiode Abortu, in VATICAN
COUNCIL II: MORE POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 441, 445 (1982) [hereinafter Declaration on
Procured Abortion].
72. This statement is not to be construed as a justification to abort the pregnancy when the
mother's life is threatened.
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Those of us interested in applying ethics to the question of abortion should
also be concerned with the harm to another that the exercise of autonomy
can produce. While we may disagree on which harms are to be avoided and
whose interests are to be protected, we probably agree that harm is to be
avoided. Consequently, I shall turn to the principle of nonmaleficence and
the contribution it makes to this segment of my investigation.
B. The Principle of Nonmaleficence
Put simply, the principle of nonmaleficence means do no harm.7 3 On
first examination, the norm of avoiding harm seems rather attractive. Most
ethical persons harbor the general notion that no one should harm another.
However, an examination of authors who treat this principle reveals that
this principle, while attractive by itself, raises questions about the contribu-
tions it can make to ethical discourse concerning abortion when we realize
that it inadequately deals with the underlying question of: Who is harmed?
For example, in the majority opinion in Roe, the Court pointed to the
harm that the woman may face if her pregnancy is to continue.74 Within a
narrow application of the principle of nonmaleficence, it might be ethical to
abort the fetus in order to prohibit harm to the woman if she is endangered
by the pregnancy. However, the Roe majority opinion failed to reconcile the
harm that the aborted fetus will permanently suffer if removed from the
mother's womb by the abortion. James Gustafson presents the case in
which the pregnancy is the result of the woman's gang rape by her es-
tranged husband and his accomplices; but like the majority in Roe, Gustaf-
son is more concerned about avoiding harm to the woman than harm to the
fetus.75 Warren's concern about avoiding harm is focused solely on the
pregnant woman: The only harm to be avoided is the harm that may befall
her (the prejudice and harm that befalls the fetus-while perhaps unfortu-
nate-is inconsequential).7 6 The view of Warren is countered by the CDF,
which acknowledges the irreversible harm suffered by the fetus during an
abortion. The CDF contends that the harm to the fetus can only be
avoided through the prohibition of abortion.77 But just as Warren is not
73. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 120, 194.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
75. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 107, 116.
76. Warren, supra note 69, at 469.
77. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 443-44. In his encyclical letter,
Humanae Vitae (Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Births), in VATICAN COUNCIL II: MORE
POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 404 (1982), Pope Paul VI urged the principle of doing no harm to
human procreation by avoiding the direct interruption of the generative process.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
concerned about the harm done to the fetus, the CDF does not address the
harm that may be suffered by the continuation of a life-threatening
pregnancy.
As admirable as the principle of avoiding harm is, it does have limita-
tions-particularly when it is only applied to one interest (that of the preg-
nant woman or the fetus) but not both. What constitutes the avoidance of
harm for one (and therefore good for the protection of that individual's
interests) may be prejudicial to the other. Thus, if we turn to the positive
effort to do good (as opposed to the avoidance of doing harm), we might
obtain a better principle to address the question of abortion.
C. The Principle of Beneficence
Beneficence is the affirmative course of action one takes to do and
achieve good. It "require[s] positive acts to assist others."78 Beauchamp
and Childress suggest that beneficence has two components. The first is a
positive component that mandates "the provision of benefits (including the
prevention and removal of harm as well as the promotion of welfare)." 7 9
The second element is the utilitarian component of beneficence that "re-
quires a balancing of benefits and harms."80 Whereas nonmaleficence re-
quires that a person refrain from doing something (i.e., harm), beneficence
imposes an affirmative obligation to take some action that will achieve a
desirable, good result.8" The obligation exists even when there is no legal
obligation to do so.82 How is the principle of beneficence applied in the
literature that I have been using concerning the topic of abortion?
In the Roe majority opinion, there is a weak form of beneficence defined
and applied in the context of giving the physician the legal protection from
prosecution when he or she performs a first trimester abortion that is justi-
fied by his or her medical opinion. 3 A contradiction immediately surfaces
in the application of the beneficence principle because the effort by the phy-
sician to do good for the pregnant woman harms the fetus. This contradic-
tion also appears in the example developed by Gustafson when action is
78. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 194.
79. Id. at 195.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 198.
82. Id. at 205; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 16-88 (1991) (discussing a moral obligation to take action like the Good
Samaritan even though there is no legal obligation to do so).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
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taken to help the woman who has been gang raped. 4 The obligation to do
what is good for the woman is highly prejudicial to the fetus. The strong
obligation that emerges from Warren's notion of beneficence to do whatever
is necessary to help the woman simultaneously supplies the harm that the
fetus will suffer from the obligation to terminate the ptegnancy.85
Interestingly, the CDF acknowledges that there may be some kind of
obligation to assist a pregnant woman when it mentions the need "to free
[women] from all unjust discrimination."86 However, the CDF simultane-
ously imposes an absolute obligation to do good for the fetus by pointing
out that discrimination against the fetus must be combatted by banning
abortion.8 7 Beauchamp and Childress observe that the exercise of benefi-
cence can be paternalistic and thereby conflict with the exercise of auton-
omy."8 In other words, the obligation to protect the fetus as advocated by
the CDF constitutes a form of paternalism89 that challenges the first trimes-
ter autonomy of the attending physician and her patient by imposing an
absolute obligation to protect the fetus from the discrimination of abortion.
Again, we see that the good that comes from one kind of beneficence
may conflict with the good that comes from obligations imposed by other
applications of beneficence. Do principle-based ethics offer any resolution
of these competing efforts to seek different goods? Perhaps the principle of
justice might offer some help, if not a solution, to this predicament that
emerges from the applications of the first three principles.
D. The Principle of Justice
Justice has been understood through a wide range of definitions. For
Socrates, it was The Good.90 For Aristotle, it included true friendship. 91
For Mill, it was the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the largest
number.92 For H.L.A. Hart, justice is treating like cases alike.93 For
84. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 116.
85. Warren, supra note 69, at 469; see also Judith J. Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL.
& PUB. AFt. 47 (1971).
86. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 446.
87. Id. at 445.
88. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 209-27.
89. Id. at 218-19.
90. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Desmond Lee trans., 1974).
91. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 502 (Richard Mc-
Keon ed., Modem Library 1992) (1947).
92. JOHN S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: ETHICAL,
POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS 321, 335 (1961).
93. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961).
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Rawls, it is the exercise of fairness.94 For John Finnis, justice is, among
other things, the realization of basic human goods for one's self as well as
for others.95 Others have seen justice as a synthesis of rewards, punish-
ments, and entitlements.96 Hart's understanding of justice (like cases being
treated alike, different cases being treated differently) constitutes what has
been termed as "formal justice." Thomas Aquinas identified several types
of justice: (1) the private arrangement between two parties may be under-
stood as "commutative justice"; (2) the just distribution of goods, services,
etc. based on needs is "distributive justice." '97 One other type of justice
referred to by commentators is social or general justice: the proper order-
ing of society to minimize and eliminate conflict so that individuals and
groups are treated with the respect and dignity that would be accorded
every other individual and group.98
In turning to the sources cited earlier to develop the first three ethical
principles, we see a variety of understandings of justice used to reconcile the
conflicts that emerge from the practice of abortion. In Roe, the majority
attempted to resolve the conflict by working out a type of calculus in which
the direct rights of the attending physician and the dependent rights of the
woman were given prominence in the first trimester of pregnancy. In the
final trimester, the state was given the preference by being able to regulate
abortion so as to protect fetal life. The middle trimester became a ground
for weighing the two interests and reaching some kind of compromise be-
tween them.99
Gustafson prefers to protect fetal life."° However, while "[life is to be
preserved rather than destroyed" and those "who cannot assert their own
rights to life are especially to be protected," there are exceptions to this
rule. 1' For Gustafson, justice might recognize the following exceptions to
the general rule: (1) "medical indications" mandate a therapeutic abortion;
(2) the pregnancy is the result of a "social crime"; and (3) "sexual and
94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971).
95. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 161 (1980).
96. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 257.
97. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Question 61, Of Commutative and Dis-
tributive Justice (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1920).
98. Id. Question 58, Of Commutative and Distributive Justice, art. 5 (Whether Justice is a
General Virtue?).
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
100. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 112.
101. Id. at 116.
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emotional conditions do not appear to be beneficial for the well-being of the
mother and child."1 °2
Since Warren asserts an absolute right of the pregnant woman to termi-
nate the pregnancy at any time, no conflict can arise challenging the wo-
man's right. If a conflict were to arise, justice would simply require
whatever is necessary to protect the woman's absolute right. Any challenge
to her right, according to Warren, would lose.
On the other hand, the CDF recognizes that "civil law cannot expect to
cover the whole field of morality or to punish all faults .... It must often
tolerate what is in fact a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one." 
10 3
While stating that abortion can never be approved, "political action" ought
to be taken to "combat its causes" in a charitable fashion that deals effec-
tively with the human sorrow and misery that accompany those who are
most involved." 4 I consider that the position of the CDF is charitable to-
ward and understanding of the interest of the pregnant woman for whom
the pregnancy creates major, possibly even life-threatening problems. Indi-
viduals, communities, and, more formally, the state through its lawmakers
are called upon by the CDF's justice principle to help and improve these
difficult situations.105 Yet, when all is said and done, both politically and
legally, the CDF reiterates that "the life of the child takes precedence over
all opinions . .. [and o]ne cannot invoke freedom of thought to destroy
life."106 Just as Warren makes the interest of the pregnant woman absolute,
the CDF makes just as absolute the position of the fetus. The positions
taken by Warren and the CDF mark the outer boundaries of the rights that
are in conflict, but neither position can really deal with the other and reach
a solution that the other side can view as just.
Does the theory of justice espoused by either the CDF or Warren (or for
that matter, the majority opinion in Roe or the position of Gustafson) really
reconcile the conflict so that the other party or side also receives the respect
and dignity that it desires? My answer is probably not. Our civil legal
system of rules and the judgments based on those rules make winners and
losers. In the questions about life that the pregnant woman and the fetus
face, the application of rules and the judgments supplied by them will often
result in one party being the winner and the other party being the loser.
102. Id.
103. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448.
104. Id. at 450.
105. Id. at 448-49.
106. Id.
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Infrequently, a compromise may be arrived at which gives both parties the
decision they seek.
Does this mean that there is no adequate solution founded on principle-
based ethics that can give the pregnant woman and the fetus the justice they
deserve? The conflicts between principle-based arguments advanced by the
woman or on behalf of the fetus suggest not. My point here is not to re-
make a principle-based ethical system that will provide such justice. The
task would be Herculean. Rather, I propose to look for the answer to this
conflict of absolutes'0 7 in a virtue-based ethical system, for I believe that
virtue-based ethics is an appropriate realm within which we might find a
more satisfactory solution to the question of abortion. The transition be-
tween principles-based ethics and virtue-based ethics is the concept of jus-
tice that is a component of both ethical systems. Thus, I now turn to the
contribution virtue ethics can make to the question I have been examining.
I suggest at this stage that the development of a virtue ethics will offer a
better way of addressing the issue of abortion. Moreover, it should provide
a consistent and coherent approach to dealing with the important issues and
interests at stake. Perhaps above all else, virtue ethics will-unlike princi-
ple-based ethics-consider more comprehensively the spectrum of interests
and experiences at stake in the matter of abortion.
V. VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE REGULATION OF ABORTION
The title of this Article raises three questions: (1) Who are we? (2) What
do we want? (3) How do we get there? These questions are derived from
Alasdair MacIntyre's seminal work, After Virtue."°' If the function of eth-
ics is to guide us toward right action,10 9 virtue ethics engages us as moral
agents who are seeking to make ourselves better moral agents in the fu-
ture.110 At the heart of both the future of the moral agent and the second
question posed by MacIntyre (i.e., where do we want to go?, or, what do we
want?) is a goal, a telos. 1' As James Keenan stresses, "[o]nly in virtue
ethics is a telos constitutive of method; no other ethical system can make
107. See generally TRIBE, supra note 53.
108. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
109. See James F. Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: Making a Case as It Comes of Age, 67
THOUGHT 115 (1992).
110. Id. at 116.
111. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 189. "[There is a telos which transcends the limited
goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life
conceived as a unity .... Id.; see Keenan, supra note 109, at 120, 123; Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., An
Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT 158, 159 (1992).
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that claim.""1 2 Because we as individual humans are also social beings
whose existence is grounded in relationships with others, the concept of the
telos helps us to understand better the question advanced by MacIntyre
(Le., where do we want to go?) by placing it into a communal setting. 113
Joseph Kotva has argued that the telos of a virtue ethic is inextricably
intertwined with the means to achieve the goal because: (1) the means move
us toward a better understanding of the end; (2) the end concerns the for-
mation of a specific kind of self; and (3) the end concerns the formation of a
specific kind of society, and societies stipulate role-specific behavior." 4
In the context of the question of abortion, Kotva points out that for
some individuals, the kind of person each of us is molds the kind of moral
questions we face. 1 5 He illustrates his point with the example that the
"question of the moral appropriateness of aborting a defective fetus never
occurs to some people[; t]hey simply proceed to have and raise the
child.""' 6 His observation and conclusion suggest that the practice of vir-
tue ethics acknowledges the sense of "otherness"; that is, in making moral
decisions about who we are and what our goal is and what means we use to
get there, we necessarily think of other individuals as we work toward the
goal. The practice of virtue ethics can therefore be based on a sense of
community, on an awareness of relationship with others.
Mary Ann Glendon has recognized and addressed this discovery in the
context of the Roe decision. While the rhetoric -of the majority opinion
focused on the individual (Le., the attending physician or the pregnant wo-
man, and the individual's right to privacy)," 7 Glendon expresses her con-
cern that the interests of the other-that the concerns of the community
most involved with pregnancy and the legality and morality of abortion-
are ignored. She addresses this lacuna by stating:
The voice we hear in the Supreme Court's abortion narrative-
presenting us with the image of the pregnant woman as autonomous,
separate, and distinct from the father of the unborn child (and from
112. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123.
113. I have developed the idea of a telos underlying the social institution of law elsewhere.
See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Teleology of Law: Citizenship and Discipleship, 35 CATH. LAW. 57
(1992).
114. Kotva, supra note 111, at 159. As Kotva further suggests, "the means cannot be sepa-
rated from the end because the means are central to the end. A telos which embodies the virtues
of justice, courage, and fidelity cannot be severed from acts and social arrangements that are just,
courageous, and faithful." Id. at 160.
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id.
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
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her parents if she is a minor), and insulated from the larger society
which is not permitted even to try to dissuade her or ask her to wait
to get counseling, information, or assistance-is more distinctively
American... in its lonely individualism and libertarianism. I8
Professor Glendon has identified the problem with the ethical principles
of Roe by suggesting that insulating individuals from one another is not a
desirable way of addressing the vital question of whether a woman should
have an abortion. Glendon refers to those other individuals who can help
the pregnant woman, the fetus, and society at large if they are permitted to
participate in the deliberation. The Pennsylvania informed consent regula-
tion enables and encourages such participation. In short, Glendon's insight
identifies the core problem with the ethics of Roe. She offers a practical
solution to the problem of the insulation of the woman prompted by Roe.
In her text, she suggests a goal (which includes individuals becoming less
isolated and more community oriented) and the means to reach the goal
(how do we get there?).
At the end of my discussion on principle-based ethics I indicated that
the element of justice is a part of both principle ethics and virtue ethics.
Since justice is related to both ethical systems, I shall now address it in the
context of a virtue-based system. I also mention here that virtue ethics en-
compasses several other considerations, including the virtues of prudence,
courage, and wisdom, all of which will be addressed shortly." 9
Within the privacy rights rhetoric of Roe and the Blackmun-Stevens
opinions in Casey and Webster, the kind of justice that emerges has lost a
good deal of its goal-oriented function. The language about "justice" that
results is narrowly focused on addressing and protecting the act of abortion
on the grounds of protecting individual rights and privacy. As Glendon
points out, the social, communal, and teleological components of duties that
are the correlatives of rights are not discussed. She correctly argues that
these components are essential to deal justly with the urgent matter of abor-
tion, which has, in the American context, been cloaked with the absolute
rights of privacy, individual autonomy, and isolation. 20 To balance the
excessive and narrow focus on the rights that emerge from the principle of
autonomy, Glendon draws attention to the importance of understanding
the needs of all the parties involved: the pregnant woman, the fetus, and
118. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 52 (1987).
119. See MACINTYRE, supra note 108. The author defines a virtue as "an acquired humhn
quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are
internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods."
Id. at 178.
120. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 38.
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the community. She further suggests that a just resolution of the difficult
questions raised by abortion rests in the development, adoption, and the
sustaining of policies that encourage child bearing and the protection of
fetal life. 21 While the interests of the fetus are protected under Glendon's
proposal, the mother is also helped with concrete programs that give her
counselling, health care for herself and her child, and other assistance that
she may need.
Lisa Cahill has examined abortion beyond the constraints of principles
by probing the realm of virtue. While she understands the predicament of
many women who face unplanned pregnancies, Cahill also recognizes that
"the principal value at stake ... is the existence of the fetus itself." '122 To
deal justly with the question of abortion, it is essential for Cahill that we
first establish an understanding of who belongs to the human community
affected by abortion before the moral relationships among these members
can be addressed. 23 After ascertaining that the fetus is from its conception
a member of the human community, she, like Gustafson,1 24 adopts a
"strong bias in favor of the fetus."1 25 Cahill reveals that her ethical ap-
proach to abortion contains some elements paralleling a virtue-based
method when she shifts attention from only the woman or only the fetus
and refocuses it on "their respective rights" being "defined in relation to
one another."'
126
Another source of a virtue-based approach to the question of abortion is
the feminist legal scholar Ruth Colker. While Colker considers herself a
"pro-choice feminist,"127 she establishes a foundation for a virtue-based eth-
ics to deal with the issue of abortion. She argues "that both feminist theory
and theology can help people discover and experience their authentic
selves."1 28 This author relies on a synthesis of theology and feminism to
"guide people to the discovery and experience of their authentic self."' 129
For Colker, the goal-the telos-is realization of this authentic self: a self
121. Id. at 53-57.
122. Lisa S. Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION AND CATHOLICISM:
THE AMERICAN DEBATE 85 (1988).
123. Id.
124. Gustafson, supra note 67, at 112.
125. Cahill, supra note 122, at 86.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Colker, supra note 55, at 1046.
128. Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added). Colker uses the Buddhist term "authentic self" to
mean that "we have control over how the self changes so that we can facilitate its movements
toward our aspirations.... It is important here for the reader to understand that this conception
of the self is not static, fixed, isolated, or universal self often described in the western philosophy."
Id at 1012 n.4.
129. Id. at 1013.
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not cut off from others, insulated by some impenetrable "privacy" but,
rather, a self, who is a member of a community, who "attempt[s] to speak
aspirationally because such dialogue may enable us to overcome short-term
disagreements and move toward our common goals."' 0 In order to attain
such goals, Colker suggests that we must rely on "[d]ialogue and contem-
plation, not rhetoric."13' Colker eschews principles supportive of absolute
privacy when it comes to abortion. She relies on relationship and dialogue
in order to "approach the abortion cases from the perspective of the kind of
people and society that we want to be."' 132
Although the CDF advances a strong principle-based approach in de-
veloping its ethical response to abortion, it does raise the teleological issue
that is constitutive of virtue ethics when it addresses the role of civil law as
an instrument of justice. The CDF acknowledges that the civil law "must
often tolerate what is in fact a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one."' 133
While this may make us pause and consider how this comment about civil
law constitutes a departure from a principle-based ethics, the CDF enters
the realm of virtue ethics when it suggests that the "role of law is not to
record what is done, but to help in promoting improvement."' 3 4 Just as
those of us who make the case for virtue ethics ask ourselves the teleological
question what do we want to become (or where do we want to go), the CDF
poses the following:
[The goal of law is] to pursue a reform of society and of conditions
of life in a milieux, starting with the most deprived, so that always
and everywhere it may be possible to give every child coming into
this world a welcome worthy of a person. Help for families and for
unmarried mothers, assured grants for children, legislation for ille-
gitimate children and reasonable arrangements for adoption-a
130. Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1045.
132. Id. at 1047. Another perspective on the need for civil discourse in the abortion debate is
offered by Teresa G. Phelps, The Sound of Silence Breaking: Catholic Women, Abortion, and the
Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 547 (1992), where the author states:
We may never live in an ideal world and we may never agree on the morality of abortion or
when human life begins. We can, nonetheless, work toward this world, an ideal world in
which empowered women live in and are supported by their community. In such a world
women are trusted to make their own choices, and both sides of the abortion debate, pro-
life and pro-choice, might be surprised at what choices they make. We can begin this
essential work by listening to each other.
Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
133. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
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whole positive policy must be put into force so that there will always
be a concrete honourable and possible alternative to abortion. 135
There is also contained within the justice component of virtue ethics the
recognition of what is the goal of society and its members. A virtuous solu-
tion to the question of abortion avoids the defect of "winner-take-all" in the
justice of a principle-based ethics. But how do we move toward the goal of
justice in virtue ethics? This is where the virtue of prudence comes into
play.
If the virtue of justice prescribes the just goal or end, then prudence is
the means to get to that end. 36 A fundamental approach to obtain the
means to the just end has been suggested by the CDF. In its discussion of
the role of civil law, the CDF recommended the promotion of improve-
ments in social structures that will simultaneously display greater charity
toward pregnant women, their families, and fetuses by making available
grants, arrangements for adoption, and other legislation that gives "con-
crete, honourable and possible alternative[s] to abortion." 137 Paralleling the
CDF's recommendations is the United States Catholic Conference's recent
election policy statement that urged voters and officials to "support public
funding policies that encourage childbirth over abortion, and... programs
that assist pregnant women and children, especially those who are poor." 138
Similar sentiments were offered eight years ago by New York Governor
Mario Cuomo.
In a speech at the University of Notre Dame on September 13, 1984,
Governor Cuomo addressed the dual nature of his position on abortion. As
a practicing Roman Catholic, he has accepted personally the teachings of
the Church and holds a "reverence" for developing human life. 139 How-
ever, as a governor of a secular state, he stated that he cannot coerce others
to accept the same beliefs that emerge from his religious tradition because
of the separation between church and state promoted by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."4 Politics aside, Cuomo then ventured
into a realm approaching virtue ethics by raising considerations that every
135. Id. at 449.
136. Kotva, supra note 111, at 166 n.9 (acknowledging his debt to James Keenan, S.J., for
this insight).
137. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 448-49.
138. See Political Responsibility: Revitalizing American Democracy, 21 ORIGINS 313, 319
(1991).
139. Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspec-
tive, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 20-21 (1984).
140. Id. at 20-23.
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member of the secular society can reflect upon and adopt regardless of per-
sonal, religious beliefs.
These considerations contain a two-fold goal-the telos-for Cuomo.
First, "we must work to find ways to avoid abortions without otherwise
violating our faith."' 41 This search is initiated by education and sustained
by elevating the consciousness of fellow citizens through the "weapons of
the word and of love."' 42 The second goal is developing practical ways in
which alternatives to abortion are encouraged through support and assist-
ance (e.g., programs making available nutritional and pediatric care, child-
birth and post-natal care, and other relief).' 43 Cuomo's recommendations
echo those advanced by Glendon. 14 As he develops the virtue of prudence,
Cuomo also raises the virtue of courage.
Courage is the virtue that enables us to meet the challenge of harm or
danger when we attempt to do something about the care and concern we
have for individuals and communities. 45 The exercise of this virtue takes
place when the humans facing risks and needing help from others (e.g., the
fetus and the pregnant woman) can rely on the response from those others
who wish to and are prepared to help.146 Cuomo serves as one example of
courage by taking a stand and publicly addressing the risks that both fetuses
and pregnant women face, and by proposing practical means for addressing
and minimizing those risks.
Underlying the virtues of justice (which helps us recognize the goal),
prudence (which provides the means for acting justly), and courage (which
reinforces us as we take the action essential to reaching the telos), is the
virtue of wisdom. Wisdom provides the insight by which we come to un-
derstand who we are and where we ought to be (or, what we want to be-
come). It parallels prudence and works in tandem with it. In a virtue
ethics approach to abortion, wisdom guides us in our quest for understand-
ing who we are as individuals and what we want to become. In the Ameri-
can culture that is strongly characterized by the almost absolute right of
privacy, "which is so bound up with individual autonomy and isolation,"' 47
the focus of our individual and community attention on who we are can be
blurred. If it is blurred as Glendon and others suggest, it is difficult to
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id. at 26-27.
143. Id. at 29.
144. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 53-57.
145. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 179.
146. Id. at 116.
147. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 38; Colker, supra note 55, at 1066.
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identify not only who we are now, but also what we want to be in the
future.
That is why Cuomo urges the need for a wisdom to see what we are; as
he says, "the wisdom contained in the words, 'Physician, heal thyself.' "148
Cuomo identifies the need to increase our understanding, to broaden our
knowledge of who we are and what we want to be when he argues that:
Unless we Catholics educate ourselves better to the values that de-
fine, and can ennoble, our lives, following those [Christian social]
teachings better than we do now, unless we set an example that is
clear and compelling, we will never convince this society to change
the civil laws to protect what we preach is precious human life. Bet-
ter than any law or rule or threat of punishment would be the mov-
ing strength of our own good example, demonstrating our lack of
hypocrisy, proving the beauty and worth of our instruction.149
When this wisdom infects our consciousness, our knowledge of ourselves
becomes more secure and more certain. And, when our self-knowledge
grows, the vision of who we want to become both as individuals and as
communities will become all the more clear. And, when our knowledge of
who we want to become is better defined, our "moral idealism [can] be
found and maintained."' 150 Cuomo synthesized the goals of virtue and the
method to attain them when he stated: "We can be fully Catholic, proudly,
totally at ease with ourselves, a people in the world transforming it, a light
to this nation appealing to the best in our people, not the worst. Persuad-
ing, not coercing. Leading people to truth by love."'51 Joseph Kotva re-
minds us that a virtue ethic has rules. It offers guidance, it does not restrict
our freedom or development, and it moves us away from "the kind of be-
havior that excludes one from the pursuit of the common good."152 I now
turn to an investigation of the common good because it identifies the goal I
believe we should seek regarding the general question of abortion and the
more specific question of informed consent.
VI. THE COMMON GOOD AND THE QUESTION OF ABORTION
In the previous section, I examined the attractions of a virtue ethics
versus those of a principle-based ethics. When we examine abortion rights
rhetoric, we find that it is usually cast in a strong "principle language." As
a result of Roe, this language possesses the architecture of privacy and indi-
148. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 26-27.
149. Id. at 27.
150. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123.
151. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 31.
152. Kotva, supra note 111, at 169.
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vidual liberty, the hallmarks of the liberal state.153 But, as James Keenan
argues, we are in need of a virtue ethics because we need to rediscover the
sense of community "[iun our liberal society where individual rights have
replaced the common good."' 54 John Finnis has likewise commented on
the importance of community to the common good for "the common good
is the good of individuals living together and depending upon one another
in ways that favor the well-being of each."' 55 It is the sense of community
and the individuals who are the community on which this part of my exam-
ination will focus. My thesis here is that the concerns of the community
and the concerns of individuals are related and complementary through the
common good. In the context of the abortion debate, I see that the strongly
opposed views that favor either an absolute right to abortion or an absolute
right to protect the fetus do not promote the common good.
My examination of the common good is based on virtue ethics because
this approach raises questions that make us look at who we are, what we
want to be, and how we get there. By examining who we are, virtue ethics
can help reveal the problems with the strong individual-rights-and-liberties
orientation of our contemporary society. When we acknowledge that we
are often individual-rights promoters who fail to relate the interests of dif-
ferent individuals to one another, we can then acknowledge that something
is wrong: What do we do when rights that we have made "absolute" con-
flict with one another? We can address this question with the second stage
of the virtue ethics inquiry: What do we want to be? If we see that there is
a need to see ourselves as individuals in community rather than as isolated
beings independent of all others (in other words, we see ourselves as indi-
viduals in community), then we can ask the third question of virtue ethics:
how do we get there? A response to this inquiry is to acknowledge the need
for public discourse. I suggest that through engaging one another in public
153. A source of this contemporary liberal doctrine is MILL, supra note 92, at 197, where the
author states: "The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." Id. (em-
phasis added).
154. Keenan, supra note 109, at 123. The author continues-correctly and properly-that
the rediscovery of community today is urgent. The example he gives is the issue of abortion
because the two principal sides often rely on the "liberal" view of a strong rights-orientation
without abortion advocates trying to understand fully the interests of the fetus and without fetal-
protection advocates comprehending the concerns that women who have unwanted pregnancies
may face. Keenan's insight relates to the point that I later advance about the need for engagement
and dialogue.
155. FINNIS, supra note 95, at 305 (emphasis omitted).
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dialogue, we educate ourselves and make ourselves wiser to use virtue lan-
guage, in the needs of both ourselves as individuals and the needs of others.
I shall now develop this thesis more fully in four segments. The first will
refocus the abortion issue as it has emphasized absolute rights language
(which I suggest is, if not antithetical to the common good, is at least often
in conflict with it). Second, I shall briefly investigate the tradition of the
common good that has application to my thesis. Next, I shall focus on the
insights of contemporary authors who have made connections between the
rights of individuals as balanced by the needs of the community. Finally, I
shall make suggestions about how we can better address the abortion con-
troversy through our willingness to serve the common good under virtue
ethics.
A. The Abortion Issue Refocused
If I were to identify the major proposition that Roe contributes to the
issue of abortion, it would be this: There is a qualified right to privacy that
precludes the state from interfering with the right to terminate a pregnancy
during the first trimester." 6 As mentioned previously, the privacy right
was given to the attending physician, not the woman; the pregnant woman's
right was derivative of the physician's right.'57 However, with the passage
of time, the fundamental declaration of Roe became obscured. In this blur,
there appeared in the minds of some members of the Supreme Court and
abortion-rights advocates "the fundamental constitutional right of women
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy."' 58 In Casey, Justices Stevens
and Blackmun argued that the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation' 59
156. It is important to note that structuring abortion rights on the foundation of privacy was
and continues to be challenged by some abortion-rights advocates. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (offering an "equal protection" argu-
ment); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 266 (1992) ("[ilt is clear that abortion-
restrictive regulation can violate the antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles which
give the constitutional guarantee of equal protection its meaning."); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality
in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 44 (1992) (stating that "laws restricting abortion violate the Equal Protection
Clause").
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 163-64 (1973), overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
158. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West Supp. 1990).
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unlawfully interfered with this "fundamental constitutional right."' 6 A
majority of the Justices (seven), however, found that the informed consent
regulation was valid and upheld it. 16
1
The Blackmun-Stevens approach to the resolution of abortion issues
strongly supports giving a pregnant woman absolute "reproductive auton-
omy" during the first trimester.1 62 One thrust of their argument is that
such autonomy is needed to ensure "both the concept of liberty and the
basic equality of men and women."' 16 In addition, they consider the right of
privacy to be "nothing less than a matter of conscience."'" Justice Stevens
suggested that regulations that "enhance the deliberative quality" of the
woman's choice are "neutral regulations on the health aspects of her deci-
sion," 1 65 but those that "influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth" are invalid.' 66 Stevens concluded that the informed
consent regulation in Casey constitutes an undue burden and therefore un-
lawfully interferes with the woman's "fundamental constitutional right" be-
cause it: (1) wears "down the ability of the pregnant woman to exercise her
constitutional right"; (2) rests "on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions
about the decisionmaking capacity of women"; (3) is premised on the as-
sumption that making the decision to terminate the pregnancy with an
abortion is made "lightly"; (4) serves no "useful and legitimate state pur-
pose"; (5) presents information "that is either common knowledge or irrele-
vant" and therefore is "irrational" and "undue"; and (6) places unnecessary
burdens on women who attempt to exercise "constitutional liberty," which
are therefore "undue."'' 67 Justice Blackmun shared Justice Stevens's criti-
cism of the informed consent regulation.
While acknowledging that the state "may take steps to ensure that a
woman's choice 'is thoughtful and informed,' "68 Blackmun found that the
160. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2841-43 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2843-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
161. Id. at 2822-31 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); id. at 2867-68
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Stevens
states, "The woman's constitutional liberty also involves her freedom to decide matters of the
highest privacy and the most personal nature." Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986)).
167. Id. at 2841-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirements of the Pennsylvania law were "rigid" and "biased." '69 In
agreeing with the district court judge, Blackmun considered the one-day
waiting period "clearly unconstitutional" because it might require two visits
to the attending physician that could increase travel time, provide further
exposure for anti-abortion protesters, and present additional financial
costs.1 70 Once again, Justice Blackmun relied on the foundation of privacy
rights to justify his attack on the state regulation. 171
True, the regulation makes a woman wait twenty-four hours before she
can abort the fetus; true, it requires in many cases that certain information
be presented to the woman; and true, it may require the woman to return to
the clinic, physician's office, or hospital a second time. But what the in-
formed consent regulation does not do, as Blackmun and Stevens suggest, is
to stop-or, to use the plurality opinion's language, place an "undue bur-
den" on-the woman from having a first trimester abortion if that is indeed
what she decides to do.
What the regulation does is present important information to the wo-
man who is about to make a momentous decision-to promote the virtue of
wisdom, or, as David Hollenbach suggests, to be "educated in virtue" by
other members of the community. 172 Unlike Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens, I view the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation as a major step
toward opening the dialogue-of increasing the virtue of wisdom-between
the woman who believes she wants to rid herself of the pregnancy and those
who have information which could show the pregnant woman that this may
not be what she wants if she is made aware of concrete alternatives such as
health care and financial support.173 The Pennsylvania regulation can open
a dialogue between each pregnant woman contemplating abortion and qual-
ified persons who, while respecting her position, also respect the position of
the developing human life of the fetus she carries.
The liberal understanding and emphasis on the right to privacy have
severe limitations, which Blackmun and Stevens ignore. In reality, a wo-
man who is pregnant is given little support by those advocating her right to
privacy. She may be in need of much more than her "right to be left alone."
She may be in need of others who can provide information or physical
assistance, which would enable her to have the child whom she would
169. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. David Hollenbach, S.J., The Common Good Revisited, 50 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 70, 77
(1989).
173. Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 71, at 449; Cuomo, supra note 139, at 27-
29.
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rather keep, but physical circumstances (poverty, lack of proper health care
for her and her child) militate against her doing so. The right to be isolated
from others, which privacy conveniently makes available, could well be the
last thing she needs.
Ironically, both the interests of the woman and those of the fetus may
not be well served by the right of privacy. Yet this right is urged by* many
who subscribe to the liberal theory of society. Bruce Ackerman presented
one of the most comprehensive outlooks of the liberal position when he
stated in reference to abortion that:
The simple truth is that a fetus is not a citizen of a liberal state.
While it may possess a humanoid body, we have seen that citizen-
ship is not a biological category. A liberal community does not ask
what a creature looks like before admitting it to citizenship. Instead,
it asks whether the creature can play a part in the dialogic and be-
havioral transactions that constitute a liberal polity. The fetus fails
the dialogic test-more plainly than do grown-up dolphins.1 74
Ackerman's point focuses on political conversation and participation in
public discourse in which only some human entities-and perhaps dol-
phins-can participate. He excludes the possibility that a third person
could speak on behalf of the fetus (as the Pennsylvania regulation, in part,
does). Liberal states do not have room for dialogue-through-proxy. But,
the tragic irony is that this view of the liberal state offered by Ackerman
and others 175 disregards the need for all vital interests to be considered by
the state in a matter as important as that involving other human life that
would be adversely affected by this "fundamental constitutional right" to
privacy.
Decisions of this magnitude need to receive the participation and the
views of all vital interests that are at stake: those of the woman along with
those of the fetus. To insulate the decision-making of the woman as well as
the woman herself from the concerns and interests of those other members
of the human community, including those who are not yet but will shortly
be born, is to misappropriate the right to privacy by using it not as a protec-
tion for, but as a weapon against the moral interests of the community. As
Michael Perry has suggested, "moral deliberation requires community." 176
174. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 127 (1980).
175. See, e.g., Rachel Pine & Sylvia Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty:
Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 429 (1992) (offering
litigation strategies for "preserving privacy rights for women"); see also Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 70 (1988) (discussing the need for a liberal response to
protect women against "invasions" such as pregnancy).
176. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, & LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 157
(1988).
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Perry further states that "[i]n constitutional deliberation, as in political de-
liberation generally, what is at issue ... is not what should I do? or how
should I conduct myself? but: how are we to 'be' together, and what is to be
the institutional setting for that being-together? ... It is not self-delibera-
tion about my life, but mutual deliberation conducted between agents impli-
cated in a common life." '177 There is little doubt that the question of
abortion places one important set of human values (those of the pregnant
woman whose existence is adversely affected by some, but not all,
pregnancies) against another important set (those of the fetus she carries).
The claim made on behalf of the woman's right to privacy and the exercise
of this right do not make this serious conflict disappear; it conceals it to the
detriment of the fetus. Perry further argues that: "Politics, then, in a mor-
ally pluralistic society, is in part about the credibility of competing concep-
tions of human good. Political theory that fails to address questions of
human good-questions of how human beings, individually and collec-
tively, should live their lives-is, finally vacuous and irrelevant."17
Recalling that he suggested that adult dolphins are more a part of the
dialogic process than human fetuses, 1 79 Ackerman argues that in a liberal
state, all forms of social dependence "are subordinated to the dialogic
processes of Neutral conversation."' ° By this, I believe he means that while
individual rights are developed through dialogue in a liberal state, these
rights seem to be developed more out of an arms-length negotiation process
that is disinterested in the other party's concerns as well as areas of mutual
concern. My conclusion about Ackerman's position is based on his state-
ment that:
Not only is each citizen of a liberal community free from any obliga-
tion to love his neighbor; he is even free to believe that his neighbor
is a despicable creature who is wasting his own life and corrupting
the lives of those stupid enough to call him friend. While citizens
will, of course, have available a rich store of associational networks
through which they may achieve their own forms of intimacy and
community, the fundamental bond that binds them all together is
not one of fraternity in any meaningful sense of the word. What is
forged instead is a bond that ties citizens together without forcing
them to be brothers; liberal conversation provides a communal pro-
cess that deepens each person's claim to autonomy at the same time
177. d at 156-57 (quoting RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 138-39 (1983)) (omis-
sions in original).
178. PERRY, supra note 176, at 182. Perry notes that "the protection of fetal life is surely
more than a trivial good." Id.
179. ACKERMAN, supra note 174, at 127.
180. Id. at 347.
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that he recognizes others as no less worthy of respect. Liberty,
Equality, Individuality are the watchwords of the liberal state. 8 '
I agree with Ackerman's assessment that there should be a communal
process involved in public life. I am also encouraged by his acknowledg-
ment that there are "others no less worthy of respect" than the autonomous
self. However, I disagree with his exclusion of developing human life from
his blueprint for the liberal society. He properly includes the important
elements of liberty, equality, and individuality that are essential to preserv-
ing individual and community life. What is conspicuous by its absence
from his plan is any appreciation of interdependence among individuals
that can be called fraternity. 182
Mary Ann Glendon has evaluated the political ideals vital to the liberal
state. 8 3 In her recent investigation of American political and social cul-
ture, she has noted:
[The] penchant for absolute formulations [of rights] . . .promotes
unrealistic expectations and ignores both social costs and the rights
of others. A near-aphasia concerning responsibilities makes it seem
legitimate to accept the benefits of living in a democratic social wel-
fare republic without assuming the corresponding personal and civil
obligations.
As various new rights are proclaimed or proposed, the catalog of
individual liberties expands without much consideration of the ends
to which they are oriented, their relationship to one another, to cor-
responding responsibilities, or to the general welfare.184
As if specifically referring to Ackerman's position, she notes that the En-
lightenment rights of life, liberty, and property are "preeminently rights of
separated, independent individuals," and that the separation of one individ-
ual from another has reached its apogee in the United States, "where 'lib-
erty,' and 'equality' did not rub shoulders with 'fraternity.' "18l5 Glendon
181. Id.
182. Ronald Dworkin suggests by using virtue and communitarian language that law is "a
fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are united in community though divided in project,
interest, and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we want to be and the
community we aim to have." RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 413 (1986).
183. See GLENDON, supra note 82.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 47-48. Glendon notes that this separation began early in the history of western
democracies when
[t]he path of the United States diverged somewhat from those of most other Atlantic-
European nations... at each of [the] great watersheds in the history of rights. The parting
of the ways was already evident in 1789 when the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen, in contrast to the [American] Declaration of Independence, emphasized
that individuals have duties as well as rights.
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further argues that this peculiarly American twist of rights exaggeration has
manifested itself in the Supreme Court's recognition of "a protected sphere
surrounding the individual."1"6 Her commentary has particular relevance
to the notion of privacy often connected with a pregnant woman's "funda-
mental" or "absolute" right to have an abortion. Glendon points out that
while the "absoluteness" of this right is an illusion, it is "hardly a harmless
one" because the "absoluteness of our American rights rhetoric is closely
bound up with its other distinctive traits-a near-silence concerning respon-
sibility, and a tendency to envision the rights-bearer as a lone autonomous
individuaL"8 7
A major point advanced by the Pennsylvania informed consent regula-
tion is that it offers the pregnant woman (who is caught between the Scylla
of having an abortion and the Charybdis of being separated from others by
the exaggerated right of privacy) connections with other human beings who
can assist her to plan her future by showing her concrete alternatives to an
act that is irreversible both for her and her child. Unfortunately, many
rights advocates fail to appreciate that her pregnancy also concerns the
community, which includes her child. The shroud of the right of absolute
privacy conceals many of her vital needs that could be addressed by the
community, if only the community were given a chance. The Pennsylvania
law challenged in Casey is one attempt to give the community such a
chance to help both the woman and her child. This law advances the un-
derstanding that the political community is a "common project," a project
unfortunately "alien to the modem liberal individualist world." ' It is the
political community that I shall examine in the next section on the tradition
underlying the common good.
B. The Tradition of the Common Good
The concern about the common good as a social and political issue
reaches back to the classical era of ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle
noted that "Every state is a community of some kind, and every community
is established with a view to some good."18 9 In looking at the state or the
political institution established to govern the community, he noted that just
governments are those "which have a regard for the common interest."19
In assessing what Aristotle considered to be just, we can turn to his dis-
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
186. Id. at 40.
187. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
188. MACINTYRE, supra note 108, at 146.
189. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, at 589.
190. Id. at 629-30.
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course on ethics in which he supplied the foundation of a theme we have
already seen: Justice is reciprocity and mutuality through relationship.19'
In placing the notion of reciprocity into the human community, Aristotle
contends that the truest or best form of justice is the reciprocal display of
friendship.' 92 The reciprocity found in this truest form of justice was ex-
pressed by Aristotle:
[Reciprocity] is the friendship of [people] who are good, and alike in
virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are
good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for
their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their
own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as
long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing.' 93
Although he was critical of the conditions of political community prac-
ticed in the ancient Rome of his time, Marcus Tullius Cicero shared the
sentiments of Aristotle when he suggested that a commonwealth or social
order emerges from the social spirit of people who make the commonwealth
their "property," which is established on the principles of "respect for jus-
tice" and "partnership for the common good." '194 Although writing for the
emerging Christian community, St. Augustine's view reflected those of Ar-
istotle and Cicero when he argued that the human race is not simply united
"in a society by natural likeness" but it is or should be "bound together by a
kind of tie of kinship to form a harmonious unity, linked together by the
'bond of peace.' ,,19 Augustine drew a distinction between the "earthly
city" and the "city of God," which has relevance to my investigation and
analysis of the privacy right that insulates the individual from the rest of the
community. Augustine's insight applicable today makes the distinction be-
tween the earthly city where self-love is supreme; in the other city, the civic
attitude is characterized by love of God and love of the neighbor.' 96
During the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, who was influenced by the
ideas of both Aristotle and Augustine, continued the work of identifying the
common good. For Aquinas, the object or telos of justice is to keep people
together in a society in which they share relationships with one another. As
he said, "justice is concerned only about our dealings with others."'197 The
notion of justice as being the mutuality or reciprocity shared among the
191. ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, at 433-34.
192. Id. at 502-03.
193. Id. at 506.
194. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 65 (1966).
195. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 547 (Henry Bettenson trans., 1986).
196. Id. at 593.
197. AQUINAS, supra note 97, Question 58, art. 2.
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members of society was further refined by Aquinas when he argued that
"the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby [each person] is
directed to the common good." '198 Furthermore, Aquinas stated as follows:
[T]he good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation
to himself or in relation to certain other individual persons, is refera-
ble to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of
virtue can pertain to justice in so far as it directs [each person] to the
common good. 199
The modem Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain brought Aquinas's
understanding of the common good into the twentieth century. Maritain
recognized the need to separate the dignity of the individual human being
from the dangers of the primacy of the isolated individual and the promo-
tion of the private good. The common good, for Maritain, is "the human
common good," which includes "the service of the human person.""° In
large part, Maritain was responding to the threats posed to the dignity of
the human person by three forms of states that existed in the first half of the
twentieth century: (1) the bourgeois liberal state, (2) the communist state,
and (3) the totalitarian state. His concerns about the modem bourgeois
liberal state have special application to the abortion question.
Maritain concluded that "bourgeois liberalism with its ambition to
ground everything in the unchecked initiative of the individual, conceived
as a little God,"20 1 was a threat to the dignity of the human person and the
common good. As if responding to the arguments made by some abortion
advocates who claim the fundamental right of privacy on behalf of pregnant
women, Maritain stated that the emphasis on individualism at the expense
of community results in "the tragic isolation of each one in his [or her] own
selfishness or helplessness."2 "2 Through his perceptive understanding of the
social conditions of the times during which he wrote, Maritain acknowl-
edged that evil arises when "we give preponderance to the individual aspect
of our being."" °3 I believe that Maritain saw excessive individualism as an
evil because he understood that the human being, who is an individual, is
simultaneously a member of the human community. For Maritain, a con-
stitutive element of being human is the "inner urge to the communications
of knowledge and love which require relationship with other persons.""
198. Id. art. 6.
199. Id. art. 5.
200. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 29 (1966).
201. Id. at 91-92.
202. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id. at 47.
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Simply put, Maritain advanced the basic position (with which I agree) that
the human person and the community are not in conflict with one another
because their vital interests are complementary rather than contradictory.
The words of Maritain are compelling and insightful in this regard:
There is a correlation between this notion of theperson as social unit
and the notion of the common good as the end of the social whole.
They imply one another. The common good is common because it is
received in persons, each one of whom is a mirror of the whole....
The end of society is the good of the community, of the social
body. But if the good of the social body is not understood to be a
common good of human persons, just as the social body itself is a
whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other
errors of a totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither
the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole
which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with
respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them
to itself. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of
persons; it is their communion in good living.2" 5
Again, as if responding to the advocates of the liberal state and the exag-
gerated right of privacy, Maritain submits that the rights of the individual
human person and the interests of the community are compatible and har-
monious. The fundamental rights of persons and those of the society in
which each person lives shares as the principal value "the highest access...
of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to
the communications of generosity consequent upon such expansion.
20 6
For Maritain, the expansion of each person's rights needs the community;
by one's self, cut off from the others, the person is alone and must fend for
the self. However, when in community, she or he can rely on the generous
support of others to be more, not less, of a human being. In the context of
the abortion issue, it would seem that the individuals most concerned (the
mother and the fetus) would be better served if society would do more to
help them. Programs providing concrete assistance to the mother would
205. Id. at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 51. While writing from the perspective of the eve of World War II, Jacques Mari-
tain stated that:
It is up to the supreme effort of human freedom, in the mortal struggle in which it is today
engaged, to see to it that the age which we are entering is not the age of the masses, and of
the shapeless multitudes nourished and brought into subjection and led to the slaughter by
infamous demigods, but rather the age of the people and the man of common humanity-
citizen and co-inheritor of the civilized community-cognizant of the dignity of the human
person in himself, builder of a more human world directed toward an historic ideal of
human brotherhood.
JACQUES MARITAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY 97-98 (1944).
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constitute attractive alternatives to abortion that are respectful of the inter-
ests of both the woman and the child whom she bears.
While Maritain's philosophy may present something of an ideal, it is
realistic in the sense that it is a goal-a telos -toward which our communi-
ties can strive. The Pennsylvania informed consent regulation contains ele-
ments of the generosity of one person helping another who needs assistance.
In the case of the woman who faces the problems of a pregnancy, there is
the support of the community-consisting of advice as well as information
about how to get concrete assistance-that can help her in a time of great
need. Without this regulation, the support of the community disappears,
and the pregnant woman is left alone with her right of privacy and the
isolation it brings as the only reward.
In the American context, Christopher Mooney has presented the view
that an underlying assumption of the United States Constitution is that "the
pursuit of the common good was and would continue to be a major motiva-
tion of all citizens.""2 7 Mooney is a realist who acknowledges that rights
emphasizing individuation and competition are not always conducive to the
common good because their intrinsic attitude enables conflict to prosper
and reconciliation to default.20 8 Commenting on this attitude, Glendon ar-
gues that the "overblown rights rhetoric" nurtures the autonomous individ-
ual and directs our "thoughts away from what we have in common and
focus[es] them on what separates us."20 9 For Glendon,
[T]he new rhetoric of rights is less about human dignity and freedom
than about insistent, unending desires [whose] legitimation of indi-
vidual and group egoism is in flat opposition to the great purposes
set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution: "to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, promote the general Welfare, and se-
cure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. 210
Glendon aptly illustrates her critique with an example taken from the legal
profession. She points to those advocates who rely on "exaggeration and
absoluteness" and neglect any other view, regardless of how legitimate or
how important, to win a case or to take over some company; on the other
hand is the "rank and file" counselor who recognizes that the client must be
protected but must also continue to live in relationships with others "that
depend on regular and reliable fulfillment of responsibilities. '211
207. CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER
OF RELIGION 59 (1986).
208. Id. at 60.
209. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 143.
210. Id. at 171-72.
211. Id. at 175.
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In their seminal work on individualism and commitment in American
life, Robert Bellah and his colleagues discovered during their research into
the American culture of the 1980s that "dependence and independence are
deeply related, and that we can be independent persons without denying
that we need one another." ' But these researchers, like Glendon, see that
the tendency of late twentieth century American individualism prompts cit-
izens to isolate themselves from their neighbors and to take care of "their
own," the result of which makes them suspicious of, and withdrawn from,
the public world.213 The language and the practice of individualism-above-
all-else has led to what Bellah and his colleagues have called the cardinal
sin of the Founders: "[W]e have put our own good, as individuals, as
groups, as a nation, ahead of the common good." ' 4 Nevertheless, the au-
thors of Habits of the Heart have identified an antidote to the poison of
individualism-above-all-else: The seeds of a renewal of a world waiting to
be born lay in the realization that "the processes of separation and individu-
ation [that] were necessary to free us from the tyrannical structures of the
past ... must be balanced by a renewal of commitment and community if
they are not to end in self-destruction or turn into their opposites. "215
Six years later, the same authors have found that the maxim "plus ga
change, plus ge le meme chose"2 6 is an accurate description of the status of
individualism and public commitment in the United States. In their most
recent work, The Good Society, they note that "to frame the abortion debate
only in terms of rights has been to inhibit realistic, morally engaged social
debate about the nature of abortion." '217 In referring to Mary Ann Glen-
don's work on the question of abortion in the United States, Bellah and his
collaborators argue that we as a nation cannot "deal realistically with the
conditions that lead to abortions on the one hand and the moral complexi-
ties of abortion decisions on the other" because our national urge to be
preoccupied with rights rhetoric "cuts off debate, polarizing society politi-
cally" between two groups unable to talk with one another.218
To conclude this section of the evolving tradition of the common good, I
turn to the work of Benjamin Barber. He also has concluded that the ex-
cesses of liberalism have led to an insularity among people that tends to
212. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 111 (1985).
213. Id. at 112.
214. Id. at 285.
215. Id. at 277.
216. "The more things change, the more they stay the same."
217. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 130 (1991).
218. Id.
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erode democratic institutions. He argues that being an individual and being
a citizen are compatible with one another:
Autonomy is not the condition of democracy, democracy is the con-
dition of autonomy. Without participating in the common life that
defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social
habitat, women and men cannot become individuals. Freedom, jus-
tice, equality, and autonomy are all products of common thinking
and common living; democracy creates them.219
As seen elsewhere, protection of the human person in all of his or her dig-
nity requires insertion and participation in, not insulation and separation
from, the community. The community prospers when its members contrib-
ute of themselves in making it prosperous; it withers when they turn within
and tend only to their private cares.220 The threat to a free world of the
good citizen is stated as:
The world in which men and women do not exist for others; in
which there can also be no public goods. In this world, there can be
no fraternal feeling, no general will, no selfless act, no mutuality, no
species identity, no gift relationship, no disinterested obligation, no
social empathy, no love or belief or commitment that is not wholly
private.22
1
Like other contemporary writers who have addressed the issue of the
common good, Barber also turns to the abortion question and the issue of
privacy to illustrate his concern with the erosion of democracy and its vital-
izing force of citizenship. Engagement of people with opposing views is
essential to resolving the issue and of reconciling differences caused by "ab-
solutizing" positions. Barber warns:
Unless the debate over abortion permits people to discuss the social
conditions of pregnancy, the practical alternatives available to the
poor, and the moral dilemmas of a woman torn between her obliga-
tions to her own body and life and to an embryo, such debate will
treat neither pregnant women nor unborn babies with a reasonable
approximation of justice.222
David Hollenbach has raised his hope that the search for "communitar-
ian objectives" is not incompatible with the achievements of and progress
219. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE at xv (1984).
220. Barber continues by stating, "From this precarious foundation [of individualism and
privacy], no firm theory of citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be expected
to arise." Id. at 4.
221. Id. at 71-72.
222. Id. at 182.
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for humanity up to the present age.223 I submit here that his concern is
legitimate, and his theory is supported by others who recognize that our
world and our national community of today are established on the interde-
pendence of individual human beings. We seem to do better, if not prosper,
when the spirit of fraternity and cooperation prevails. We suffer (as we do
in our abortion clinics, in Somalia, in Bosnia) when the spirit of isolation
and separation reigns. It is important, to be sure, to pay attention to the
individual who cries out, "Look at me! I'm different." It is equally impor-
tant when we do so, however, to also say, "Look at us! We are the same."
In the next section of my discussion, I shall focus on how the issue of
the common good emerges in the abortion debate when we look at the "me"
and the "us."
C. Current Perspectives on Abortion That Relate to the Common Good
Within the present day context of abortion, we can identify the "me" in
the debate as those individuals and groups who hold what I call absolutist
positions on the issue. The example on the pro-abortion side could well be
the pregnant woman whose own life has been threatened by a difficult preg-
nancy. On the other side would be the devoted individual who holds the
view that all human life is sacred and that no other human being has the
right to take such life, especially the life of the fetus. I am confident that in
between these two positions, most if not all the other positions, which can
be viewed as pro-abortion, pro-choice, or pro-life, fall. The "us" generally
would include all members of the specific society or community that is con-
cerned about the abortion issue. I suggest that the community or society
might be composed of several levels that, in addition to the woman and her
baby, include the hospital or other medical center that treats pregnant wo-
men, the woman's family, the state that has (or may be developing) a pro-
gram for regulating abortion, the national government that has (or may be
developing) a program to regulate abortion, and any other groups that have
come together to express and advocate their views about abortion in public
arenas.
One avenue for proceeding into the contemporary scholarly debate on
abortion is through the work of Judge John Noonan.224 Judge Noonan has
taken the Jewish 22' and Christian 226 scriptural admonition "to love your
223. Hollenbach, supra note 172, at 94.
224. Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
225. Leviticus 19:18.
226. In the New Testament, the command to love your neighbor as yourself is found at Mark
12:30, Matthew 22:39, and Luke 10:27. The Golden Rule ("do unto others as you would want
them to do to you") is found at Matthew 7:12.
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neighbor as yourself" and put the fetus into the position of the neighbor so
that the fetus's life can arguably have parity with one's own life.227 In order
to be of greater appeal to secular interests, Noonan recasts his argument by
saying that the religious commandment has its humanistic counterpart:
"Do not injure your fellow [hu]man without reason.1 228 He goes on to say
that:
In these terms, once the humanity of the fetus is perceived, abortion
is never right except in self-defense. When life must be taken to save
life, reason alone cannot say that a mother must prefer a child's life
to her own. With this exception, now of great rarity, abortion vio-
lates the rational humanist tenet of the equality of human lives.229
However, even this humanist approach can fail to convince some individu-
als that the life of the fetus is like mine or yours. This has prompted one
commentator to point out that the British Parliament recently rejected leg-
islation ensuring that medical practitioners delivering a fetus capable of sus-
taining life outside of the womb be required to protect its life at the
conclusion of the abortion.23°
Ronald Dworkin has also examined the question of how to consider the
status of the life of a human fetus. He readily admits that "it seems undeni-
able that in the ordinary case a fetus is a single living creature by the time it
has become implanted in a womb, and that it is human in the sense that it is
a member of the animal species homo sapiens"; however, the protection to
be accorded this human interest in Dworkin's estimation is quite another
matter.2 31 After making this observation, Dworkin proceeds to liken fetal
human life to a piece of sculpture, or the assemblage of Dr. Frankenstein's
monster, or a baby carrot: He suggests that smashing the sculpture, de-
stroying the mechanism that would vitalize Frankenstein's monster, or
picking the baby carrot prematurely are no different than aborting the fetus
227. John T. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABOR-
TION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 58 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. John Finnis has recently noted that this humanist approach did not appear to move the
British Parliament into taking legislative steps to help a fetus sustain his or her life in the perform-
ance of an abortion. See John Finnis, The Legal Status of the Unborn Baby, 43 CATH. MED. Q. 5
(1992). There the author relates the following legislative tactic: "In the final stages of Parlia-
ment's consideration of the 1990 amendments to the Abortion Act, a Conservative woman peer
moved two amendments intended to secure that when an abortion is being performed under the
Abortion Act..., the medical practitioner doing the termination should use 'all reasonable steps
to secure that the child is born alive.' Each amendment was comfortably defeated." Id. at 7.
231. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 397 (1992).
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before the third trimester.232 His grounds for making this comparison rest
on his premise that the fetus's interests parallel those of the sculpture, the
baby carrot, and the monster because "nothing has interests unless it has or
has had some form of consciousness-some mental as well as physical
life." 23
3
Dworkin anticipates arguments against his analogy by referring to the
"fallacious argument that abortion must be against the interests of a fetus,
because it would have been against the interests of almost anyone now alive
to have been aborted. ' 234 Dworkin then goes on to suggest that a fetus may
develop interests in retrospect, and he draws upon the following
illustration:
[T]hat it was good for [Dworkin] that [his] father was not sent on a
long business trip the night before [his] parents conceived [him],
rather than, as in fact happened, two days later. It does not follow
that it would have been bad for anyone, in the same way, had
[Dworkin's father] left on the earlier date. There never would have
been anyone for whom it could have been bad.2 "
Dworkin argues that if he were not conceived because his father had left for
the business on the earlier date, there would be no Ronald Dworkin who
would have interests. But Dworkin's argument fails because it makes sup-
positions that disregard the facts. His father did not leave early; Ronald
Dworkin was conceived; Ronald Dworkin had interests that would have
been adversely affected if his mother decided to have an abortion. And
what might that interest be? No Ronald Dworkin among many other
things, including his impressive scholarship.
Dworkin relies on one further example to make his point, but this exam-
ple fails as well. He argues: "[I]f a woman smokes during pregnancy, some-
one will later exist whose interests will have been seriously damaged by her
behavior. If she aborts, no one will exist against whose interests that will
ever have been."1236 If the woman aborts because of natural causes, that is
one thing; however, if she willingly and knowingly terminates her preg-
nancy, that is quite another. In this latter case, the woman who smokes or
drinks or takes dangerous drugs (all of which can adversely affect her child
who is still in her womb) and then voluntarily aborts is like the person who
commits a murder and then tries to remove the evidence by burning the
body and dissolving the ashes in acid. Dworkin's basic argument seems to
232. Id. at 402-03.
233. Id. at 403.
234. Id. at 404.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 405.
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focus on the ability of a born human because it has "some form of con-
sciousness-some mental as well as physical life." '23 7 Patricia King has an
important counter to this problematic reasoning. She points out that
neither fetuses nor newborn infants nor comatose adults have "conscious-
ness," yet there are important interests worth protecting in each of these
cases.238 John Hart Ely, who holds a pro-abortion position, has indirectly
pointed out the fallacy of Dworkin's reasoning:
Dogs are not "persons in the whole sense" nor have they constitu-
tional rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing
them: It does not even mean the state cannot prohibit killing them
in the exercise of the First Amendment right of political protest.
Come to think of it, draft cards aren't persons either.239
Dworkin's approach to the issue of abortion is troublesome. He at-
tempts to eliminate the fact that the fetus is a human entity who has vital
interests that are worth discussing and protecting. Perhaps in some cases
these rights are not absolute because there are other rights involved-par-
ticularly those of the mother whose own existence may be compromised in
a small number of cases by the fetus. That is my point; that is Glendon's
point. We cannot afford to look at one interest and neglect the other com-
peting interests that are simultaneously involved. Rosalind Hursthouse has
cast the issue involved here well. In a recent article, she relies on virtue
theory not to "solve the problem of abortion" but to illustrate how we
ought to "think about it."2" I suggest that how we think about the interest
of the fetus cannot be the fashion in which Dworkin casts the reflection: It
is wrong to say that an interest that once was, never was if it is destroyed
(as Dworkin implies in the case of abortion). To borrow from Hursthouse,
we must think about what it is we are doing before we do it; then, we must
talk about what it is we contemplate doing before we do it. To act in a
prejudicial way toward the fetus by aborting it, and then think about it and
talk about it ex post facto and say that it never was because it no longer
exists is not only illogical, it is also wrong.
Patricia King has taken a thoughtful approach in considering how we
think and talk about the interests of the fetus. She concludes that the viable
fetus (one capable of life outside the womb) has a greater interest in protec-
237. Id. at 403.
238. Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of
The Unborn, 77 MICH. L. Rnv. 1647, 1669 (1979).
239. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
926 (1973).
240. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 233
(1991).
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tion than the previable fetus because, in her view, "the fetus should not be
entitled to the same degree of protection at every stage of development." '24 1
While I do not concur with this particular judgment she makes, I do join in
her more general opinion that this does not mean that the previable fetus
has no interests at all worth protecting. King asserts that the previable
fetus does have interests and those interest merit discussion and protection.
As she states, "the unborn fetus, the newborn child, and the mature adult
are all at different stages of development, and the fact that a fetus is not
conscious or socially responsive should not preclude all legal protection."'242
But how do we discuss the level of protection to be given the fetus?
And, how do we discuss the level of protection to be given the mother? If
the rights and interests of the fetus change, might we not expect that those
of the woman undergo change as well? Alan Brownstein and Paul Dau
have recently argued that a proper assessment of the abortion issue necessi-
tates our realization that the pregnant woman's interests are not static but
vary during pregnancy:
[T]he woman's right also varies during pregnancy and that this
change in interest shifts the balance of state interests against funda-
mental rights in many cases. Indeed, if the woman's interest in ter-
minating her pregnancy declines to a sufficient extent, the balancing
necessary to justify abortion restrictions may be accomplished with-
out determining exactly when the conceptus experiences a life worth
living.243
How we go about evaluating the interests of the principals, vis-A-vis the
woman and the fetus, can only be achieved by frank and honest discussion
among all of us who hold a substantive view on abortion. Ruth Colker has
offered some helpful insights on how this kind of discussion can proceed.
Although she is a feminist who holds pro-choice views, Colker nevertheless
acknowledges that women have responsibilities along with rights when the
subject of abortion is examined. 2" She further acknowledges that the right
to an abortion cannot be grounded in disrespect for the fetus. 245 Colker
calls upon the woman considering abortion to appreciate the virtue of wis-
dom needed to make a decision that is not only important to herself but to
241. King, supra note 238, at 1673.
242. Id. at 1672.
243. Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33 B.C. L. REV.
689, 749 (1992); see also Cahill, supra note 122, at 87, where the author argues that the woman's
and fetus's "respective rights must be defined in relation to one another (and, in a less immediate
sense, to the rights of others, for example, family members)." Id.
244. Colker, supra note 55, at 1050.
245. Id. at 1055.
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the fetus as well.246 But a pregnant woman does not obtain this wisdom in
the vacuum of her privacy and isolation from others. She obtains the wis-
dom she needs through dialogue with others. As Colker argues:
I oppose a complete prohibition of abortion regulations, because it
would prevent the state from developing mechanisms to encourage
women to consult other people. I would support legislation requir-
ing hospitals and clinics that perform abortions to make available
group counseling sessions... for all pregnant women so that they
can be exposed to competing viewpoints in a safe space.24
This is basically what the Pennsylvania informed consent regulation is all
about. Another feminist who is pro-life, Lisa Cahill, has emphasized the
need for community and individual understanding that the respective rights
of the mother and the fetus must be defined in relation to one another.24
"Where those rights can conflict, neither can be absolute. The rights of
both are limited, but still significant.' 249
Laurence Tribe has made a recent contribution to the debate and dia-
logue on abortion. He is somewhat critical of informed consent regulations,
which he believes can be burdensome to some women, especially those from
rural areas. He does not think that these kinds of regulations can "serve
their ostensible purpose of fostering consideration of the gravity of a deci-
sion to abort a pregnancy. "25' He rhetorically asks the question: "What
woman who would take lightly the decision to have an abortion will rethink
it more seriously simply because a law says she has to wait a day before
having the procedure?" 2s  While Tribe displays no enthusiasm for this kind
of informed consent regulation, neither does he find the harsh, one-sided
rhetoric helpful in the effort to reconcile the absoluteness of some pro-life
and pro-choice advocates. I doubt that he finds the threat made to legisla-
tors of "[t]ake our rights, lose your job"2 2 a conducive way of attempting
to reconcile the differences. After all, Tribe demonstrates his appreciation
of the need to inject abortion alternatives, such as the "humane options" of
pre- and post-natal care and education about human reproduction.25 3 Re-
views of Tribe's approach are mixed; however, both Michael McConnell 254
246. Id. at 1063-64.
247. Id. at 1066 (citation omitted).
248. Cahill, supra note 122, at 87.
249. Id.
250. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 203.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 179.
253. Id. at 209-12.
254. Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1991) (reviewing TRIBE, supra note 53).
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and Stephen Carter2" agree with Tribe on the need for public discourse and
dialogue on the divisive issue of abortion. McConnell, while arguing that
Tribe's position fails to do this, nevertheless finds the general project of
moving beyond the clash of absolute positions about abortion to be a "wor-
thy purpose." As he suggests, "There is too much shouting and too little
serious discussion of the law and morality of abortion. 25 6 Carter, while
giving reasons why dialogue may not resolve the question "in the near
term," nonetheless generally agrees that discussion and examination of al-
ternatives to abortion are vital to resolution of the conflict.2" 7 I will con-
clude this section of my presentation with the advice given by Michael
Perry on the subject of political dialogue.
Perry believes that the goals of the liberal state which are based on indi-
vidualism and privacy have proved to be futile.258 The alternative he con-
structs begins with what Perry terms "deliberative, transformative politics"
in which he calls for members of American society to engage one another
"in productive moral conversation." '259 Perry has taken recent steps to de-
velop more fully this process of public dialogue:
[He proposes the need for] a politics in which citizens meet one an-
other in the public square, sometimes to reach consensus, more often
diminish dissensus, and most often, perhaps, simply to clarify, to
better understand, the nature of their disagreement, but always to
cultivate the bonds of (political) community, by reaffirming their ties
to one another, in particular their shared commitment to certain au-
thoritative political-moral premises.260
Of course, for politics to be effective, it must include more than talk, more
than public discourse and dialogue on the pressing issues of the day, and.
Perry acknowledges this. But in doing so, he emphasizes that the need for
"dialogue and tolerance" he advances has to be more than something that
will be "devalued and marginalized. '2 61 The dialogue and tolerance Perry
finds necessary to deal with the difficult public issues of the present day are
the kind that will nourish "a form of political community in which,
notwithstanding our sometimes radical disagreements with one another
[perhaps like the disagreements that surround abortion], we always strive to
understand one another, to know one another, to serve one another, better
255. See Carter, supra note 3.
256. McConnell, supra note 254, at 1181.
257. Carter, supra note 3, at 2763-65.
258. PERRY, supra note 176, at 55-56.
259. Id. at 4.
260. PERRY, supra note 54, at 125.
261. Id. at 144.
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than we now do."' 2 62 Perry's understanding of dialogue, tolerance, and a
community in which individuals sincerely work at understanding, knowing,
and serving one another leads into my own reflection about the common
good that underlies the subject of abortion.
D. Abortion and the Common Good: Coming to Know Ourselves
In constructing my own understanding of the common good in the con-
text of the abortion debate, I return to the informed consent regulation. I
do so with the goal of determining whether Perry's notion of "dialogue and
tolerance" can help us understand the important human issues at stake,
and, if so, how we can then go about addressing them. I conclude that
Perry's approach, which shares elements of the works of other authors I
have investigated, can help construct both (1) an understanding of the com-
mon good and (2) how it can be advanced. Both constructions rest on a
foundation in which the underlying, diverse views come together and share
their individual perspectives. Both perspectives must be considered in order
to ascertain what is, if not the best solution to the problem, then a better
solution than we have now.
While there may be problems of communication in defining solutions to
moral issues like abortion and identifying a "shared notion of virtue or the
common good" as Mary Ann Glendon acknowledges, this does not mean
that the public decision-making in which we as citizens engage one another
can "remain resolutely neutral on all controversial questions involving
moral issues." '263 With the deep insight that characterizes much of her
work, Glendon argues that "it is only natural that ideas of law as embody-
ing a social dialogue should come to have a special appeal." 2  I would add
that not only does social dialogue have "special appeal," but that it is ur-
gently needed in order for American society to begin the construction of
helpful, concrete solutions to the divisive issue of abortion. Only then can
we properly take into account the variety of significant and valuable inter-
ests that now seem to be insulated from one another by the cries of absolute
rights, which are increasing rather than diminishing in volume. Glendon
states that "it does not seem too soon to say that although modern law
cannot establish or enforce a single vision of virtue, it can play its part in
promoting the potentially self-correcting processes of dialogue and
dialectic."26
262. Id. at 145.
263. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 139.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 140.
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The Pennsylvania informed consent regulation at the heart of the Casey
decision is one reasonable approach to facilitate dialogue and dialectic in
the abortion controversy. While some critics of the Pennsylvania regulation
argue that it imposes an "undue burden" on pregnant women,266 in reality,
it presents an opportunity for pregnant women to consider that there is an
important interest of another, as well as her own, at stake. The attending
physician must first of all inform the woman at least twenty-four hours
before the abortion about the nature of the proposed procedure, the proce-
dure's risks, the estimated age of the fetus, and the medical risks to her
associated with carrying the child to term.2 67 The information is presented
orally, which is more expeditious than requiring the woman to read some
document that may be written in technical language and difficult for a per-
son not schooled in the language of the health care profession to
understand.
The second component of the twenty-four hour waiting period man-
dates that prior to the abortion, either the physician or some other qualified
person designated by the physician informs the woman about state publica-
tions containing information on alternatives to the abortion, information on
medical assistance (including prenatal, child birth, and postnatal care), and
information that the father is liable for support (even if he has offered to pay
for the abortion). An exception to this last component is in cases of rape.268
It is significant to note that this section of the informed consent regulation
gives the woman the option to review printed materials; if she exercises that
option, the materials are provided free of charge. If she does not elect the
option, she only receives the information verbally.269 Prior to the abortion,
the woman signs a form certifying that she has received this information.
270
What she does with the information is left up to her: She can consider it,
she can discuss it with others during the twenty-four hour period, or she
can disregard it. The choice is hers alone.
It is important to acknowledge that in cases of a medical emergency,
2 71
the physician is under a duty to explain to the pregnant woman, if possible,
the medical indications supporting his or her judgment about the medical
266. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2851 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Pine & Law, supra
note 175, at 411.
267. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
268. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
269. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
270. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
271. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West Supp. 1990) defines "medical emergency" as that
"condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the
medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy
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emergency and why the "abortion is necessary to avert her death or to avert
substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function."2 72
I do not suggest that this regulation is the most desirable for giving
equal consideration to the interests of the woman and those of her child
when an abortion is being considered. These provisions are weighed heavily
in favor of the woman's interest notwithstanding the charges of some that
they constitute undue burdens. Still, this regulation is one small step in the
direction of opening a dialogue between the two principal interests that are
at stake; moreover, it encourages some measure of tolerance on each side of
these interests to understand the concerns of the other party.
To draw from Mensch and Freeman, I suggest that the Pennsylvania
informed consent regulation is a step toward putting aside the abortion per-
spective of "rational secular individualism" in favor of a more generalized
appeal toward the common good of appreciating and balancing (ever so
slightly) the significance of competing interests.2 73 The Pennsylvania regu-
lation is only the first step in the direction of helping women see the moral
issues, the issues of conscience that are a vital part of the abortion debate.
As Mensch and Freeman also state, the rights-based language of Roe and
other pro-abortion advocacy "fails to capture the moral and social experi-
ence of many women. "274
In the realm of the practical, the informed consent regulation in Casey
helps to educate a woman about concrete alternatives she may have in lieu
of proceeding with the abortion. Verbally, she is given information about
health care and other financial support options. These options reflect some
of the practical alternatives to abortion mentioned by Governor Cuomo. 275
Ironically, many pro-abortion advocates term their movement the "pro-
choice" position. But what real choice is there in taking the narrow view
that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion; this is not a position
of choice, it is rather a position of absoluteness without alternative. On the
other hand, the Pennsylvania scheme gives the woman some real choice
that includes the choice to terminate or to continue the pregnancy with the
assistance of counseling, health care, and other support. Again, as Mensch
and Freeman point out:
[E]ven for those [pregnant women] not facing extreme economic
hardship, there are other social pressures that can give one the expe-
to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible
impairment of major bodily function."
272. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(b) (West Supp. 1990).
273. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1095, 1105.
274. Id. at 1123.
275. Cuomo, supra note 139, at 27-29.
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rience of having "no choice." Those pressures include an internal-
ized feminist pressure to be successfully autonomous and
independent, and, as pro-life advocates have argued with some force,
male pressure for women to be sexually available without reproduc-
tive consequences....
"Choice" contains its own coercions, in other words, which may
be a necessary price to pay but should not go unnoticed. Ironically,
it is the pervasiveness of the language of choice and freedom in our
culture which makes a forthright examination of those coercions so
legally and politically out of bounds.276
It is worth noting that Mensch and Freeman are wife and husband who
have either had abortions or have been the responsible other in abortions.2 77
They speak with the conviction of understanding that comes from experi-
ence. They now present that experience so that others may share their un-
derstanding of what is at stake in an abortion. For them, the starting point
for discussion is the discussion itself; the discussion then must move into
recognition that abortion is about "life or death., z7  They acknowledge
that "[t]o abort a fetus is to kill, to prevent the realization of human life."'279
In pointing to the circumstances of the 1991 war against Iraq, Mensch and
Freeman opine that the choice:
[T]o kill does not make it wrong on that score alone; but we surely
need a vocabulary for talking about life and death issues in moral
terms that underscore the seriousness of any choice for death. Our
experience with abortion, and, perhaps with war, suggests that the
lack of such a vocabulary will lead inevitably to excess.28 °
I find it necessary to take the conclusion of Mensch and Freeman at least
one step further: Once we discover the vocabulary, we must use it. More-
over, its use must be regular and frequent. With the dormancy of the vo-
cabulary comes the insularity of the conversationalists; and with their
insularity comes the isolation of individualism that makes one person (or
one interest) forget the concerns of the other.
At its most fundamental level, that is what the common good is all
about: the one being with the other, the me with the you. Ruth Colker and
Michael Perry both refer to the scriptural commandment to love your
neighbor as yourself.281 Their recognition of this scriptural commandment
276. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 4, at 1125-26 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 933-34.
278. Id. at 1137.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1137-38.
281. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 54, at 50-5 1; Colker, supra note 55, at 1075 (quoting Leviti-
cus 19:15-18).
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is important because the command makes us intimately aware of our simi-
larities as human beings. But, specifically, what does the commandment
mean in the context of abortion and the debate about it?
I think it means this: When we are willing to discuss the question of
abortion, we can and often do learn a lot more about the subject, especially
when we are talking with others who hold different views. As we dispose
ourselves to engage one another in a difficult but still important discussion,
we come together in a community that does not necessarily share the same
views but that does share the same interest in this topic. As a community,
we can build a foundation of recognition that we have something in com-
mon (our humanity that begins and ends in the same way: with life and
death). This mutual interest forges the foundational link between us and
helps us recognize that we share a "likeness to one another. ' '2 82
Some of us may be reluctant to approach this recognition of likeness
with the other because it seems incompatible with our individuality and
freedom. Yet, as Philip Rossi has noted, the mistake we often make about
ourselves and our freedom is that "we conceive of freedom primarily, if not
exclusively, by reference to human agents in their individuality and inde-
pendence, rather than in terms of their shared human communalities and
their fundamental interdependence." '283 While many of us think that it is
our independence that makes us human, it is really our social dimension,
the fact that we are individuals who are members of a society, that we are
distinct human beings who nevertheless flourish when we relate to one an-
other-not when we are isolated from one another. It is, after all, our inter-
dependence that brings us together into the community of human beings.284
Community fosters exchange between people (and their interests). The ex-
change, in turn, promotes the opportunity to see that human interaction is
mutually beneficial, that it serves and promotes our common good to "care
for one another's total well-being. "285
282. PHILIP J. Rossi, S.J., TOGETHER TOWARD HOPE: A JOURNEY TO MORAL THEOLOGY
viii (1983).
283. Id. at 5.
284. As Philip Rossi argues:
This community is, first and foremost, a community of mutuality: a community of those
who conscientiously foster the skills that enable the essential interdependence of their lives
to work for the attainment of good for one another. Mutuality fostered in this way consti-
tutes the core of the charity or love that in the Catholic tradition has been claimed to be
the fundamental form of the life of virtue. Thus the human community that provides a
condition fundamental for satisfying, for each and all, our basic human cravings is a com-
munity in which charity gives form to virtue.
Id. at 68.
285. Id. at 145.
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I enter the conclusion of this Article (but not the debate, nor the discus-
sion) on abortion by drawing our attention to one final insight from Rossi.
Rossi's notion of the common good emerges from "the recognition of com-
munality at the heart of moral life: 'I am as she; she is as I., ,2816 He trans-
fers this fundamental point into the abortion controversy when he states:
"[A]cceptance of abortion by our contemporary culture has as one of its
major engendering factors the massive failure of many of the practices of
our social, political, and economic life to establish, foster, and be at the
service of human mutuality. '2 87
This brings me to the my last words. The notion of the common good
that I have attempted to present in this discussion about abortion (and I
suspect of applicability to many other issues that challenge the human com-
munity today) is this: When we engage one another in conversation, we can
and do learn about one another. We learn what we did not know before;
often, we also learn what we thought but what we did not want to admit.
We discover that we are different because that is what makes us individuals.
But, more important, we discover-and this is the part that is not easily
admitted-that we are also similar in many ways. Each time we engage the
other in conversation, we see a reflection of ourselves in the other. I suspect
that our rights-oriented culture reinforces the differences that superficially
make us different but, in truth, mask our fundamental similarity. We dis-
cover our resemblance each time we engage one another in conversation, in
dialogue, even debate. We see in each of our conversations a piece of a
mosaic that reflects the other. And, when we assemble more of the mosaic,
as we see more of the pieces come together, not only do we see the other, we
also see ourselves.
This is how the questions about abortion and the common good come
together: The more we discuss these issues, the more we see that the con-
cerns of the pregnant woman are our concerns. And, just as significantly,
when we hear about the concerns of the fetus, we see the concerns that
belong to us. For in the fetus, in the mother, we see another human being
with whom we have so much in common. And when we see that other
human being, we see ourselves. When we make this discovery, when we
allow it to seep into our deepest consciousness, we can then acknowledge
that the portrait that emerges from our many conversations belongs to all of
us because it represents all of us. It is both our portrait and the portrait of
the other.
286. Id. at 154.
287. Id. at 155.
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THE PRECEDENTIAL FORCE
OF PANEL LAW
PHILLIP M. KANNAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts of appeals are authorized by statute to hear and deter-
mine cases by panels as well as en banc.1 In 1992, 6851 three-judge panels
were possible from court of appeals judges alone.2 The number of possible
panels ranged from twenty in the First Circuit to 3276 in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.3 The number of possible panels would have increased substantially if
district judges were included.4 Panels perform almost all of the appellate
work in the federal judicial system;5 yet, as explained below, they lack a full
range of judicial power and an adequate precedential system to fulfill this
responsibility effectively.
No statute defines the precedential force of each panel's decision on sub-
sequent panels of the same circuit. Intracourt comity, the model followed
by district courts, could have been adopted by the courts of appeals.' In-
stead, all thirteen circuits, with the possible exception of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, have developed the interpanel doctrine: No panel can overrule the
precedent established by any panel in the same circuit; all panels are bound
* B.A. 1961, University of North Carolina; M.A. 1963, University of North Carolina; J.D.
1974, University of Tennessee. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988). "En bane" and "in banc" are both correct spellings for the same
term. Although some sources, including the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, use "in bane,"
most courts prefer "en bane." In this Article, "en bane" will be used unless spelled otherwise by
the source quoted.
Panels usually consist of three circuit judges, or two such judges and one district judge. An en
bane court for a circuit generally consists of all the circuit judges in regular active service in that
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988).
2. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., concurring), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
3. Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988).
5. FED. R. Arp. P. 35(a) (An en banc "hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will
not be ordered."); see also Gonzales v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 F.2d 637, 641 (5th Cir.
1985) (stating that en banc consideration is an extraordinary procedure)
6. See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that under
the doctrine of intracourt comity, judges of coordinate jurisdiction within a jurisdiction should
follow rulings of other such judges except in unusual or exceptional circumstances), aff'd sub norm
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). Such precedent is not binding.
See, eg., Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 1981), affid, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th
Cir. 1982), and affld, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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by prior panel decisions in the same circuit.7 In the Seventh Circuit, the
rule is implied from the practice of circulating, to all active judges of the
court, panel decisions that reverse precedent. 8
The decisions applying the interpanel rule have not clearly articulated
their legal bases. The rule is apparently based on the assumption that
panels have no judicial power or jurisdiction to overrule panel precedent.9
This assumption, in turn, seems based on an implication that, because the
courts en banc have retained the authority to overrule panel precedent, 10
panels have no such authority. That rationale, however, is questionable be-
cause en banc courts retain a full set of judicial power, but only this one
facet is denied panels.
Another possible basis for the interpanel rule is Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 35 ("Rule 35"), which explicitly authorizes en banc courts to
resolve conflicts between decisions, although panels are not so authorized.
This argument at best justifies only one part of the interpanel rule: the in-
ability of a panel to overrule precedent. It does not support the other con-
clusion: namely, that panels are bound by such precedent. In any event,
Rule 35's authorization of en banc courts to resolve conflicts does not sup-
port the interpanel rule. If the interpanel rule were valid, there would be no
conflicts and no need for en banc courts to have authority to resolve them.
7. United States v. Walling, 936 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir. 1991); Capital Produce Co. v.
United States, 930 F.2d 1077, 1078 (4th Cir. 1991); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53
n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 406 (1990); Greenhow v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
863 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 823
F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied
sub non. Cohen v. United States, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Alexander v. Chevron, U.S.A., 806 F.2d
526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986); Humane Society of United States v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 790 F.2d 106, 110 & n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1986); General Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1225 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 239
(1987); Julius v. Johnson, 755 F.2d 1403, 1404 (11th Cir. 1985), afid on habeas corpus proceeding,
875 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 971 (1989); Meeks v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.,
738 F.2d 748, 751 (6th Cir. 1984).
8. See United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 176 nn.2 & 4 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(pointing out this practice of the Seventh Circuit in Moody v. United States, 497 F.2d 359, 365 n.7
(7th Cir. 1974)); United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362, 366 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1666 (1992); Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Adamson, 665 F.2d 649, 656 & n.19 (1 1th. Cir.), rehg denied, 700 F.2d 953 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983); In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1984); Ford v. General Motors Corp.,
656 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e note that the task of reexamining and overruling
panel decisions is left to the full Court, sitting en banc.").
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In addition to lacking a firm basis, the interpanel rule is at least implic-
itly inconsistent with Rule 35,11 with the statute authorizing panels,12 and
with statutes creating appeals as of right. 3 These three inconsistencies are
examined in Part II. If the interpanel rule is flawed by being contrary to
these statutes, one would expect to find evidence that the rule does not work
in practice in the cases that apply or attempt to apply it. Part III considers
that evidence. Part IV suggests three alternatives to replace the interpanel
rule.
II. STATUTORY BASES FOR QUESTIONING THE INTERPANEL RULE
In this Part, the interpanel rule is tested for consistency with Rule 35,
with the statute authorizing panels, and with statutes creating appeals as of
right. The interpanel rule is inconsistent with all three statutes. Adjust-
ments must be made in either the interpanel rule or in the three statutes.
Modifying the interpanel rule would primarily affect judicial administration
by increasing the number of en banc decisions. Courts of appeals them-
selves could make the change by repudiating the interpanel rule. In con-
trast, if the statutes were amended, fundamental legal theory would have to
be altered, which would require action by courts and Congress. Conse-
quently, the interpanel rule, not the statutes, should be modified.
A. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35.
Under Rule 35(a), only two conditions permit a hearing or rehearing en
banc. One condition is "when consideration by the full court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions.""4 This language anticipates
a lack of uniformity within the circuits. In adopting this rule, the Supreme
11. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are not statutes. However, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1988) expressly authorizes the Supreme Court to "enact" these rules. They are codified at 28
U.S.C. For convenience, they will be included in the discussion of statutes in Part II of this
Article.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
13. These include 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) regarding final decisions of district courts and
many other statutes that grant parties the right to appeal final actions of federal agencies. Exam-
ples of these latter statutes are § 7006(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6976(a) (1988), and § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988). For
convenience, all such statutes will be grouped and considered as a single unit in this Article.
14. FED. R. App. P. 35(a)(2).
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Court expected panels to develop inconsistent law and even specified the
procedure for resolving such inconsistencies.15
By establishing the interpanel rule as law, the courts of appeals have
subverted the intent of the Supreme Court in two ways, one substantive and
the other procedural. The substantive conflict is that the interpanel rule
forecloses the possibility of inconsistent decisions within a circuit. This is
contrary to Rule 35, which indicates that panels have the power to reject
panel precedent in the circuit. Although the Supreme Court recognized
that panels have the judicial power to reject panel precedent, the courts of
appeals, through the interpanel rule, deny the existence of such power.
The procedural deviation from the Supreme Court's intent is that the
courts of appeals have developed their own rule for resolving conflicting
intracircuit panel precedent. The court-made rule states that if a panel's
decision is inconsistent with the previous decision of a panel in the same
circuit, the later decision is not the law; it is invalid.16 This rule mandates
that there be no inconsistent interpanel decisions in a circuit. Inconsisten-
cies are aborted at conception. The Supreme Court, in Rule 35(a), foresaw
that such inconsistencies would arise and provided a mechanism for resolv-
ing them, but did not require that they be resolved. If the Court, acting
with the express authority of Congress, had intended no inconsistent in-
terpanel decisions in a circuit, it would have required en banc resolutions or
provided some other procedure to assure consistency.
B. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with the Statute Authorizing
Panels
The interpanel rule not only prohibits each panel in a given circuit from
overruling other panels' decisions, it also forbids a panel from overruling its
own decisions.17 Thus, for circuit panels, the doctrine of stare decisis takes
15. See, e.g., 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 235.02 n.3 (2d ed.
1992) ("The function of the in bane hearing is important in resolving conflicting decisions within
the circuit ... ").
16. Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 n.2 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of
reh'g, (5th Cir. 1992); Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
17. Although no case was found that addresses this point directly, this conclusion is inherent
in the interpanel rule itself when stated in the form that only an en bane court can overrule panel
precedent. See, e.g., Ford v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e
note that the task of reexamining and overruling panel decisions is left to the full Court, sitting en
bane."); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978) ("This panel, of course, is bound by
Sylvestri and cannot properly overrule it except by rehearing en bane."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979); see also Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 72 ("In
theory, prior-panel rules permit panels to create binding precedent, which can be overruled only
by the entire court sitting en bane.").
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on an absoluteness that is contrary to the intent of that doctrine. Stare
decisis, as described by the Supreme Court, is "not an inexorable com-
mand""s and "not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion." 19 In the Supreme Court's formulation of the doctrine, courts not
only have the power to reject their previous holdings, they have an obliga-
tion to do so in some circumstances.20 Yet, under the interpanel rule,
panels have neither the power nor the obligation to deviate from their past
decisions.21
The statute22 creating the authority of panels to decide cases does not
hint that Congress intended to burden society with a set of handicapped
courts. The statute mandates that "cases" and "controversies" "shall be
heard and determined"23 by panels. The statute places no restrictions on
"heard and determined." No language in the statute implies that a funda-
mental property of stare decisis, the authority of a court to overrule its own
precedent, is to be changed. Such radical departure from stare decisis, an
integral part of the common law, would require a clear expression of Con-
gress's intent to change the judicial course. Not only is there no clear ex-
pression in the statute authorizing panels, there is no evidence of it at all.
The interpanel rule is simply court-made law that sharply contrasts with
the statute the courts are purporting to apply. The interpanel rule should
be rejected, and panels should be able to apply stare decisis in full measure
like all other courts.
C. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with Statutes That Create an
Appeal as of Right.
Courts of appeals are given "jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the district courts."12 4 That grant of jurisdiction,25 which is obliga-
tory for the courts of appeals, creates a right to have the courts of appeals
18. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
19. Id. at 2609-10 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
20. See, ag., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("[T]he decision to reexamine Plessy was... not only justified
but required."); Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing two important ex-
amples of the Court applying this process).
21. The strongest evidence of this proposition is that no court stating the interpanel rule has
noted an exception for its own precedent. See cases cited supra note 7; see also supra note 17.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
25. This applies to all parties in a civil case, defendants in criminal cases, and the government
regarding certain issues in criminal cases.
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exercise the jurisdiction.26 The interpanel rule, however, depreciates this
right.
A right to have a court exercise its jurisdiction means a right to have the
court exercise its judicial power. That is the meaning of jurisdiction. The
judicial power of a court includes the authority to reject its own prece-
dent.27 Thus, when a party with a right to an appeal goes before a panel
encumbered with the interpanel rule, that party's right is curtailed.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE INTERPANEL RULE IS INVALID
Just because a legal doctrine has exceptions does not render the doctrine
invalid. However, as the number of exceptions increases, confidence in the
doctrine declines. Moreover, if the exceptions are necessary to avoid con-
flicts between the doctrine and very fundamental legal principles, the doc-
trine is questioned even further. As the discussion of the exceptions to the
interpanel doctrine will show, the interpanel doctrine contains both of these
symptoms, which makes its legal validity questionable.
Some exceptions to the interpanel rule, although very narrow and pre-
cise, implicate fundamental questions of judicial power. In this category are
the cases in which a panel is confronted with a ruling by a prior panel that
would vest jurisdiction in the panel when none exists. The dilemma facing
the court is whether to follow the interpanel rule and allow a court to create
jurisdiction or to engage in "soft rejection" of the rule: that is, find an ex-
ception and respect the jurisdictional boundaries created by Congress.
An example of this dilemma and how it can be resolved is found in
Hayes v. United States Government Printing Office.28 The issue in Hayes
was the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in a mixed-motive2 9 appeal from
the Merit System Protection Board. An earlier motions panel found juris-
diction; the later merits panel refused to be bound by that holding.3 ° The
inability to revisit that question would have been at odds with the court's
basic power to decide whether it had jurisdiction, and questions of jurisdic-
26. "Ordinarily the conferral of jurisdiction without mention of discretion to decline to exer-
cise it has been construed to make the exercise of jurisdiction obligatory. Read this way, § 1291
confers on persons aggrieved by a final decision of the district court a right to review by the court
of appeals." 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, 110.05.
27. See United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Reinhardt &
Nelson, JJ., concurring) (discussing differences between courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
in applying stare decisis).
28. 684 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
29. A mixed-motive case is one in which a federal employee "raises allegations both of dis-
crimination and of insufficient evidence to support the agency decision of [poor performance or
misconduct]."
30. Hayes, 684 F.2d at 138 n.1.
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tion can be considered at any stage of a proceeding. The same reasoning
has been applied when, after a panel grants interlocutory appeal, 31 a later
panel concludes that the decision was incorrect and amounted to the panel
creating jurisdiction.32
A second narrow exception arises when en banc review of a panel's deci-
sion is not possible. In these cases, a later panel is not bound by the earlier
panel's decision. An example of this exception is North Carolina Utilities
Commission v. Federal Communications Commission.33 In this Fourth Cir-
cuit case, all but one of the active judges of the court were disqualified, and
thus en banc review was not possible. The court, which included two
judges from the Fifth Circuit sitting by designation, held that when the
interpanel rule would deny the parties the right to even the possibility of a
review of panel precedent, a right guaranteed by statute, the interpanel rule
must yield.34
Courts chafing under the strain of the interpanel rule also use a broader
and more malleable exception, the "intervening change" exception. This
exception provides that if an intervening, controlling change in the law oc-
curs after a panel decides an issue, a later panel is not bound by the earlier
panel's decision. The intervening change can be caused by the en banc
court,35 the Supreme Court,36 Congress,37 or an authoritative state court or
legislature when that state's law is controlling. 38
Intervening changes in the law often are within the discretion of
the hearing court. A panel faced with precedent it believes is wrong
almost certainly can weave a complex argument that points to some
shift in the intervening law.39 Gresham Park Community Organization v.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
32. Ray v. Edwards, 725 F.2d 655, 658 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984).
33. 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. AT&T v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
34. Id. at 1044-45.
35. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 908-09 (11th
Cir. 1990).
36. See, e.g., Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207, 1211 (1 th Cir. 1992) ("We may decline
to follow a decision of a prior panel if necessary to give full effect to a United States Supreme
Court decision."); Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
326 (1991); Adamson v. Lewis, 955 F.2d 614, 620 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (referring to a collection of
cases so holding), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
37. United States v. Woodard, 938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1210 (1992).
38. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 936 F.2d 571 (5th
Cir. 1991).
39. Unfortunately, using complexity to obscure questionable reasoning was not beyond even
Justice Marshall. Jerry J. Phillips, Marbury v. Madison and Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act,
60 TENN. L. REV. 51, 52 (1992) ("The reasoning on this issue, which is central to the outcome of
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Howell' illustrates how far panels will stretch to escape panel precedent
that they consider in error. The plaintiffs in Gresham Park sought an in-
junction under federal civil rights law41 to prohibit the enforcement of an
injunction issued by a Georgia state court. The panel in Gresham Park was
faced with clear panel precedent from Brown v. Chastain.42 In that case, the
panel held that the district court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the state
court's order.43 The Gresham Park panel acknowledged that Brown was
consistent with a "line of the Fifth Circuit cases"" and that Brown had
been followed by other panels.45 Using questionable legal analysis, the
panel avoided precedent. The panel developed two arguments for not fol-
lowing Brown, but neither argument is persuasive.
The panel's first effort to avoid Brown involved the claim that Brown
was implicitly inconsistent with two later Supreme Court cases, Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd.,4 6 and Juidice v. Vail,47 which applied the abstention doctrine.
The panel premised that if the Supreme Court abstains from hearing a case,
it must have had jurisdiction to hear the case.48 That premise is highly
questionable. Perhaps neither the parties nor the Court raised the issue of
jurisdiction. In Califano v. Sanders,49 the Court considered the issue of a
court deciding the merits without considering jurisdiction. In Califano, the
court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was not an in-
dependent basis for jurisdiction. 0 The Court referred to previous cases it
had decided in which jurisdiction had been assumed to exist under the
APA, although the issue had not been considered.5 It is simply not univer-
sally true that a court must have had jurisdiction if it decides a case or if it
the case, is as confusing and convoluted as any to be found in constitutional law. One suspects
Marshall of intentionally confusing the issue, to obscure the weakness of his reasoning.") (footnote
omitted).
40. 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
42. 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970).
43. Gresham Park, 652 F.2d at 1234 ("Under Brown, the district court here would have no
jurisdiction over GPCO's suit to enjoin the enforcement of the state court order.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1234 n.14.
46. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
47. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
48. Gresham Park, 652 F.2d at 1234.
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988).
50. 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
51. Id. "Three decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little discussion, that the
APA is an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, an Act of Congress enacted
since our grant of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is
not to be interpreted as an implicit grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions."
Id. (citations omitted).
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decides to abstain. The argument in Gresham Park based on that assump-
tion is grounded on a false premise and therefore leads to an invalid
conclusion.
Gresham Park's second argument to circumvent Brown asserted that
later cases in the Fifth Circuit departed from Brown. The panel cited Henry
v. First National Bank (Henry 1)52 and Henry v. First National Bank (Henry
11)" as departing from Brown. The weakness in this argument is that these
cases should have been invalid under the interpanel rule because they were
decided after Brown and were required to follow Brown. 4 To avoid the
error it perceived in Brown, the panel in Gresham Park should have faced
squarely the interpanel rule, which appeared to make Brown binding. In-
stead, the panel constructed complex arguments based on dubious premises.
Ironically, it also relied on decisions that ignored the interpanel rule, as it
strove to show that it did not have to ignore the rule.
Another exception to the interpanel rule based on serious or egregious
errors allows panels even more opportunity to avoid the interpanel rule. Of
course, the later panel will decide whether the earlier panel precedent was
erroneous and, if so, whether the error was serious enough to warrant rejec-
tion. This is a prescription for rule-swallowing if ever there was one.
Panels have been willing to follow the prescription. An example of this
willingness is Tucker v. Phyfer.55 While panel precedent controlled the out-
come in Tucker, the earlier decision failed to mention a controlling
Supreme Court decision that would have determined the outcome.56 Con-
sequently, the later panel felt free to reject the earlier panel's holding. 7
Courts have also developed the manifest injustice rule, a more generic
rule based on the "egregious error" exception. Under this exception, the
later panel is free to re-examine the issue if following panel precedent would
cause manifest injustice.58 The later panel, of course, determines whether
following precedent would result in manifest injustice.
If unable to find an intervening change in the law or rationalize a finding
of egregious error or manifest injustice, a panel has a final escape valve from
52. 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied sub. nomL Henry v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
405 U.S. 1019 (1972).
53. 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
54. See supra text accompanying note 16.
55. 819 F.2d 1030 (1lth Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 1035 n.7.
57. Id.
58. See, eg., United States v. Fooladi, 746 F.2d 1027, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e see no
reason to conclude that the panel's ruling was 'manifest injustice.' "), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006
(1985).
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the interpanel rule. A panel can rely on the principle that all courts should
decide cases according to their reasoned view of the way the Supreme Court
would decide the case today, rather than limiting their function to mere
blind adherence to precedent.5 9 Panels quite rationally have concluded that
they, like all courts, have this power.6°
With the many exceptions, including some based on judicial discretion
and judgment, it is difficult to imagine a case that a panel could not exempt
from the interpanel rule.61 The interpanel rule is not a principle of law for
courts to follow, but an obstacle for them to avoid. It has been openly
ignored;62 its existence has been vigorously denied by a Senior Circuit Judge
of the Sixth Circuit;63 and it has been avoided by a 1982 finding that an
1891 case had been overruled sub silentio by an 1894 Supreme Court deci-
sion. 64 The interpanel rule is no longer conducive to coherent, reasoned
judgments, and it forces strained logic based on questionable premises and
nebulous implications in Supreme Court precedent. Such a state of affairs is
an obvious example of exceptions swallowing a rule. The interpanel rule has
lost its compulsion, its ability to bind panels, and is at best an alternative to
its expanding exceptions.
59. Cf Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We con-
clude that the courts of appeal should decide cases according to their reasoned view of the way
[the] Supreme Court would decide the pending case today.").
60. Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 & n.4 (Ist Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(overruling precedent after circulating opinion to all active judges;, advised that this should be
done only sparingly and with extreme caution); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 945 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that a panel can overrule panel precedent in
"those few instances in which newly emergent authority, although not directly controlling, never-
theless offers a convincing reason for believing that the earlier panel, in light of the neoteric devel-
opments, would change its course"), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993).
61. In the opinion of one chief judge, the more judges in a circuit, the less likely the interpanel
rule is to be applied. Tjoflat, supra note 17, at 72 ("As the monitoring burden grows with the size
of the court, jumbo court judges simply abandon their prior-panel rule implicitly, if not by
design.").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1979); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Tjoflat, supra note 17, at 70 ("[T]here are too many situations in
which three-judge panels, in their published opinions, have glossed over precedent or have disre-
garded it sub silentio, or in unpublished opinions, have decided cases plainly contrary to an estab-
lished rule of law.").
63. Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979) ("However, there is no rule in
this Circuit which requires an en banc hearing to overrule a decision of a three-judge panel."),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1076 (1980).
64. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE THE INTERPANEL RULE
Discarding the interpanel rule is only half of the job; a replacement is
needed. Three alternatives are proposed in this Article for completing this
task. The first alternative would allow conflicting panel precedent in a cir-
cuit. The second and third alternatives would eliminate that possibility and
the legal uncertainty created by it.
The first alternative to replace the interpanel rule would permit a panel
to depart from, but not to overrule, prior panels' decisions. The amount of
weight or deference to be given to panel precedent would be for the courts
to decide by an evolutionary process. One possibility would be the standard
applied by federal district courts regarding intradistrict precedent: to follow
such precedent as a matter of comity except in unusual or exceptional
circumstances.65
If the alternative of freeing panels to accept or reject panel precedent
were adopted, circuits would have conflicting precedent. There would be
an increased need for en bane courts to exercise their authority to resolve
the conflicts and to maintain or achieve uniformity.66 In circumstances
likely to result in rehearings, circuit rules to guide the en bane courts
would inject more predictability into the system. This, in turn, would
greatly benefit the bar.
If the existence of conflicts and the increased docket of the court en
bane seem too steep a price for rejecting the interpanel rule, courts could
utilize a variation of this alternative and establish a senior panel to rehear
and resolve conflicts. 67
The second alternative that could replace the interpanel rule would
grant panels the authority to disregard intracircuit panel precedent, and
also the power to overrule it. As in the first proposal, the courts would
determine the weight panel precedent is to have. However, a decision in-
consistent with such precedent would overrule it. This approach is analo-
gous to the long-standing rule of the Supreme Court that when two of its
decisions are in conflict, the more recent one has the effect of overruling the
older one.68 This second alternative has the advantage of giving a high level
of certainty to the law in the circuits. It also would not increase the pres-
65. See supra note 6.
66. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
67. Even under the interpanel rule, a panel can be authorized to overrule circuit precedent by
the full court and all active members. See United States v. Taylor, 828 F.2d 630, 633 (10th Cir.
1987).
68. Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (basing rule on
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1976) and Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129, 132 (1888)).
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sure on en banc courts to rehear cases merely to achieve uniformity in the
circuit.
The courts of appeals could adopt either alternative without legislation.
The third, however, would require intervention of the Supreme Court to
change Rule 35. Under this approach, when a panel determines that con-
trolling panel precedent is wrong, it would certify the issue to the court en
banc. The court en banc would be required to hear and decide that issue.69
A variation of this model would authorize the court en banc to empower a
panel to resolve this issue. Either form of this third proposal would prevent
conflicting panel precedent in a circuit. The price for this certainty would
be an increased burden on the en banc court to hear more cases, a burden
that could be eliminated by the suggested variation.
V. CONCLUSION
The interpanel rule deprives panels of part of their judicial power, de-
nies parties a portion of their right of appeal, and dilutes the strength of the
Supreme Court's enactments. The courts have ambiguously and obliquely
eliminated the interpanel rule by creating a spiraling array of exceptions.
This has made reliance on the rule uncertain. The courts have rejected the
substance of the rule, but have left the facade standing. It is time to bring
that down, too. The judicial system would benefit if the courts of appeals
eliminated the rule decisively and directly.
The most reasonable replacement for the interpanel rule is the first alter-
native presented in Part IV. Under that model, panels would be freed from
the control of panel, but not en banc, precedent. This enhances the author-
ity of the panel hearing a case and thereby restores a major portion of the
parties' rights of appeal. It would also re-establish the duty of resolving
conflicts for en banc courts as envisioned by the Supreme Court. Neither of
the other two alternatives meets these boundary conditions as well as the
first, but either would be better than the current interpanel rule.
69. Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (The court en
banc had the power to determine what issues it would consider, and it could grant rehearing
limited to specific issues only.).
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ESSAY
WAKE THE NATION: LAW STUDENT
INSIGHTS INTO THE
NEW JERUSALEM,
THOMAS L. SHAFFER 2
ANTHONY J. FEJFAR3
Let the River Run,
Let All the Dreamers Wake the Nation,
Come the New Jerusalem!4
Mike Nichols's 1988 movie Working Girl5 gave Melanie Griffith "a
star-making showcase" for her talents; it gave Harrison Ford a chance to
show that he could play light comedy; and its theme song, Let the River
Run, won an Academy Award for Carly Simon.6 After watching and dis-
cussing the movie with groups of law students from our respective universi-
ties,7 we noticed that both the movie and the song make a religious claim,
one that we take seriously. This claim can be found in the principal apoca-
lyptic literature in the New Testament:
And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven
and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea.
And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from
God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.
1. Title adapted from CARLY SIMON, Let the River Run, on WORKING GIRL SOUNDTRACK
(Arista Records 1989).
2. Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. B.A. 1958, Uni-
versity of Albuquerque; J.D. 1961, University of Notre Dame; LL.D. 1983, St. Mary's University.
3. Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A. 1981, Creighton
University; J.D. 1985, University of Nebraska.
4. SIMON, supra note 1.
5. WORKING GIRL (Twentieth Century Fox 1988).
6. LEONARD MALTIN, LEONARD MALTIN'S MOVIE AND VIDEO GUIDE 1410 (1993).
7. The Harrisburg campus of the Widener University School of Law is a constituent part of
the largest law school in the United States. The law school at the University of Notre Dame, now
in its 126th year, is a culturally and ethnographically Roman Catholic, but otherwise widely di-
verse, institution.
To remove fluency obstacles, not noticeable to listeners but which would be distracting to
readers, we have edited the students' oral remarks that are presented here. Additionally, the
remarks are arranged thematically.
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And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tab-
ernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they
shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their
God.
And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there
shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall
there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.
And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things
new. And he said unto me, Write: for these words are true and
faithful.8
"Let the River Run," the song says. "Let All the Dreamers Wake the Na-
tion. Come the New Jerusalem!"9
In Working Girl, Tess McGill is a secretary in a New York City securi-
ties firm who goes to night school, pays attention to business as if she were
an analyst rather than a secretary, and prepares to be, as she thinks, more
than she is. She is not content to ride the ferry across New York Harbor
between Wall Street and New Jersey twice a day; she is not content, as it
turns out, to share her life with a boyfriend whose ambition is to own his
own boat.
Tess McGill's creators may have envisioned Thomas Hardy's Tess,10
but their creation, unlike Hardy's, is not an object of fate. Tess McGill takes
control of her life; she is out to change things. She is a "Dreamer" out to
"Wake the Nation." She is a bright, working-class young woman, deter-
mined to get ahead. Tess does get ahead, not by diligence alone (she is not a
8. Revelation 21:1-5 (King James Int'l Version). This Christian vision invokes the more an-
cient Hebraic version:
Awake, awake;
Put on thy strength, 0 Zion;
Put on thy beautiful garments,
O Jerusalem, the holy city;
For henceforth there shall no more come into thee
The uncircumcised and the unclean.
Shake thyself from the dust,
Arise, and sit down, 0 Jerusalem;
Loose thyself from the bands of thy neck,
O captive daughter of Zion.
Isaiah 52:1-2 (Jewish Publication Society). Rabbi Joseph Hertz says, in an editorial note to this
Jewish apocalyptic vision of the restoration of the Temple after the Babylonian captivity: "Jerusa-
lem will rise again from its present degradation. Let her array herself as a queen, surrounded by
her restored children. The mountains and waste places of Judea shall rejoice at the Lord's trium-
phal return to Zion." PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 837 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1987).
9. SIMON, supra note 1.
10. See generally THOMAS HARDY, TEsS OF THE D'URBERVILLES (Juliet Grindle & Simon
Gatrell eds., Oxford University Press 1983) (1891).
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Horatio Alger heroine), nor because she locates powerful patrons (she is no
Pygmalion either), but by trickery. Tess pretends that she is her boss, an
ambitious, socially credentialed yuppie named Katharine Parker. While
Parker is in the hospital recovering from a skiing injury, Tess is able to
succeed in her undertakings because of the deception.
"Who makes it happen?" Tess asks herself in a little self-help exercise
she learned from her boss. "I do. I make it happen," she answers. For a
while, she, like a lawyer, exercises power she does not have. Or rather, she
exercises power without authority. However, unlike most lawyers, she acts
through deception. For a while, as she puts it, she refuses to follow "rules
that I had nothing to do with setting up."
Eventually, the deception is uncovered and for a while Tess is defeated.
But then Tess attracts the attention of her own Daddy Warbucks, and by
the end of the movie, she is a entry-level corporate manager in a new job.
She has her own office, dresses like Katharine Parker, and is far from the
madding crowd of the secretarial pool. She telephones her friends there and
tells them what has happened, and they cheer at her success.
In the last scene of the movie, Nichols's camera pans away from Tess's
new office, like a bird flying away, out of the window and into the sky over
New York City. The scene widens to show Tess's office as a cubicle among
cubicles, like a shoe box on the shelf with hundreds of other shoe boxes in
the back of a store. It is a single-occupant, junior manager's cubicle,
though, in a building on Wall Street, a place of power and yet perhaps the
most provincial place in America. It is surrounded by scores of offices with
scores of junior managers working in them, but Tess has her own window
now. She is one of the managers, ready, in a phrase Auden used, for an-
other entirely male generation of young managers to trudge on time to a
tidy fortune.
This final scene could as easily have shown the office of a beginning
associate in a law firm on Wall Street or in one of the scores of law firms in
other cities that have adopted the ethos of Wall Street law. We law teachers
and our students, of course, thought of Tess's resemblance to a beginning
big-firm lawyer as we asked ourselves about Tess's vision-the New
Jerusalem:
Tom (not Shaffer): I'll say the New Jerusalem is her office, definitely.
Getting the office. I think her religion.., was to get this job, and she's in
heaven at the end of the movie when she gets her office.
Cindy: Her New Jerusalem was not just the job. I think it was the
happiness. I think she is going to change the system by the way she does
things herself.
1993]
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Eric: But is that saying she's just become one of the cogs in the system?
Is the dream to become one of the cogs in the system? It seemed to me that
her life was much more vibrant and real before she became successful.
Regina: I don't think that just because she had that one office in that
big office building makes her a cog. I think it's just a start of her New
Jerusalem. She's just starting out; she's going to, hopefully, go forward. At
the end with her new secretary, she doesn't lay down any rules; she doesn't
lay down any laws; they're going to work together. I think that's building
her New Jerusalem. She has to make a difference and make it a little better.
Fred: You do get the sense that she's become one of the pillars in the
New Jerusalem. She is a woman buying into a man's system instead of a
woman looking to change the system that she saw the initial fault in. At the
end, the elation shows to me a kind of complacency that doesn't indicate
that she's going to change the system that was giving her the shaft in the
beginning.
Bobby: When you become a part of corporate America, you may very
well change to reflect the values of the individuals that brought you there.
The position is tailored by the people who brought you there. You have to
fit in to what they have chosen to put you into. You become one of them.
Monica: How many corporate men did we see? Not very many; we saw
a few. But look at those vast secretarial pools. I mean floors and floors of
them. So she went and got out of that. I think that is really a huge contri-
bution, rather than just this ditsy little thing who was looking for a mink or
a six-thousand-dollar dress. I didn't see it as quite that superficial.
Barry: She wasn't going to go along with what everybody else was do-
ing. I thought that was the perfect victory for her.
Paul: That remains to be seen. The movie ends with her finally having
somebody underneath her. You never know what is going to happen after
that, when the pressure comes down and you know you are faced with all
these pressures. Who knows what somebody else is going to do? She may
very well turn into another Katharine. You don't know.
Deb: Do you really think that [Tess] is going to turn bad?
Todd: You never know. Maybe. The system does strange things.
Our discussions led us to issues relating to values, the meaning of life,
and cultural trends:
Todd: I think the movie really exemplified what was going on in the
1980s: You have to bend the rules to get to the top. And you have to get to
the top at all costs. When the 1990s started, people started to reject that
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and are now kind of going back to a simpler tradition. I think you can see
that in American culture.
Matt: Maybe if you want to talk about a transition from one decade to
the next, maybe Pretty Woman" "shows [better] how that transition is
moving. In that movie [the ruthless lawyer deal-maker played by Richard
Gere] is not going to be like that anymore. Maybe the reason people like
that movie so much is ... because they have this whole ideal that they don't
believe in anymore, and a new ideal they are starting to believe in again.
Todd: I think a lot of people our age are finally beginning to realize that
the 1980s and greed, and success at all costs, even at the cost of not being
happy in your social life-I don't think that's important anymore, because
people want to go back to the family and go back to having a life outside the
workplace. Materialism has changed, and... values have changed.
Barry (contrasting Tess McGill with her boss, Katharine Parker):
Katharine is a kind of false person. She uses all of these stereotypes, all this
very proper language, and she has all these dates at the country club, and
the perfect vacation, but you get the impression that she doesn't have any
friends in her fake, fragile world. I contrast that with the real life that Tess
is trying to lead, where she does have values; she does have a personality;
she wants accomplishments of her own. She's concerned about personal
things, whereas the other characters seem more concerned about their envi-
ronment and keeping and protecting it the way it is. Maybe in the 1980s
there were so many people that were worried about creating [Katharine's]
kind of world for themselves and creating that kind of image for them-
selves. When I am that old, I certainly hope I am not doing that kind of
dance.
Cindy: There is no set thing that we have to do. That's what was said
about our generation which is so true.
We also reflected upon "the system" and "society," and our own
dreams and hopes for the future:
Bobby: From my perspective as a black man, the system is bad.... I
don't want to belabor the point, but I think there is a way to change it, and
a few people are in a position where they really can. Those are some of the
people that have a goal in mind and are not really looking for a lot of return
from things.... If you are not looking solely for monetary reward for what
you are doing, then I think it becomes a little easier to keep changing things
11. PRE=rY WOMAN (Touchstone Pictures 1990).
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and to not necessarily buy into the system, and yet still be part of the
system.
Tom: I don't think society is so bad. I think maybe what needs to be
changed is for people to set their goals not necessarily based so much on
success, so that "success" is going to make me an unhappy or happy person.
But maybe to say some things like: "If you make it that's great, but if not,
if you are happy, that is the most important thing." To de-emphasize the
material things in life.
Cindy: One of the things I have realized since coming to law school and
having had the opportunity to reflect on my life is that we can do anything
we want with this degree. You can go out there and teach, or work in
shelters, work for a corporate firm, whatever. There is not one set thing.
Susan: I came from an ethnic family and I'm the first woman from my
family to graduate from college and will be the first lawyer in the family....
The American Dream in my family, though, is not to be educated. It took
me eight years out after college to go back to higher education. In my
family, it was more the work ethic. Get out and get a job. You were only
valued if you worked. For me, education has been part of the American
Dream. So now I'm being educated, and when I get out I'm going to be
fifty thousand dollars in debt. So I don't know whether that is a dream or
not. Sometimes I get scared that I traded one thing for another.
Cindy: There are a lot of things you can do that will also [allow you to]
pay your loan payments. There are lots of things you can do and still pay
your loan payments and live in a meager way. I mean there is no set way
that you have to do things. I think people need to realize that, and you
need to go out and look for that.
Deb: You hear a lot about our generation being lazy. Just because a
large consensus doesn't want to work sixty to eighty hours a week, like the
last generation did, I don't think that's lazy. I think it's just a change of
priorities. Make enough money just to have enough fun and a good life.
Matt: So your priorities really have changed. Once everybody has obli-
gations, i.e., family, children, I think we will try to be at least as involved
with our children as our parents were with us. In the 1990s, that is going to
take a tremendous amount of work. I don't think things are going to slow
down.
John: As long as law schools are so expensive, if you've been to law
school, it makes people almost have to take out loans, have to take jobs that
are high paying and usually very demanding. I think it's a vicious cycle.
Todd: Not necessarily. It just takes longer to pay them off. I'm taking
a job that is nowhere near the amount of money I could be making. It's just
going to take longer to pay it off, just because it's what I want, here, right
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now. I just want to forsake that twelve-hour workday because I don't think
it's worth it. All you do is get ulcers; you don't accomplish anything in the
long run. You are not happy. What's the point of living the life if all you
are doing is working, working, working, when you don't have time off for
yourself and your loved ones?
Keri: But the thing is, you are going to get ulcers if you're forty-five and
you can't buy a house yet. I mean, maybe this is selfish of me, but I don't
want to have to struggle like my parents did, and I won't.
Matt: I don't want my kids to have to struggle either.
There are, perhaps, two notions in those conversations about what the
New Jerusalem is. One notion is, like the imagery the song appropriates,
apocalyptic: a new personal horizon for Tess, 2 a position from which she
can be effective against injustice, enjoy freedom from oppression, and even
realize the American Dream of prosperity and self-sufficiency. The other
notion is what the theologians call a prophetic notion: Tess represents a
generation that will return to and proclaim the values of its living
tradition."a
The risk, in either notion, is that Tess will become like her oppressors;
she will become an oppressor of others. She will take on, from those in
other junior-manager cubicles and those who put them there, what Walter
Brueggemann calls "static royalist consciousness," a religion whose god is
limited by those who exercise political and religious power. 4 The culture
that accompanies such a god is characterized by what Brueggemann calls
12. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a "new" horizon. Rather, a new horizon can
only develop out of a past horizon or tradition, and what is "new" will always retain some of the
"old." See HANS G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 306 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Mar-
shall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) ("[T]he horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past.").
13. In the text we refer to "tradition" as "living" because a tradition can only be preserved
through the creative acts of those who have inherited it. As Gadamer puts it, "In a tradition...
old and new are always combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly
foregrounded from the other." Id.
14. WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THE PROPHETIC IMAGINATION 17 (1978). According to
Brueggemann, during the life of Moses the gods of Egypt were the "immovable lords of order."
Id. Theirs was a culture of "static royalist consciousness" and a religion of "static triumphalism,"
where the gods called for the legitimation of the societal status quo:
In Egypt ...there were no revolutions, no breaks for freedom. There were only the
necessary political and economic arrangements to provide order, "naturally," the order of
Pharaoh. Thus the religion of the static gods is not and never could be disinterested, but
inevitably it served the interests of the people in charge, presiding over the order and bene-
fitting from the order. And the functioning of that society testified to the rightness of the
religion because kings did prosper and bricks did get made.
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the "religion of static triumphalism" and the "politics of oppression and
exploitation."' 5
Brueggemann's alternative Hebraic and biblical religion is suggested in
the students' perception that Tess's relationship with her secretary will be
different than the relationship Katharine Parker had with Tess. It is what
he calls "alternative prophetic consciousness," a faith in which the believer
sees and feels the suffering of other persons and dares to imagine and act to
help bring about an alternative vision of society based upon love and jus-
tice. 6 Such a person is moved by a consciousness that integrates creative
15. Id. The Israel of King Solomon, characterized by static royalist consciousness, was one
where consumer goods seemed plentiful and survival assured-at least for the King and royal
society. Id. at 33. The affluence of the royal class, however, did not come without a price: "Cove-
nanting which takes brothers and sisters seriously had been replaced by consuming which regards
brothers and sisters as products to be used." Id.
Brueggemann also points out that the affluence of the royal class was made possible by the
presence of an "oppressive social policy":
[This] affluence was undoubtedly hierarchical and not democratic in its distribution. Obvi-
ously some people lived well off the efforts of others, for we are reminded that there were
those 'who built houses and did not live in them, who planted vineyards, and did not drink
their wine.' Fundamental to social policy was the practice of forced labor, in which at least
to some extent citizens existed to benefit the state or the corporate economy.
Id.
Additionally, Brueggemann suggests that there was a relationship between imperial economics
and a religion of static triumphalism. Id. at 34. The economics of affluence and the accompany-
ing social policy of repression were effectuated through the "establishment of a controlled, static
religion in which God and his temple have become part of the royal landscape, in which the
sovereignty of God is fully subordinated to the purpose of the king." Id. (emphasis omitted).
This is a domesticated god who is under the "control" of the political-religious status quo, a god
who is static and distant and whose passion is tamed. See id. at 35.
16. Moses, the paradigm of the prophet, carried a prophetic vision of an alternative con-
sciousness that had two dimensions: "a religion of God's freedom as alternative to the static
imperial religion of order and triumph and a politics of justice and compassion as alternative to
the imperial politics of oppression." Id. at 18. The underlying point being that "there is no
freedom of God without the politics of justice and compassion, and there is no politics of justice
and compassion without a religion of the freedom of God." Id. Thus, Brueggemann states that
alternative prophetic consciousness must be both critical and energizing: "Our faith tradition
understands that it is precisely the dialectic of criticizing and energizing which can let us be
seriously faithful to God." Id. at 14. It is precisely here, Brueggemann points out, that our
popular political culture, in both its "conservative" and its "liberal" manifestations, fails to seri-
ously challenge the status quo. This is because:
The liberal tendency has been to care about the politics of justice and compassion but to be
largely uninterested in the freedom of God. Indeed, it has been hard for liberals to imagine
that theology matters, for it seemed irrelevant. It was thought that the question of God
could safely be left to others who still worried about such matters. As a result, social
radicalism has been like a cut flower without nourishment, without any sanctions deeper
than human courage and good intentions. Conversely, it has been the tendency in con-
servative quarters to care intensely about God, but uncritically, so that the God of well-
being and good order is not understood to be precisely the source of social oppression.
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imagination and critical analysis with passionate, caring love.17 Several stu-
dents suggested that an alternative prophetic consciousness would manifest
itself in Tess's relationship with her secretary, since one of the lasting im-
pressions of Tess (a credit to the character and to Griffith's art) is her ability
to love. The fact that such a skill is realistically related to doing business on
Wall Street is a piece of feminist consciousness that is evidently
apocalyptic.1 8
Both of these postures, as well as what our students see as the New
Jerusalem and what they fear may come to them instead, are matters of
faith. The faith of static royalist consciousness is faith in evident power, the
sort of evident power Tess saw around her when she was in the secretarial
pool. Under this faith, individual capacity for creativity, critical analysis,
and even for care, is repressed, numbed, or skewed in such a way that Tess
becomes oblivious to the fact that personal, communal, and societal con-
sciousness can be transformed. She becomes so weary, perhaps, or cynical,
or diverted, that she cannot find the energy to challenge the arrangements
of power in which she is getting by.19
Id. at 18. The epistemological message of such consciousness may not be a popular one: "[T]he
dominant culture, now and in every time, is grossly uncritical, cannot tolerate serious and funda-
mental criticism, and will go to great lengths to stop it." Id. at 14.
17. See Anthony J. Fejfar, A Road Less Traveled: Critical Realist Foundational Consciousness
in Lawyering and Legal Education, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 327 (1990/91) (discussing critical realist
foundational consciousness as an integrated mode of consciousness).
18. See ROSEMARY R. RUETHER, NEW WOMAN, NEW EARTH: SEXIST IDEOLOGIES AND
HUMAN LIBERATION (1975) (discussing the need for a new society in which love is no longer
relegated to a passive domestic sphere, but is instead expressed passionately in all dimensions of
life).
19. See BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 14, at 41, 46. Brueggemann points out that in order to
maintain itself, the static royalist consciousness of the Solomonic era had to find a way to numb
the feelings of the people and direct their energies away from prophetic concerns and lifestyles.
Id. This was accomplished in several ways. First, through the development of a static cosmos
theology, in which it is assumed that the constitution of present and future society has been pre-
ordained, and in which human nature, forms of human interaction, and even God are assumed to
be static and unchanging. Id. at 34, 41. Moreover, the presence of passionate, caring love in
religion, people, and community had to be eliminated: "[P]assion as the capacity and readiness to
care, to suffer, to die, and to feel is the enemy of imperial reality." Id. at 41.
Second, there is another equally powerful tool at the disposal of royalist consciousness: indi-
vidual or familial satiation. Id. "Imperial economics is designed to keep people satiated so that
they do not notice. Its politics is intended to block out the cries of the denied ones. Its religion is
to be an opiate so that no one discerns misery alive in the heart of God." Id. Within this political-
religious reality of Solomon's time, "the human agenda of justice was utilized for security. The
God of freedom and justice was co-opted for an eternal now. And in place of passion comes
satiation." Id. at 40-41. Thus, Brueggemann concludes that "the dominant history of that pe-
riod, like the dominant history of our own time, consists in briefcases and limousines and press
conferences... and new weaponry systems. And that is not a place where much dancing happens
and where no groaning is permitted." Id. at 41-42.
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"Sometimes I sing and dance around the house in my underwear,"
Tess's friend Cyn tells her. "Doesn't make me Madonna. Never will."
And Tess, in a rare moment of discouragement, tells herself to wise up and
not take the whole thing so seriously. That is the way static royalist con-
sciousness feels to a person at the bottom of the ladder. Our students
seemed to say that such consciousness is idolatry. It is as much idolatry as
it is the self-deceptive perpetuation of injustice that their immediate fore-
bears accepted and that they will not accept. Still, the weariness or cyni-
cism that Tess experiences does not simply materialize out of nowhere. It
comes from within an organizational culture in which persons, especially
working-class women, are treated as objects or commodities.2 0 They are to
be used as Tess's male superiors attempted to use her for their own ad-
vancement. In an early scene that our students did not discuss, Tess has an
opportunity to improve her situation, and that of her immediate superiors,
by granting sexual favors to a man who is able to help them along.
In this and other scenes in the movie, Tess is made the object of sexist
jokes by nonclerical male colleagues. Tess is not taken seriously as a person
who is unique and talented; rather she is told that in order to "get ahead"
she will have to "put out" sexually.
Although our students did not discuss situations of sexual harassment
as blatant as those depicted in the movie, they did describe work exper-
iences in which women were marginalized, stereotyped, or ridiculed:
Susan: The real movie is the one that's not told here. The movie that's
not made; the movie that happens after she's in that position, the way they
treat you. I was told right out: "I have no time for you to have children,
because I have a business to run." I think that you see that culture there in
who [Katharine Parker] was in the movie.
Gretchen: The hardest part, I found, was to have personal relation-
ships, not necessarily romantic relationships, but friendly relationships with
the people at work.
Carla: Well, you have to walk a really fine line between not being too
feminine-because you look too weak compared to the big boys-and then
you have to be feminine enough because you are still a woman and you have
to wear make up.
20. See JOHN KAVANAUGH, FOLLOWING CHRIST IN A CONSUMER SOCIETY: THE SPIRITU-
ALITY OF CULTURAL RESISTANCE (1981) (discussing the impact that economic theory and prac-
tice can have in "commodifying" persons); cf BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 14, at 26 ("The
language of the empire is surely the language of managed reality, of production schedule and
market. But that language will never permit or cause freedom because there is no newness in it.").
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Gretchen: The woman's voice on the phone was never the person that I
wanted to talk to; I always wanted to talk to the person she was working for
... so I had to combat that on the other end.
Susan: In my company, I dealt with all men except one other woman
who was also a manager. One time I tried to set up a meeting with her and
she said well, she couldn't do it that day, because she was going to get her
period. I mean, what was I supposed to say? And these men treated her
like a little girl. I tried to be more professional, and they just didn't know
what to do about it. I didn't get any support from the men, and there were
no other women in management, so what are you going to do there? Your
friends at home don't even know what you're doing; they don't even under-
stand. I felt very alone. Nobody understood, because the men think you're
whining and complaining. So I left. I lasted six months.
Carla: I think many times you have to work harder as a woman to be
taken seriously. You have to be a little bit more careful about the way you
dress, the things that come out of your mouth, when you show emotion in
an office setting. I think you have to be more careful about doing those
kinds of things.
One of several interesting aspects of the movie as a description of cul-
tures is the fact that Tess, Cyn, and Tess's former boyfriend, Mick, all ap-
parently grew up in the same Irish-Italian ethnic neighborhood in northern
New Jersey. While some of us thought that certain parts of the movie were
unrealistic, Cindy, who grew up in an ethnic Italian family and neighbor-
hood on the East Coast, identified with Tess:
Cindy: I identified very, very much with the movie and the way [Tess]
evolves from what she was in the beginning. That reminds me a lot of what
I have done with my career up to this point, in what I've done with my life,
how I've evolved professionally .... I think the reason I identified so well
with the movie... is that I grew up in a neighborhood very much like that,
very ethnic, very Italian. There is so much of that religious thing. I wanted
to do everything I could in my power to get out. I could not wait to get out.
I left home when I was sixteen. I wanted to get the whole vision-of New
York City, the big city-and to leave the neighborhood.
Similarly, Susan, who grew up in an ethnic Italian family, identified
with Tess's mixed feelings toward her ethnic neighborhood and culture. On
the one hand, just as Tess identified with her friends in the old neighbor-
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hood, Susan laments the fact that the neighborhood and familial relation-
ships that she grew up with are disappearing.21
Susan: When my great-grandmother came to this country, everybody
all lived together. The aunts, the uncles, they all lived within a couple of
houses of one another. The Italian church was here, the Irish church here,
and the Polish church here. The religion and the family thing were all one.
The family and your religion were your support. But let's face it, who of us
lives near their family anymore? We all live away. My brothers live on the
West Coast and our family structure has broken down, and with it we have
all become individuals. Now we can only relate to one another as
individuals.
Susan, however, also attributes the patriarchal attitudes that Tess exper-
ienced at the hands of her old boyfriend, Mick, to that same type of ethnic
culture:
Susan: I come from an ethnic Italian family and also was in a manage-
rial position and was the only woman in that position in the company. I
think that your "family" situation can sort of alienate you. Tess didn't re-
late to her boyfriend [Mick] anymore. She told him she got a promotion
and he never even asked her to what [position]? The biggest thing for him
was what was going on with him. I think that was the culture. I mean,
look who he chose [to marry, after he and Tess broke up]? He chose
Doreen Agalagucci, or whatever her name was.... Even [Tess's] girlfriend
[Cyn] wanted to keep her down. Her girlfriend was stressing that she was
breaking out of the mold. They want to keep you where they're at and the
minute you get there they don't understand you, so they really, I think,
discount you.
Susan, however, is not rejecting relationship or community. Instead,
she appears to be looking for relationships of mutual support, rather than
those of domination and subjugation.2 2 In the movie, Susan saw Tess's rela-
tionship with Jack [played by Harrison Ford] as suggesting the possibility
of such mutual support:
Susan: I don't know what the answer is. Maybe the answer is that in
the movie, the man [Jack] might have been somewhat of a support to her.
21. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES ch. 5-7 (1991) (relating the experiences of Italian-American lawyers).
22. See EVELYN EATON WHITEHEAD & JAMES D. WHITEHEAD, MARRYING WELL: STAGES
ON THE JOURNEY OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE (1983) (discussing interdependent marriage relation-
ships involving role sharing and mutual support).
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He seemed a little supportive with the lunch box-better than the average
bear-as far as that kind of stuff. He believed in her.
Given the experiences that some of our students related, and the reli-
gious imagery suggested in the Carly Simon sound track to the movie, it
seems that a deficiency in the picture was the absence of characters and
themes that explicitly involve family and religion. While individual life ex-
periences and attitudes differed, many of our students recognized the im-
portance of their families and religious communities. The issue of family
surfaced in relation to career plans and parental attitudes toward work:
Deb: When I saw this movie I thought of my parents. This movie is the
epitome of what my parents would want me to do-they would love to see
me in a big office. That's what they would think of as success for me and
they would be thrilled if that's what I would do. My values are different
from theirs. I guess it goes back to them having to work really hard all
their lives just to get where they were, and our generation didn't have to
work as hard. [Our generation has] always had everything. We are already
set and programmed to go into the [Katharine Parker] position.
Susan: My Dad was a businessman and I guess I thought the American
Dream was to make money; or for a woman it was to get into the man's
world, be as successful as possible, and don't let them keep you in a box. I
don't know though. Now I think, we can all see the end of law school
coming and I wonder what the dream really is. Is it to get out there and fall
into these stereotypes?
For many of our students, experiences of community and family life
related closely to the religious dimension of their lives. Regina, for exam-
ple, had a positive experience of family, community, and religion, which
had a substantial impact on her attitudes toward work and social justice.23
Her comments suggest an integrated approach to living in which she refuses
to compartmentalize her life.24 It is interesting, in reference to the commu-
nity Tess thinks she is leaving behind and the vague possibilities of a new
23. Apparently, the impact of religious upbringing on attitudes toward social justice is not
just limited to our students. See SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 21, at 189-90 (where Mario
Cuomo discusses in his diary the impact that Catholic education had on his concern for, and
actions on behalf of, those persons in society who are in need).
24. See DANA JACK & RAND JACK, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives, in MAP-
PING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND EDUCATION 263 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988) (discussing women lawyers who
refuse to "split" themselves, and who attempt to express the virtues of care in their professional
activities); see also Fejfar, supra note 17 (contrasting consciousness constituted by a "truncated
self" and consciousness constituted by an "integrated self").
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community to be joined, that the religious dimension for these students is
communal. The New Jerusalem, like the old one, is a community:
Regina: I think you said, Bobby, that you can't be in the business world
and be religious. I don't know what you meant. For me I never thought of
it that way. For me religion is a part of my life everyday. And I couldn't
get through school or work without reflecting on who I am and how I am
behaving. Thinking of others, not passively, but actively. Doing things for
others. I think social consciousness is great and that is what we need. For
me religious faith is more of a personal thing. I was brought up going to
church on Sunday, but it didn't end there. In my family life, we were al-
ways doing things together. Actually, where I am from is a very commu-
nity place, and that must be why I am fortunate. I think that you can't split
yourself.
Cindy and Monica also seem to express an integrated approach to reli-
gion and living:
Cindy: I think religion, whether you go to church on Sunday or
whatever, has to be your way of life. I got very interested in the Jewish
faith .... In the Jewish religion, part of their belief is that, although a lot of
them are orthodox and they follow it strictly as far as going to synagogue
and doing traditional Jewish things, the reality is that religion to them is
not just going to synagogue once a week. It is a way of life; it's family. And
that is what I am about. When I go to church now on Sunday, I do it
because I want to be there and I want to share in what I want to share in.
What I wish is that what a lot of people could get out of religion is that it
should be a way of life. And it's not just that you do things for people, but
you are really thinking about the next person.
Monica: I was brought up in a real religious background. My mother
had been a nun and my father had been a brother in a religious order. Reli-
gion is such a part of everything I think, and everything I do. I stopped
going to church for a long time. I didn't need it. Then I realized that you
go to church for that communal support. You go to help the group.
While Regina, Cindy, and Monica seem to have found an experience of
religious identity akin to what Brueggemann describes as "alternative pro-
phetic consciousness" within institutional religious structures, other stu-
dents have not. These students, although they have rejected institutional
religious practices, seem not to be rejecting religious faith or community as
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such. Instead, they are searching for a more authentic community and reli-
gious experience.25
Susan: I grew up going to Catholic school. I wore the uniform every
day and the whole deal. I also grew up in an Italian family. So there is that
whole thing, the Catholic thing. Since getting to college, I haven't been to
church hardly at all. So I guess I have made a choice against the traditional
version, and I've tried. I've searched a little bit. It's hard to do it by your-
self. So if we are asking, is there a New Jerusalem, a middle ground or type
of community? I think it takes an incredible amount of energy to find it. I
don't find it here at school at all. I feel very alienated here at school. Be-
cause I feel people are in a box. Nobody is interested in anybody different,
or if you speak out too much. So I don't know where you find community.
So if you go searching for community that takes a lot of energy. I don't
know. If you've found it, I would like to know. But I don't know where it
is. I think that the New Jerusalem is inside: It has to be some peace you
come to about yourself. You can't look at this world out here because this
will drive you nuts. I don't know; it's nice and everything; I just don't
know where it is. I mean, I guess it is in my friendship with Setarah or
Cindy; do you know what I mean? That would be the New Jerusalem for
me, to feel some sort of spiritual community with other people. But I think
it is a lot of work.
Sophia: I just had a comment about the Catholic religion and the hier-
archy. I didn't want it at all, which is why I left it. I couldn't wait to get
out of Catholic school after grade school; I just split. The problem was that
I think the hierarchy, and the way the religion is run, to me is just a busi-
ness. It is all just glitter and everything else. They have the Pope and all
that stuff. My experiences were just discipline. All you had to do is sit
there and fold your hands and do this and do that and sing in church.
Don't question anything, just memorize everything. It was just totally ri-
diculous. So then I explored other types of religion. With any type of or-
ganized religion, my problem was one extreme or the other. Either you
didn't understand, you weren't to question things, like in the Catholic reli-
25. See GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, WE DRINK FROM OUR OWN WELLS: THE SPIRITUAL JOUR-
NEY OF A PEOPLE (William E. Jerman ed. & Matthew J. O'Connell trans., 1984) (discussing the
relationship between the experience of authentic spiritual solitude and authentic religious commu-
nity). Interestingly, nine out of 10 adults in the United States say they believe in God; nearly as
many say they have never doubted God's existence. Eight out of 10 believe in miracles. George
Gallup, Jr. & Jim Castelli, 9 of 10 Share a Belief in God, WASH. PoST, Nov. 28, 1987, at B6
(reporting on the results of a Times-Mirror Corp. poll, "The People, Press, and Politics'). Sixty-
nine percent of adults in the United States claim membership in a religious congregation; 80% say
they feel led by God in making decisions, and 40% say that God has spoken to them. Religion in
America, THE GALLUP REPORT, April 1987.
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gion when I was very small, or else it was too much of a "do-goody" type of
atmosphere. Everybody was real "happy" and everybody "loved" every-
body, and, you know, it was sickeningly sweet. So that didn't fit me right
either. I feel being inter-related with people in the community is really a
good idea. I don't think it takes that much of an effort, as Susan said. I
think it's just laziness. I think everyone is just so bogged down with doing
their own thing that they just don't think about it. I don't think it really
takes that much of an effort.
Susan: I was home recently for a funeral, and these two priests and
nuns that I know from home were there. They're living in community; and
they are living with lay people in community. It was the most wonderful
funeral because these people are all in a community and they got up and
they all talked about this woman who was dead. They all wanted to die like
her. I thought to myself, this is not reality. These people have a wonderful
support system, but, God, I don't know-other than what I witnessed
there, where do you find it? When you get out into the work world, espe-
cially the legal field that we're going into, I mean, I don't know where-
uhhgg-it's frightening, I think.
The discussion above seems to indicate that, for many of our students,
family and religion are very important. They are not rejecting relationships
and community. Rather, they are looking for an experience of community
and spirituality that is integrative personally, mutually supportive relation-
ally, and interdependent communally. They seem to be rejecting a god and
religious community characterized by dominance-submission and distant
hierarchical authority.26
After having listened to the insightful discussion of our students, several
thoughts come to our minds. We wonder, how many students at law
schools throughout the country share similar dreams for the future? We
26. Lutheran pastor and theologian Karen Bloomquist describes religious consciousness
characterized by such attitudes and such communities:
God becomes the paradigm of a distant, hierarchical authority; the legitimation of the
authority that is structured into all other orders of life; an authority who calls for a submis-
siveness that serves the interests of a class structured society .... Subordinates are forbid-
den to get angry over their situation, but those in positions of authority are to exercise their
anger as an expression of God's anger. God puts us in our place and intends for us to live
in harmony with our neighbors, regardless of their material advantage over us. These
kinds of understandings, whether or not they are true to what was intended, help keep in
place the structures and ideology of classism.
KAREN L. BLOOMQUIST, THE DREAM BETRAYED 49 (1990).
Gadamer suggests that true authority is not based upon blind obedience, but rather upon
competence and knowledge:
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hope that our students are right in predicting that students in the 1990s will
have a strong desire to build relationships of mutual support and respect at
home, in their communities, and at work. Contrary to what one may hear
around the law school or in the media, there are law students and future
lawyers who are concerned with more than merely maximizing their
salaries.
Finally, the discussion raises questions for those of us who are law
teachers and law school administrators. Do we spend a disproportionate
amount of our time in our teaching and writing describing or analyzing
what is or has been, to the detriment of imagining or helping to create what
might be?27 Do we emphasize competitive individualism and spend insuffi-
cient time helping to develop and nurture mutually supportive relationships
within, and beyond, the law school community?28 Are we doing enough to
set an active example in service to others in the larger community through
probono, civic, charitable, or religious involvement? We hope the answers
to these (as we think of them) "prophetic" questions are yes. But, in our
own cases at least, we suspect that we could be doing more. If we members
of the law school community are to be participants in helping our students
to more effectively "Dream" and "Wake the Nation," then perhaps these
questions need our attention.
Based on the Enlightenment conception of reason and freedom, the concept of author-
ity could be viewed as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be, in fact, blind
obedience....
But this is not the essence of authority. Admittedly, it is primarily persons that have
authority; but the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdi-
cation of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge-the knowledge,
namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this
reason his judgment takes precedence--i.e., it has priority over one's own.... Authority in
this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to commands.
Indeed, authority has to do not with obedience but rather with knowledge.
GADAMER, supra note 12, at 279.
27. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Legal Education and Legal Scholarship: From Rationalist Dis-
course to Dialogical Encounter, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 97 (1991) (discussing the influence of one-
sided analytic "visualism" upon legal education).
28. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND
PEOPLE (1977) (suggesting that legal education does not do enough to develop interpersonal capa-
bilities in students).
1993]

COMMENTS
THE FORMAL INQUIRY APPROACH: BALANCING A
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE
WITH A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
In McDowell v. United States,' Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan,
dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari to review whether judges
must conduct formal inquiries with defendants before permitting them to
exercise their right of self-representation. The dissent identified a conflict
among the federal appellate courts in their efforts to arrive at a proper bal-
ance between the constitutional right of self-representation and the need to
ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel before defendants are
permitted to proceed pro se.z
This Comment will review the Supreme Court's early decisions with re-
spect to a defendant's constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel.
As will be seen, the standard that emerged from these early cases was
highly protective of a defendant's right to counsel even in the face of a
purported waiver.
The impact of Faretta v. California3 will then be discussed. In Faretta,
the Supreme Court, for the first time, recognized that defendants have a
constitutional right to represent themselves. The effect of the Faretta deci-
sion has been to create a zero-sum game between two constitutional rights.
The result often leaves lower court judges in the untenable position of hav-
ing their decisions appealed no matter how they rule on a defendant's re-
quest to proceed pro se. If a judge permits a defendant to proceed pro se,
the defendant may argue on appeal that the constitutional right to counsel
1. 484 U.S. 980 (1987).
2. Id (White, J., dissenting). Justice White distinguished between the "record as a whole"
approach, in which no specific inquiries or special hearings must be conducted to ensure a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of counsel before a defendant is permitted to proceed pro se, and a
second approach, in which a trial judge must conduct a special hearing to ensure a defendant
understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. The opinion mentions four cir-
cuits that follow the "record as a whole" approach (First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits),
and four circuits that require a special hearing before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se
(Third, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). Id. at 980-81.
3. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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was compromised because the defendant did not make a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver of counsel. Conversely, if a judge denies a defendant's request
to proceed pro se, the judge's decision may be attacked for failing to recog-
nize the defendant's constitutional right of self-representation.
There has been a split in authority among the appellate courts since
Faretta on the question of how to recognize a defendant's constitutional
right to proceed pro se without violating his constitutional right to counsel.
The two approaches to this problem that have emerged will be examined.
Finally, an argument favoring the requirement of a formal inquiry in which
defendants are explicitly warned of the dangers and disadvantages of pro-
ceeding pro se will be advanced.
II. EARLY CASE LAW
The constitutional right to counsel was first recognized in Powell v. Ala-
bama.4 In Powell, seven black youths were charged with raping two white
girls.5 An indictment was returned, and the defendants were arraigned six
days after the alleged crime took place.' At their arraignment, the defend-
ants pleaded not guilty.7 Six days later, a mere twelve days from the date of
the alleged crime, the trials8 began.9 Each of the three trials was completed
within a single day.'
The trial judge appointed all the members of the Alabama Bar as coun-
sel for the defendants' arraignment."I He anticipated that the members of
the Bar would continue to help the defendants if no counsel appeared. 2 On
the morning of the first trial, however, only one Alabama attorney agreed to
assist in the youths' trials, and this was after the judge appointed a visiting
attorney from Tennessee to represent the youths.' 3 Thus, as the Powell
Court noted, the defendants were put in peril of their lives within a few
moments after an identifiable attorney was charged with any degree of re-
sponsibility for representing them. 4
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Id. at 49.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 53. There was a severance upon the request of the state, and the defendants were
tried in three separate groups.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 50.
11. Id. at 49.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 55-56.
14. Id. at 58.
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Out of this set of facts emerged the Supreme Court's declaration that
criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
The Court's decision centered on the right to be heard in a criminal trial.' 5
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."16
Five years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,17 the Court reaffirmed its decision
in Powell and reminded trial courts of their duty to protect the right to
counsel in the face of a purported waiver. 8 In Zerbst, two enlisted men in
the United States Marine Corps were charged with possessing and distribut-
ing counterfeit money.' Although counsel represented them at their pre-
liminary hearings, the defendants were unable to employ counsel for their
trial.20 The defendants informed the trial judge that they did not have an
attorney, but were ready for trial.2 ' The defendants made no specific re-
quest to the trial judge to appoint counsel, although there was evidence to
suggest that such a request had been made to the District Attorney, who
replied that no right to counsel existed unless a defendant was charged with
15. Id. at 68. The Court cited Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898), when it stated that
"the necessity of due notice and an opportunity of being heard is described as among the 'immuta-
ble principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the
Union may disregard.'" Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
16. Id. at 68-69. Continuing its reasoning for finding a constitutional right to counsel, the
Court stated:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 69.
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18. Id. at 465. According to the Court:
This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While
an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be
clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that deter-
mination to appear upon the record.
Id.
19. Id at 459-60.
20. Id. at 460.
21. Id.
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a capital crime.22 The defendants represented themselves during the trial
and were convicted as charged.23
The waiver in Zerbst was implied and did not involve a specific request
by the defendants to waive their right to counsel. 24 The Court was con-
cerned that a trial judge would rely on a defendant's implied waiver of
counsel as a basis for permitting the trial to go forward without the assist-
ance of counsel.25 A defendant's constitutional right to be represented by
counsel "invokes... the protection of a trial court," stated the Court, and
an implied waiver of counsel is not in keeping with this protective duty.2 6
Accordingly, the Court refused to find a valid waiver of counsel on the
record before it and reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision in
order to determine whether the defendants competently and intelligently
waived their right to counsel.2 7
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,28 the Court was squarely
presented with the question of whether a defendant could waive his right to
counsel. The case actually involved the waiver of a jury trial,29 but because
22. Id. at 460-61.
23. Id. at 460. The ineptness of their defense without the assistance of counsel is demon-
strated by the testimony of one of the defendants at a subsequent hearing discussing his effort to
contradict testimony presented by the prosecutor:
I objected to one witness' testimony. I didn't ask him any questions, I only objected to his
whole testimony. After the prosecuting attorney was finished with the witness, he said,
'Your witness,' and I got up and objected to the testimony on the grounds that it was all
false, and the Trial Judge said any objection I had I would have to bring proof or disproof.
Id. at 461.
24. See id. at 460.
25. See id. at 465.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 469. In addition to the protecting duty of the courts, the Zerbst opinion mentioned
two additional considerations that mitigated against the finding of a valid waiver in this case. One
was that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. Id. at 464. The other was that "[t]he determination of whether there has
been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and con-
duct of the accused." Id.
The second consideration has been used as authority for finding a valid waiver of counsel in
the absence of an inquiry or a hearing by the trial judge in which a defendant is made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d
838, 846 (Ist Cir. 1989); Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (1 1th Cir. 1986). While
the language may be used to support the notion that factors other than an inquiry or a hearing will
support a valid waiver of counsel, the holding of the case should not be overlooked. In Zerbst, the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused, as displayed in the record, was not enough to
support a valid waiver of counsel. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469.
28. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
29. Id. at 272.
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the defendant waived his right to a jury while proceeding pro se, the validity
of the defendant's waiver of counsel was also directly implicated.30
The defendant in Adams was indicted on six counts of mail fraud.31 He
insisted on conducting his own defense and was permitted to do so after
informing the trial judge "that he had studied law, and was sufficiently fa-
miliar therewith adequately to defend himself, and was more familiar with
the complicated facts of his case than any attorney could ever be.' 32
The Court, while strongly suggesting that without the assistance of
counsel a defendant could not present his best defense, nevertheless, held
that a defendant "may waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel
if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."'33
Thus, the defendant's waiver of a jury trial without the assistance of counsel
was upheld.34
Adams is significant for two reasons. First, underlying the decision was
the belief that the constitutional right to counsel was "jealously guarded"
by the Court's previous holdings in cases such as Zerbst.35 Therefore, while
some of the language in Adams, when read in isolation, appears to show a
ready willingness by the Court to accept waivers of constitutional rights
such as the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel,36 such a conclusion
misplaces the importance that the Court had placed on what it perceived
were existing constitutional safeguards that would prevent waivers in most
instances.37
The second concern, as expressed by Justice Douglas in his dissent, is
that without a reliable, objective standard for ensuring a defendant's intelli-
gent and competent waiver of a jury trial without the assistance of counsel,
appellate courts would be forced to speculate, based on information con-
tained in the record, whether a defendant had a full understanding of the
consequences of such a decision.38 Speculation over whether defendants
30. See id. at 275.
31. Id. at 270.
32. Id. The basis for the defendant's remarks, at least on the issue of familiarity with the
case, stemmed from the fact that he had previously brought suit against the New York Stock
Exchange and represented himself during both the trial and on appeal to the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court. Id. at 270 n.1.
33. Id. at 279.
34. Id. at 280-81.
35. Id. at 280.
36. For example, the Court stated, "[T]o deny [defendants] in the exercise of [their] free
choice the right to dispense with some [constitutional] safeguards... is to imprison [defendants]
in [their] privileges and call it the Constitution." Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 283-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Furthermore, the right to trial by jury, like the
right to have the assistance of counsel, is 'too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:785
truly understand the consequences of waiving their right to counsel, partic-
ularly in the absence of a formal inquiry by the trial judge, continues to be a
source of concern in more recent decisions.39
One final early decision that has shaped subsequent court opinions on
the question of whether defendants have made a valid waiver of counsel is
Von Moltke v. Gillies.4° In Von Moltke, the defendant was charged with
violating the Espionage Act of 1917.41 The defendant was imprisoned for
nearly one and a half months before she finally agreed to plead guilty to the
charges brought against her. 2 While the defendant was imprisoned she
was unable to retain counsel and, thus, counsel was not present when she
appeared before a judge to enter her guilty plea.4 3
When the trial judge noticed that the defendant was not represented by
counsel, he initially refused to accept the guilty plea.' However, after ap-
proximately five minutes of routine questioning, the trial judge permitted
the defendant to sign a written waiver of counsel and accepted the plea.45
In response to the haphazard manner in which this waiver was ac-
cepted, Justice Black set forth a standard that requires a trial judge to en-
gage in a "penetrating and comprehensive examination" of defendants who
attempt to waive their right to counsel.46 Justice Black's reasoning' is per-
haps more important than the standard itself, which gained the support of
in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.'" Id. at 284 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Glassner v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).
39. See infra note 127.
40. 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 709.
42. Id. at 712-15.
43. Id. at 716-18.
44. Id. at 717.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 724. In Justice Black's words:
To discharge the duty [of protecting the right to counsel] properly in light of the strong
presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate
as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact
that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive
this right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver
must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to
the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed
waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and compre-
hensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
Id. at 723-24.
47. According to Justice Black:
This case graphically illustrates that a mere routine inquiry-the asking of several stan-
dard questions followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel-may leave
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only a plurality of the Court and, thus, is not a constitutional standard.4"
While the Von Moltke standard has not evolved into a constitutional stan-
dard, it is nevertheless often cited by appellate courts when reviewing
whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel
before exercising the right to proceed pro se.4 9
III. FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA
A defendant's privilege to proceed pro se was accorded the status of a
constitutional right in Faretta v. California.50 The effect has been to place
lower courts in a difficult position by requiring them to balance a defend-
ant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel with a defendant's
constitutional right of self-representation.51 Prior to this decision, although
a majority of states recognized the right to proceed pro se,52 it was plausible
to argue that granting a defendant's request to proceed pro se was premised
not on a constitutional right but on a statutorily created privilege.5 3
This distinction is important because, if self-representation is considered
a privilege and not a constitutional right, courts have discretion to decide
a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused has
executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel.
Id at 724.
48. Mary C. Garcia-Feehan, Note, United States v. McDowell: A Newer Standard for
Waiver, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 383, 388 n.32 (1988).
49. See, eg., Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1991);
Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100, 1104 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 350 (1991);
Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1982) (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
50. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
51. See Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Since the Supreme Court announced its decision in Faretta there has been tension be-
tween the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. The tension exists because
the rights are reciprocal: to assert one necessitates waiver of the other. The problem is
most difficult for the trial judge because if he allows a defendant his right to proceed pro se,
he runs the risk that he may have denied the defendant his right to counsel. Similarly, if
counsel is appointed to ensure that the right to counsel is not violated, the right to proceed
pro se may be violated.
Id at 997 (citation omitted).
52. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 813 & n.10.
53. Justice Burger identified two sources of authority for his belief that prior to the Court's
decision in Faretta the right of a defendant to proceed pro se was not a constitutional right. First,
the Court's decision in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), had distinguished between the
"constitutional prerogative" to be present at trial and the "recognized privilege" of self-represen-
tation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 842 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Second, Section 35 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 had explicitly provided a statutory right to self-representation in federal criminal trials,
while the text of the Sixth Amendment, which was proposed the day after the Judiciary Act was
signed, provided only for the right to counsel. Id. at 844 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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whether a particular defendant's request to proceed pro se will be granted. 4
Thus, if a trial judge was not convinced that a defendant was capable of
conducting his own defense, the judge would not be obliged to grant the
defendant's request to proceed pro se.55 However, by holding that defend-
ants have a constitutional right to self-representation, the Faretta Court
took this discretion away from trial judges and gave defendants an absolute
right to represent themselves, irrespective of any concern for the fairness of
the trial.1
6
In Faretta, the defendant, charged with grand theft, asked to defend
himself because he was concerned about the ability of the public defender's
office to adequately represent him 7.5  The trial judge first stated that he be-
lieved that the defendant was "making a mistake."58 Despite his reserva-
tions, the judge issued a preliminary ruling allowing the defendant to waive
his right to counsel.5 9 However, in a subsequent hearing, the trial judge
reversed his previous ruling because he was not convinced that the defend-
ant made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel.' Moreover, the
trial judge ruled that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to
conduct his own defense.6" This latter ruling formed the basis for the
Court's holding that the Sixth Amendment "necessarily implies the right of
self-representation.,
62
Since Faretta, lower courts have wrestled with the issue of how to en-
sure that defendants make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel
before exercising their absolute right to proceed pro se. The inconsistency
in the lower courts over what standard to apply is due to the lack of gui-
dance in Faretta.3 Furthermore, the bases upon which the Faretta Court
found a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel are inconclusive on the
54. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 842 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Price, 334 U.S. at 285-86).
55. See id. at 846-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 845-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 807.
58. Id. at 807-08.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 808-10.
61. Id. at 810 & n.4.
62. Id. at 832.
63. The Faretta Court's only reference to a standard has itself proven to be contradictory.
The Faretta Court stated that "in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representa-
tion, [a defendant] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.'" Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
A close examination of this standard reveals two elements: (1) a defendant should be made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se (2) so that the record will establish that the
defendant comprehends the ramifications of waiver of counsel. The inconsistency in the lower
courts stems from the question of whether a defendant must still be made aware of the dangers
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question of what actions a trial judge must take when a defendant requests
to proceed pro se.64
A final consideration, noted in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Faretta, is
the method by which lower courts properly balance a defendant's constitu-
tional right to counsel with a defendant's constitutional right to proceed pro
se. 61 On the one hand is Justice Stewart's explanation of the personal inter-
est of a defendant in proceeding pro se:
[Because a defendant] will bear the personal consequences of a con-
viction... [i]t is the defendant.., who must be free personally to
decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.
And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own
detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' 66
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger explains the governmental in-
terest in preserving the right to counsel:
[T]he quality of [a defendant's] representation at trial is [not] a mat-
ter with which only the accused is legitimately concerned.... [T]he
integrity of and public confidence in the system are undermined,
when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-ad-
vised decision to waive counsel.... True freedom of choice and
society's interest in seeing that justice is achieved can be vindicated
only if the trial court retains discretion to reject any attempted
waiver of counsel .... 67
and disadvantages of proceeding pro se if the record indicates that, irrespective of any such warn-
ing, the defendant understands the consequences of waiving the right to counsel.
64. The Faretta Court indicated that the record affirmatively showed that the defendant un-
derstood the consequences of waiving his right to counsel. Id. at 835. However, part of that
record included the warning given to the defendant by the trial judge. Id. at 808. Two possible
interpretations are therefore possible. One is that the warning given by the trial judge was ancil-
lary to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of waiving counsel as shown by the
record and thus was not required. The other interpretation is that the warning was an integral
part of the record because it showed that the defendant had been explicitly made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and, thus in the absence of such a warning, the
record standing alone would have been insufficient. A further question arises if the latter interpre-
tation is followed. That question concerns how extensive the colloquy between the trial judge and
a defendant must be before an appellate court will consider the warning given by the trial judge to
be sufficient.
65. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Since the right to [the] assistance of counsel and
the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to be mea-
sured?" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 834 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
67. Id. at 839-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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IV. SPLIT IN AUTHORITY AFTER FARETTA V CALIFORNIA
The impact of Faretta on subsequent appellate decisions has produced
two approaches for determining whether a defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his right to counsel before exercising his right of self repre-
sentation. 68 The first, the "record as a whole" approach, does not require
the trial judge to conduct a hearing or an inquiry to ensure the validity of a
waiver.69 Rather, if it can be discerned from the record developed in a case
that a defendant was aware of the consequences of waiving his right to
counsel, the trial judge's decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se
will not be reversed.7 0 Seven circuits follow this approach.7 1
Johnson v. Zerbst72 supports the record as a whole approach. In Zerbst,
the Court identified how a trial judge should determine whether a defendant
made a valid waiver of counsel: "The determination of whether there has
been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, includ-
ing the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 73 In other
words, no formal inquiry in which a defendant is warned of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se is needed if the record sufficiently estab-
lishes that the defendant was aware of the consequences of his decision.
The second approach places an affirmative duty on the trial judge to
conduct an inquiry with a defendant in which the dangers and disadvan-
tages of proceeding pro se are discussed.74 In the absence of such an in-
quiry, a decision by the trial judge to permit a defendant to proceed pro se
will be remanded to the district court.7 5 Five circuits follow this
approach.76
68. See supra text accompanying note 2; see also infra notes 71, 76.
69. United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988).
70. Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (11th Cir. 1986).
71. See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 977 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991); United States v. Bell, 901 F.2d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 845 (1st Cir. 1989); Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997 (1lth Cir.
1989); Gallop, 838 F.2d at 110; Wiggins v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
72. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
73. Id. at 464; see also supra text accompanying note 27.
74. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 959 (10th Cir. 1987).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2593 (1990).
76. See Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1991); Silkwood,
893 F.2d at 248; United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250-51 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 980 (1987); United States v.
Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 (1982).
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The formal inquiry approach finds support in Von Moltke v. Gillies."
As previously discussed, Justice Black believed that the only way a judge
could determine whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
the right to counsel was by conducting a "penetrating and comprehensive
examination" of the defendant.78
It is important to recognize at this juncture that the formal inquiry ap-
proach does not necessarily require a more rigorous standard to evaluate
whether a defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. At
first glance, this might appear to be the case, since circuits that follow the
formal inquiry approach require judges to explicitly warn defendants of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se.7 9 However, in the D.C.
Circuit, which follows the formal inquiry approach, judges are merely re-
quired to engage defendants in a "short discussion" of the dangers and dis-
advantages of proceeding pro se.80 By contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits, two circuits that follow the record as a whole approach, have in-
structed judges to conduct a formal inquiry whenever a defendant requests
to proceed pro se to ensure that defendants are "fully informed" of the
consequences of waiving their right to counsel.81
The formal inquiry approach provides a framework in which defendants
will always be told of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se
because some form of inquiry between the trial judge and a defendant is
required.82 However, the crux of a valid waiver of counsel is not what is
said to a defendant, but whether a defendant understands what he is giving
up by waiving his right to counsel.
77. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
78. Id. at 724; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 74-76.
80. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
81. See, eg., United States v. Bell, 901 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1990). In Bell, the appellate court
reaffirmed its "strong preference" that trial courts, as a matter of course, conduct a formal inquiry
in which the defendant is fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se and is explicitly advised
against self-representation. Ia at 576-77. The court even went so far as to point trial judges to 1
BENCH BOOK FOR UNrrED STATES DisTRiCT JUDGES § 1.02-2 (3d ed. 1986) as an appropriate
source for guidelines to follow during an inquiry with a defendant who makes a request to proceed
pro se. Id at 577. The position taken by the Seventh Circuit has, if anything, become more
pronounced. See United States v. Belanger, 936 F.2d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he trial court
must 'conduct a formal inquiry' in which it asks the necessary questions and imparts the necessary
information.") (quoting United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 733 (7th Cir. 1988)).
In Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997-98 (11th Cir. 1989), the appellate court similarly
stated that a trial court must hold a hearing "to make sure that the accused understands the risks
of proceeding pro se," although in "rare cases" such a hearing may not be required. The guide-
lines to be followed by trial judges in the Eleventh Circuit also represent an extremely high stan-
dard for evaluating whether a request to proceed pro se should be granted. Id. at 997 & n.4.
82. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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Both the record as a whole approach and the formal inquiry approach
have emerged as means by which to ascertain whether defendants were
aware of the consequences of waiving their right to counsel when they exer-
cised their right of self-representation. A defendant's background, experi-
ence, and conduct are clearly relevant in determining whether the
defendant was aware of the consequences of a waiver. Similarly, a formal
inquiry conducted by a trial judge in which a defendant is warned of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se establishes that the defend-
ant was made aware of the consequences of proceeding without counsel.
The critical question is whether a hearing or an inquiry should be required
whenever a defendant requests to proceed pro se or whether such a formal
inquiry should be left to the discretion of the trial judge on a case-by-case
basis.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to answer this question in Pat-
terson v. Illinois.3 However, Patterson further confused the issue and left
the appellate courts without additional guidance.
In Patterson, a member of the Vice Lords street gang was indicted for
the murder of a rival gang member.8 4 The accused, after learning of the
indictment against himself and two other members of the Vice Lords, gave
a lengthy statement to police officers, 5 describing in detail the involvement
of himself and other gang members in the murder.8 6 The accused gave a
similar statement a second time to the Assistant State's Attorney.8 7 The
defendant was advised of his right to have the assistance of counsel, and he
initialed each of the warnings contained in a Miranda waiver form before
giving his statements to authorities."8
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the accused made
a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at the time of his postindict-
ment confessions. s9 The Court answered in the affirmative and applied a
"sliding scale" method of analysis.9"
83. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
84. Id. at 287-88.
85. Id. at 288. The statement was given at least in part because the accused believed that the
principal actor had not been indicted. Id. Prior to this statement, the accused was given a Mi-
randa waiver form that was read aloud to him and subsequently initialed by him. Id. One of the
warnings contained in the Miranda waiver form was that the defendant had the right to consult
with an attorney. Id. at 288 & n. 1.
86. Id. at 288.
87. Id. at 288-89.
88. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 85.
89. Id. at 289.
90. Id. at 298. At one end of the scale, no warning need be given at a postindictment photo-
graphic display identification. Id. At the other end of the scale, the "most rigorous" means must
be employed to ensure that a defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
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Although the Court appears to recognize a requirement for some form
of inquiry between the trial judge and a defendant before permitting the
defendant to proceed pro se at trial,91 this interpretation has not emerged.
For the most part, the limited impact of Patterson on subsequent lower
court decisions is explained by the fact that the Court cited Faretta as au-
thority for what procedures courts must adhere to before permitting de-
fendants to exercise their right of self-representation. 92 However, Faretta
does not provide any clear indication of whether a formal inquiry is re-
quired when defendants seek to waive their right to counsel. 93 Under one
interpretation of Faretta, a formal inquiry is not required, but merely forms
a part of the record from which an appellate court can evaluate whether a
defendant was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro
se.94 Under a second interpretation of Faretta, a formal inquiry is required
since the waiver of counsel that took place in Faretta came only after the
judge warned the defendant against proceeding pro se.95
Thus, those circuits that follow the record as a whole approach are un-
affected by the Patterson decision since they find support under one of the
possible interpretations of the Faretta waiver standard.96 Likewise, those
circuits that follow the formal inquiry approach are also unaffected by the
Patterson decision since they too find support in Faretta.97
For these reasons, any reliance on Patterson as authority to support the
requirement of a formal inquiry is misplaced. Patterson does not address
the proper application of the Faretta waiver of counsel standard. Patterson
states only that it should be applied.
V. AN ARGUMENT FAVORING THE ADOPTION OF THE FORMAL
INQUIRY APPROACH
The formal inquiry approach has the advantage of ensuring that defend-
ants are explicity told the consequences of waiving their right to counsel
pro se at trial. Id Because the waiver of counsel in this case was near the lower end of the scale
(postindictment stage), the use of the Miranda warnings as a means of making the accused aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation was sufficient. Id. at 299.
91. Id. at 298 ("[R]ecognizing the enormous importance and role that an attorney plays at a
criminal trial, we have imposed the most rigorous restrictions on the information that must be
conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting him to
waive his right to counsel at trial.").
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
96. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
97. See id.
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before they are permitted to exercise their right to proceed pro se.9" While
there is no guarantee that a defendant's decision will be any more knowing
and intelligent simply because he is explicitly made aware of the benefits of
counsel and the disadvantage of proceeding pro se, the formal inqury ap-
proach nevertheless contributes to what the true objective should be when a
defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel: Did the trial court take all
reasonable steps to ensure that a defendant understood what he was giving
up when he decided to proceed pro se?99
In some cases, the requirement of a formal inquiry will amount to noth-
ing more than a formality, especially when a defendant has experience with
the court system and already understands what he is giving up by waiving
his right to counsel."° In such instances, one could argue that requiring a
formal inquiry amounts to a waste of judicial resources.
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel is one of the most
important rights that criminal defendants retain. 10' Though Faretta gives
criminal defendants a right to represent themselves, courts should continue
to abide by the notion, first set forth in Zerbst, that they have a duty to
protect a defendant's right to counsel, even when the defendant seeks to
waive that right." 2 Trial judges may no longer have discretion to decide
whether a defendant should be permitted to proceed pro se,' 0 3 but they
certainly should attempt to convey to defendants the reasons a waiver of
counsel may be detrimental to their case. If a defendant persists in his re-
quest to proceed pro se even after the trial judge's warnings against such a
decision, then the defendant's decision must be respected."° However, by
requiring judges to conduct a formal inquiry before defendants are permit-
ted to exercise their right of self-representation, courts will have taken all
reasonable steps to ensure that defendants have been made aware of and
understand the consequences of their decision.
98. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
99. See discussion supra part IV.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 977 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991) (The defendant was an attorney who was admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and had represented numerous defendants in court.);
United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (1st Cir. 1989) (The defendant was a member of the
Maine Bar and had tried numerous criminal cases in both state and federal court.).
101. See discussion supra part II.
102. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); see also supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
103. See discussion supra part III.
104. See discussion supra part III.
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A second reason for rejecting the argument that a formal inquiry wastes
judicial resources is that, in many cases, it may actually conserve judicial
resources. When defendants have been explicitly warned against proceed-
ing pro se, the merits of an appeal based on a defendant's failure to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel diminish. Therefore, the number
of appeals raising the issue of an invalid waiver of counsel should decline.
When the issue of an invalid waiver is raised on appeal, the existence on the
record of an explicit warning by the trial judge about the dangers and disad-
vantages of proceeding pro se should reduce the amount of time necessary
to determine whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel. For these reasons, a small investment of judicial resources at the
front end of a case should result in hefty returns when judicial resources are
conserved during the appellate process.
It should be noted that appeals have not stopped in those circuits that
presently follow the formal inquiry approach.10 5 However, the basis for
those appeals is the adequacy of the hearing itself, not whether a hearing
took place. 10 6 For this reason, the Supreme Court could effectively stop all
appeals on the issue of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel by
adopting a standardized set of inquiries that judges are required to perform
whenever defendants request to proceed pro se. The risk of such an ap-
proach is that defendants may be afforded 'less protection of their right to
counsel than the protection afforded under the record as a whole approach
unless the constitutional standard adopted mandates an extremely thorough
and comprehensive discussion of the advantages of counsel and the disad-
vantages of proceeding pro se. 107 The Bench Book for United States District
Judges is a source currently relied upon in three circuits °1 and provides
guidelines from which the Supreme Court can ideally formulate a constitu-
tional standard for finding a valid waiver of counsel that will satisfy, if not
exceed, the "penetrating and comprehensive examination" of defendants
advocated by Justice Black in Von Moltke.109
The tradeoff to adopting a standardized set of inquiries as the constitu-
tional standard is that a defendant's background, experience, and conduct
105. See supra note 76.
106. See supra note 76.
107. See supra notes 48, 80-81.
108. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have suggested that trial judges follow the
guidelines set forth in 1 BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRIcT JUDGES, supra note 81,
when conducting a hearing or an inquiry in response to a defendant's request to proceed pro se.
See Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100, 1109 (1lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Bell, 901 F.2d
574, 577 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1987).
109. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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will no longer be taken into consideration when a defendant waives his right
to counsel. However, the failure to consider these factors after a defendant
has been explicitly warned against proceeding pro se is no different than
relying on a defendant's statements after the defendant has been advised of
his Miranda rights.110
Furthermore, after Faretta, judges no longer have discretion to deny
what has become a defendant's absolute right to proceed pro se. I1 Thus, a
defendant's background, experience, and conduct may suggest a lack of un-
derstanding about the consequences of waiving counsel, but the defendant
must, nevertheless, be permitted to proceed pro se." 2 As a result, these
factors should no longer play a role in determining whether defendants
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Instead, as long as de-
fendants are made explicitly aware of the consequences of their decision to
proceed pro se through a standardized set of inquiries set forth by the
Supreme Court, their waiver of counsel should be deemed valid. Such an
approach is the only way that the right of defendants to represent them-
selves can be respected without holding the door open to continued appeals
on the issue of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.
The formal inquiry approach also advances two additional, important
governmental interests. First, without a requirement that trial judges con-
duct a formal inquiry before allowing defendants to proceed pro se, the
responsibilities of prosecutors may begin to take on a judicial role. For
example, in United States v. Moya-Gomez, 1 " the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found unsatisfactory a pretrial hearing in which the trial judge of-
fered to appoint a lawyer to represent the defendant, but failed to explain
the disadvantages of self-representation." 4
However, the appellate court considered a formal inquiry conducted by
two Assistant United States Attorneys, who were prosecuting the case, to
weigh in favor of finding a valid waiver of counsel.' The appellate court
was quick to point out that, despite its consideration of the colloquy be-
110. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. See discussion supra part III.
112. See discussion supra part III.
113. 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989).
114. Id. at 733-34. The defendant was involved in an extensive cocaine network centered in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Id. at 714. He was convicted on one count of conspiracy to possess co-
caine with intent to distribute, six counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
one count of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 716. On appeal, the defendant
asserted six reasons why he was entitled to a new trial; one was that he did not make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel before the district court permitted him to proceed pro se. Id.
115. Id. at 735. During this inquiry, the defendant was warned of the dangers and disadvan-
tages of self-representation by two Assistant United States Attorneys. Id. at 734-35.
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tween the prosecuting attorneys and the defendant, it was inappropriate for
the district court to have delegated its duty to ensure a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of counsel to the prosecuting attorneys.
116
Similarly, in Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright,' 17 the prosecutor was directly
involved in questioning the defendant on whether he was waiving his right
to counsel." 8 The avowed purpose behind the prosecutor's questions was
to ensure that the trial judge's decision to allow the defendant to proceed
pro se would not be overturned on appeal. 1 9 On appeal, the defendant
raised the issue of an invalid waiver of counsel. 20 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the defendant's waiver of counsel
after examining the colloquy that took place between the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney, and the trial judge. 2 Unlike the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which considered a colloquy between the prosecuting
attorneys and the defendant to be inappropriate, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed absolutely no concern over the prosecutor's involve-
ment during the pretrial hearing.' 22
The use of prosecutors to convey information to, or elicit information
from, defendants is hazardous because prosecutors serve as advocates for
116. Id at 735. The Moya-Gomez court stated that "'[i]t is the solemn duty of a federal
judge.., to make a thorough inquiry.'" Id (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722
(1948)). The court also cited language that places on the trial judge the responsibility for deter-
mining whether there has been an intelligent and competent waiver of counsel. Id. (citing John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).
A second concern of the Moya-Gomez court was the impact that such inquiries would have on
the adversarial process. In the court's words, "this duty should not be discharged by enlisting the
defendant's adversary to conduct the waiver inquiry." Id. at 735. The court again cited Von
Moltke, 332 U.S. at 725, when it concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not contemplate that
prisoners shall be dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, however conscien-
tious and able those agents may be." Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 735.
117. 800 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 1060-62. The defendant was "convicted in state court on four counts of selling
unregistered securities, four counts of fraud in connection with the sale of unregistered securities,
and four counts of grand theft." Id. at 1058-59. Prior to his trial, the defendant asked for and
was granted a number of continuances so that he could raise money for a private attorney. Id. at
1059. Approximately six months later, the trial judge held a pretrial hearing in which the defend-
ant affirmatively waived his right to counsel. Id. at 1060. It was during this hearing that the
prosecutor became directly involved in questioning the defendant. Id at 1060-62.
119. Near the end of the hearing, the prosecutor stated to the trial judge: "Only thing, I
don't want to belabor this, but if it weren't for the history of this case I wouldn't be quite as
worried as I am now, but I want [the defendant] to understand and to so state that once we start
on this ship it's not going to dock .... " Id at 1062.
120. Id. at 1059.
121. Id at 1060-62, 1068.
122. See id. at 1063-68.
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the government. It is contrary to our adversarial system of justice to place
prosecutors in a position of having to serve as counselors to defendants.12 3
Of course, in cases like Moya-Gomez and Fitzpatrick, it may be argued
that a prosecutor is performing the adversarial role by ensuring that a
waiver of counsel will not be overturned on appeal.124 However, this argu-
ment leads directly to the concern expressed in Moya-Gomez that defend-
ants should not be dependent on government agents for legal counsel and
aid. 125
The adoption of the formal inquiry approach will ensure that prosecu-
tors are not put in the position of having to counsel defendants on the dan-
gers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. This approach serves the best
interests of prosecutors and defendants under our adversarial system of
justice.
The other governmental interest, and perhaps the most important rea-
son for adopting the formal inquiry approach, is that engaging defendants
in a formal inquiry before permitting them to proceed pro se contributes to
the criminal justice system's efforts to ensure fairness at trial.126 The formal
inquiry approach assists in this objective by ensuring that all defendants are
made aware of the consequences of waiving their right to counsel before
they are permitted to proceed pro se. By explicitly warning all defendants,
regardless of their background, experience, or conduct, appellate courts will
no longer be placed in the difficult position of having to speculate from the
record whether a defendant is simply trying to manipulate the judicial sys-
tem or, in fact, did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.127
123. Of course, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that justice is done. Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). However, prosecutors should also prosecute with earnestness and
vigor. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 119.
125. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 735; see also supra text accompanying note 116.
126. The importance of the right to counsel as it relates to fairness in the criminal justice
system is a frequent theme in court opinions. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-33
(1975) ("For it is surely true.., that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair
trial."); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) ("The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours.") (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932) ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510
F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("While a criminal trial is not a game in
which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near [equal] match in skills, neither is
it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.").
127. See, e.g., Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (Strozier I1); Strozier v.
Newsome, 871 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1989) (Strozier 1). In Strozier I, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the district court's decision upholding the validity of the defend-
ant's waiver of counsel in order to develop a more complete record. Strozier I, 871 F.2d at 999-
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A formal inquiry will not change a defendant's decision in many, per-
haps most, cases. However, the mere fact that it will give defendants an
opportunity to listen to some of the reasons why the assistance of counsel
may be valuable to them and, in the process, provide defendants with infor-
mation they otherwise might not have considered justifies inclusion of a
formal inquiry requirement. It is one of the reasonable steps courts can
take to ensure, to the extent possible, that defendants make a knowing and
intelligent wavier of counsel before exercising their rights to proceed pro se.
Courts' efforts to dissuade defendants from proceeding pro se will also
signal to society that the criminal justice system is not interested in easy
convictions. Assuming that there is an imbalance between adversaries
when defendants waive their right to counsel, a formal inquiry requirement
serves the important function of demonstrating to society that courts are
committed to taking all reasonable steps to fully apprise defendants of the
consequences of waiving their right to counsel when defendants insist on
representing themselves. This type of proactive response by the courts
should promote citizens' continued respect and admiration for the fairness
of their criminal justice system.
1000. On remand, a magistrate found that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel. Strozier II, 926 F.2d at 1101-02. The magistrate's report and recommendation were
adopted by the trial court, prompting a second appeal. Id. at 1102.
In Strozier I, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's waiver of counsel
on the basis of the magistrate's findings. Id. at 1107-08. The magistrate's report included the
following factors as evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel:
(I) the defendant's fifth-grade educational level and lack of health problems; (2) the defendant's
extensive background with the criminal justice system as a result of prior convictions; (3) the
defendant's contact with three attorneys, two of whom testified that they advised the defendant
against proceeding pro se, although the defendant denied he was ever fully informed of the risks of
self-representation; (4) the defendant's discussion with an attorney who informed the defendant of
the charges and penalties brought against him, even though the record of his own defense indi-
cated that the defendant either was not informed or misunderstood the charges; and (5) the de-
fendant's limited knowledge of courtroom procedure. Id. at 1106.
The appellate court's displeasure with having to try to determine from an ambiguous record,
and in the absence of a formal inquiry whether the defendant was simply trying to manipulate the
judicial system or, in fact, did not understand the consequences of his decision to waive the assist-
ance of counsel is readily apparent. In Strozier I, the court set forth a stern suggestion to the
lower courts that the difficulties inherent in any criminal trial, including the importance of eviden-
tiary rules, be made known to defendants who request to proceed pro se. Strozier I, 871 F.2d at
998. In Strozier II, the appellate court went so far as to "strongly urge" the lower courts to
conduct an inquiry similar to that found in 1 BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES, supra note 81, § 1.02-2 to 1.02-5. Strozier II, 926 F.2d at 1109.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The elevation of a defendant's privilege to proceed pro se to the status of
a constitutional right has created the type of constitutional question that
can only be resolved by the Supreme Court. That question concerns how to
properly balance two competing constitutional rights: the right to proceed
pro se and the right to have the assistance of counsel.
Underlying these rights are the interests they represent. Certainly, a
defendant's individual interest in being free to decide whether to accept the
assistance of counsel should be preserved. However, simply because a de-
fendant's right to proceed pro se is recognized does not mean legitimate
governmental interests should become subservient to the interests of the
individual defendant. Governmental interests such as conserving judicial
resources, maintaining the independence of prosecutors in criminal cases,
and preserving confidence and integrity in the criminal justice system
through fair trials are a few examples of why the Supreme Court should
adopt the formal inquiry approach as the constitutional standard for finding
a valid waiver of counsel in cases where defendants exercise their right to
proceed pro se.
The formal inquiry approach, while not encroaching upon the constitu-
tional right to proceed pro se, provides a framework to ensure that impor-
tant governmental interests will not be glossed over when defendants
exercise their right of self-representation. Anything less than a constitu-
tional standard that requires some form of hearing or inquiry in which de-
fendants are warned of the consequences of waiving their right to counsel is
simply too deferential to the interests of individual defendants over the gov-
ernmental interests triggered whenever defendants exercise their right to
proceed pro se.
BRIAN H. WRIGHT
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THE U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY:
THE QUEST FOR UNIFORMITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment' (FDI) "encompasses a range of business ac-
tivities with a common result: the exercise of some degree of management
or control over [an] enterprise by a foreign entity."2 Foreign investors find
investing in the United States advantageous for many economic and polit-
ical reasons. Recent currency fluctuations have essentially lowered the
price of U.S. companies to foreign investors. In addition, lower production
costs in the United States in relation to rising real wages, falling productiv-
ity, and increased taxes abroad make the United States attractive to foreign-
ers.3 Investors are also attracted to the relatively limited government
intervention in industry, as well as the political stability of the United States
government.4 Foreign manufacturers can also avoid some of the effects of
protectionist legislation by manufacturing goods in the United States rather
than abroad.5 This allows foreign investors to tap into American commer-
cial, financial, and labor markets for resources, opportunities, and technical
information that are not available when dealing from their home country.6
Despite these economic and political advantages, foreigners are not buying
U.S. companies at random simply because they are "good buys."7 Rather,
foreign investors generally concentrate on a handful of key areas of interest
to them.8
1. The most prevalent form of direct investment is the creation of multinational enterprises
through acquisition of existing businesses. Direct investment also includes joint ventures and the
establishment of new foreign-owned businesses, which may or may not be integrated into an ex-
isting multinational organization. Richard W. Shepro, Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States: A Legal Analysis, 4 Wis. INT'L L.J. 46, 48 (1986).
2. Id. at 47. The United States government, however, limits this definition to ownership or
control of 10% or more of an enterprise's voting securities. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (1991).
3. HARVEY A. PONIACHEK, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 15
(1986).
4. Id.
5. For example, goods manufactured in the United States by foreign-held businesses are
treated as "American" under the Buy American Act, which requires the federal government to
buy American goods for public use within the United States. See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)-(d) (1988).
6. As noted by Shepro, "many foreign drug companies have U.S. research and development
arms to take advantage of the large supply of U.S. Ph.D's." Shepro, supra note 1, at 48 n.8.
7. Edward J. Ray, A Profile of Recent Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 516 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 50, 61 (1991).
8. Id. For example, Japan has concentrated on research and development of intensive manu-
facturing interests, where substantial production gains are realized through the expansion of ex-
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Although many countries have recently increased their investments in
the United States, American politicians have expressed particular concern
over the number of American businesses acquired by the Japanese, and
many have blamed the Japanese for domestic economic trouble.9 This be-
came especially noticeable in the 1992 election-year use of Japanese inves-
tors as "scapegoats." °10 By emphasizing the trade imbalance and ignoring
the immense potential impact on U.S. employment and economic growth,
protectionists' tried to brainwash the average American into believing that
the United States needs to end traditional free trade policies.12 Calling for
the institution of a "Buy American" ethic and the return of corporate own-
ership to U.S. entities, 3 many "Buy American" boosters insisted the move-
ment was not "Japan bashing," but was rooted in deep concern for the
ailing U.S. economy. 4 While this debate has diminished somewhat since
the election, many have criticized President Bill Clinton for his failure to
commit consistently to a free trade stance.' 5
Clinton's position, however, is fairly representative of the current U.S.
policy-there is no longer a clear-cut answer whether a specific investment
transaction is within the confines of U.S. law.' 6 Since the "average Ameri-
can" does not understand the necessity for foreign investment,' 7 and the
current policy is susceptible to change based upon constituent uproar, a
isting plants and the creation of new facilities. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
FOREIGN DEBT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. 60 (1989).
9. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
10. Kenneth T. Walsh et al., The "America First"Fallacies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
3, 1992, at 22.
11. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
12. The Democratic "candidates were vying over who can deliver the harshest words and the
strongest promises about giving America a leg up in world economic competition." David E.
Rosenbaum & Keith Bradsher, Candidates Playing to Mood of Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1992, at Al. But see Walsh et al., supra note 10, at 22 (asserting that the current protectionist
movement is much more than mere "talk").
13. Kevin Anderson & Denise Kalette, Movement Heats Up to Buy American: Consumers
Doing Their "Little Bit," USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 1992, at IA.
14. Id. Economists and politicians agree that the protectionist movement has gained strength
due to the "flagging economy and the loss of high-paying American manufacturing jobs in the
automobile, steel and other industries to [countries] where markets are not as open as they are
here." Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at A2.
15. See, e.g., Morton M. Kondracke, Clinton Shifts Again: From Free Trade to Managed
Trade, ROLL CALL, Apr. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File.
16. In addition to the regulations described below, foreign investors are subject to the same
takeover regulations as their domestic counterparts. See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Leg-
islative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1539, 1540-59 (1991) (discussing federal antitakeover regulations, which are applicable to
both foreign and domestic investors).
17. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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renewed "Buy American" movement could backfire if it becomes "fodder
for a move towards protectionism." 8
The continuing controversy over foreign investment has touched off a
political debate that focuses not merely on the overall merits of foreign in-
vestment, but also on a multitude of peripheral issues. Common concerns
include: the acknowledged data gap regarding the extent and effect of for-
eign investments; the anticompetitive practices of some foreign investors
who purchase American companies to acquire technology, thereby placing
U.S. national security at risk; the increased competition among states to
boost their local economies through foreign investment; and the lack of
legal reciprocity in most foreign nations. 9 To counteract these inconsisten-
cies, the federal government must uniformly implement standards in sup-
port of traditional U.S. free trade policy. At the same time, the federal
government needs to instill an understanding among American workers and
business owners that our business relationships with Japan and other for-
eign nations can remain an asset rather than become a liability, if the proper
approach is used not only toward foreign investment but in all international
business transactions.
This Comment will address the protectionist or free trade controversy in
the United States as it pertains to foreign direct investment, emphasizing
the ignorance of many current American attitudes toward increased Japa-
nese investment. Part II will discuss the currently vague federal policy to-
ward foreign direct investment and the impact of fluctuating American
views toward such investment. Part III will discuss the role of the states in
encouraging foreign direct investment and the current competition among
states vying for local investment. Part IV will discuss the need for a uni-
form national standard that will withstand potential changes in the execu-
tive branch and counteract short-term changes in public attitude. Finally,
Part V will examine the options for a restructured policy that will afford
American businesses and workers an opportunity to profit from foreign
investment.
II. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The federal government derives its constitutional power to regulate FDI
from the Commerce Clause, which specifically grants Congress the power
18. Anderson & Kalette, supra note 13, at 1A.
19. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SusAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY
IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 27 (1988).
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to "regulate Commerce with foreign [n]ations."2 ° The Supreme Court
stated that this constitutional power is "not merely an authorization to
Congress to enact laws ... but by its own force created an area of trade free
from interference by the States .... [T]he Commerce Clause even without
implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States."2 1 Therefore, federal responsibility for foreign investment policy
was clearly anticipated by the Constitution. Congress, however, has failed
to provide laws that are capable of consistent enforcement within the execu-
tive branch and, as a result, a dangerously ambiguous overall policy is in
effect.
A. Open or Free Trade v. Protectionism
The United States has long advocated free trade policies;22 in fact, every
President since Herbert Hoover has taken a free trade stance.23 These
traditional objectives regarding FDI were reiterated by President Ronald
Reagan:
[T]he United States believes that its direct investment abroad should
also receive fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory treatment....
[T]he United States seeks to... foster a domestic economic climate
in the United States which is conducive to investment, ensure that
foreign investors receive fair and equitable treatment under our stat-
utes and regulations, and maintain only those safeguards on foreign
investment which are necessary to protect our security and related
interests.24
In continued support of these objectives, President George Bush de-
clared that his administration would "continue to resist calls for protection
and managed trade... [including] any attempts to hinder the free interna-
tional flows of investment capital, which have benefitted workers and con-
sumers here and abroad."2 In addition, President Bush emphasized the
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also MICHAEL CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ECONOMY 87-114 (1991) (discussing the Commerce Clause and the role of the federal government
in regulating interstate and foreign commerce).
21. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) (citations omitted).
22. See generally TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 275-78 (briefly detailing the history
of U.S. foreign investment policy).
23. Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at Al.
24. Statement of the President Transmitting International Investment Policy, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214, 1216-17 (Sept. 9, 1983).
25. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the 1990 Economic Report, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRE. Doc. 180, 183 (Feb. 6, 1990).
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United States commitment to reducing existing barriers to internatiorial in-
vestment throughout the world.26
President Clinton, on the other hand, has been criticized for his failure
to commit consistently to a free trade stance.27 His policy on Japanese in-
vestment appears to sway somewhere between a free trade stance and a
"managed" trade stance. While critics claim that this position is inconsis-
tent and that the President "needs to pick a side," his policy parallels cur-
rent U.S. laws. These laws make it difficult to define the "sides," bringing
to light the ongoing battle between protectionism and free trade and the
question of whether holding to a strict view of either position is possible in
light of the current world marketplace.28
Advocates for a continued open trade policy argue that the United
States needs foreign investment not only to expand the U.S. economy, but
also to resolve current international debt problems.29 FDI supporters em-
phasize the creation of jobs, the introduction of new technology, and the
consumer benefits realized through increased competition that are associ-
ated with FDI. In addition to the quantitative effects on U.S. employment
and income, FDI can act as a "catalyst," 0 and as a result, "foreign mul-
tinationals may revitalize American industry by introducing new technol-
ogy, managerial skills, and labor practices."31
The free trade view has historically been criticized by advocates of an
alternative political view known as "protectionism." The protectionist view
sees FDI as a threat to economic independence, political sovereignty, and
national security.32 Historically, the main political threats to free trade
have arisen because of a fear of job loss.3 3 Today, however, dissatisfaction
also results from a growing concern over stagnant real wages and incomes
in the United States and the lack of available "good jobs at good wages." 34
26. Id For a complete discussion of the current movement toward reciprocity, see infra
notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. President Clinton campaigned wholeheartedly
as a free trade advocate and consistently emphasized his aversion to protectionist policies.
28. See, eg., Jonathan A. Knee, Polar Opposites on Foreign Investment, TEXAS LAW., Feb. 1,
1993, at 17.
29. See, e.g., Statement of the President Transmitting International Investment Policy, supra
note 24, at 1214.
30. Id. at 1215.
31. NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: How
FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY 124 (1989).
32. Cheryl Tate, Note, The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Invest-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 2023, 2023 (1990).
33. RUDIGER W. DORNBUSCH ET AL., AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR
THE 1990s, at 2 (Robert Z. Laurance & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1990).
34. Id. at 3.
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These protectionists mistakenly believe that if foreign investment is not
curbed, U.S. workers will continue to lose out as Japanese firms "outhustle"
the American competition." This contention, however, can be refuted by
evidence of Japanese capital that has funded many new plants and sup-
ported many local economies.36
B. The Debate over Japanese FDI
Protectionist sentiment has been fueled by the recent American obses-
sion with the Japanese. Part of the U.S. fascination may have originated
because the Japanese have been the most publicized competition to U.S.-
based firms. As a result, there is natural curiosity whether Japanese success
can be repeated here.37 However, this curiosity has turned into an irra-
tional fear that the Japanese will take over the United States. Former Presi-
dent Bush recently acknowledged this trend:
Some have rather cynically said, well, Japan's going to own all of the
United States. My view is, I support Japanese investment in our
country. It results in competitiveness. It results in productivity in-
creasing in our country. If they can come in and show us a better
way to run a [business], the guy next door is going to have to do a
better job, or his [business] is going to go down.38
This statement also reflects the traditional U.S. policy discussed previously.
Despite historic executive support for free trade, protectionist sentiment
was still alive and well in the politics of the 1992 election. What the candi-
dates offered in their commercials, however, was "more emotion than logic,
[and] more oratory than substance."'39 Regardless of the fact that "[i]f you
tally all the economic benefits [of] free trade and all the benefits from pro-
tection, free trade generally comes out ahead,"' politicians exploited the
sense that Americans were being treated unfairly in international trade, es-
pecially by the Japanese. 41 Because American "politics is fueled by votes,
not theories, '4 2 many Americans received false information regarding for-
eign investment and continue to feel threatened by Japanese investors.
35. GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 220.
36. The Japanese accounted for $9.1 billion in manufacturing and new plant expansion in the
United States between the years of 1979 and 1987. Ray, supra note 7, at 60-61.
37. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 18.
38. President's Remarks and an Exchange with Soviet Journalists on the Upcoming Moscow
Summit, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1057, 1061 (July 25, 1991).
39. Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at Al.
40. Id. at A2.
41. A New York Times-CBS News Poll taken in November 1991 showed that 32% of Ameri-
cans believed that the Japanese compete unfairly. Id.
42. Id.
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"With the buyouts of firms ranging from CBS Records to Talbots to
Thermos, there is hardly an industry in America untouched by Japanese
money."43 However, Japan is not the largest foreign investor in the United
States,' thereby proving that the notion of "a potential Japanese takeover
of [America] has little to do with actual facts."'4 Therefore, to calm
America's irrational fears, it is also important to note that "Japanese firms
show surprisingly little difference in their [ownership] behavior from other
foreign firms."46 In addition, Japanese "value added" and compensation
theories per worker and research and development efforts are similar to
those of other foreign-owned firms. The only behavioral difference appears
to be Japan's apparent higher propensity to import.47 This selection bias is
undoubtedly due to the Japanese corporate structure and ownership of a
"family" of intermingled manufacturers that rely on one another for busi-
ness.48 As a result, Japanese-owned corporations rely upon other Japanese
manufacturers with whom they already have a working relationship and to
whom they feel a sense of loyalty. However, as American suppliers are
purchased by or conduct business with other "family members," they be-
come integrated into the Japanese "family," providing potential for ex-
panded domestic consumption. 49
C. The Current Status of Federal FDI Regulations
1. Antitrust Laws
The Clayton Act5" is applicable to transactions involving acquisitions of
U.S. companies by either domestic or foreign corporations. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is the principle antitrust statute applicable to mergers and ac-
quisitions in the United States. A Section 7 violation occurs when an acqui-
sition of all or part of the stock or assets of a "person" 51 engaged in
43. Business Tokyo Publishes the BT 100: The Definitive List of Japanese Investors in America,
Bus. Wire, Apr. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
44. Ray, supra note 7, at 51.
45. Id. at 60.
46. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 64.
47. Id.
48. See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 295 (discussing the Japanese corporate
structure known as "keiretsu").
49. See id. (discussing the cross-fertility of U.S. and Japanese businesses).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
51. The Clayton Act defines the term "person" to include the following: corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States, the territories, the
states, or the laws of any foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1988).
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commerce (or an activity affecting commerce) by another such "person"
substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly.52
In determining whether a violation has occurred, the "market" involved
must be defined. This definition becomes more difficult, and essentially
more important when multinational corporations are involved.53 Once the
applicable market has been determined, the Clayton Act looks not only to
the present effect on competition, but also to the probable future effects of
an acquisition by prohibiting "anticompetitive acquisitions even where the
offending restraint of trade is only incipient at the time of suit."54
Section 7 claims can be brought by both the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice. 5 In the alternative, private parties
may bring suit to "(1) prevent a hostile takeover, (2) challenge an acquisi-
tion involving competitors, (3) enjoin future acquisitions for a period of
years or (4) recover treble damages for antitrust injury sustained as a result
of unlawful acquisitions." 6 In order to bring a successful claim, a private
party must satisfy five elements: (1) the plaintiff must fall within the Act's
definition of "person" set forth above, (2) a violation of the "antitrust laws"
must have occurred, 57 (3) a direct injury must have been suffered by the
plaintiff, (4) the injury must have been caused by the violation charged, and
(5) the injury suffered must be measurable to some degree in dollars. 8
Where friendly acquisitions are in question, the parties involved may
seek an "advisory opinion" to determine if antitrust violations would result
from a proposed transaction. Both the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice and the FTC have procedures for "advance approval."59 It
is important to note, however, that this advice can be revoked.60 Addition-
ally, the involved parties may not be willing to release all relevant informa-
tion to the government prior to the transaction, raising doubts about the
accuracy of the advice.6
52. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
53. See Lawrence J. Hilton, Note, Antitrust and Foreign Competition: Proposals for a Dy-
namic Approach to Market Power Analysis, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 315 (1991) (discussing the difficul-
ties in multinational antitrust "market" determinations).
54. 3 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 23.01,
at 23-6 (1993).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 11(b), § 15 (1988).
56. 3 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 54, § 23.01, at 23-7.
57. Antitrust acts consist of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and portions of the Wilson
Tariff Act.
58. 8 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 54, § 60.02[2], at 60-24.
59. See 16 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1993).
60. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1993).
61. See generally Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 137-38 (1991).
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When investing in the United States, foreign corporations must realize
the consequences of antitrust violations and prepare accordingly for possi-
ble violations.62 This becomes especially important when Japanese corpora-
tions attempt hostile takeovers because the Japanese government rarely
enforces its antimonopoly law. As a result, Japanese investors may not be
aware of U.S. antitrust laws to help defend against the takeover of a U.S.
corporation, because there is no parallel enforcement in Japan.
2. Federal Entry Restrictions
Military and political interests are often protected by restrictions on for-
eign control of certain types of businesses.6 3 Since "foreign control" is not
uniformly defined, foreign investors must carefully investigate the scope of
these provisions when examining possible U.S. acquisitions in areas such as
natural resource excavation, communications, and national defense. For
example, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 contains a reciprocity pro-
vision that prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from granting excavation
leases to aliens whose nation does not allow "similar or like privileges" to
U.S. citizens or corporations."4 This can be especially important when na-
tions such as Japan are involved. Based on Japan's lack of internal natural
resources, coupled with its high demand for raw materials,65 these indus-
tries may seem attractive to Japanese investors. However, ownership of
these industries may be out of reach.
Federal restrictions on foreign ownership also protect industries vital to
the national defense when: (1) the industry provides materials required by
current defense contracts, or (2) the industry is crucial to the maintenance
of a healthy economy and the operation of the national government.66 For
example, the Atomic Energy Act of 195467 provides that while a foreign
entity may not obtain a controlling interest in a nuclear facility, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission may allow a foreign enterprise to maintain sub-
stantial interests in such facilities.6" The national defense considerations of
62. See Stephen M. Axinn, Techniques and Antitrust Aspects Concerning Foreign Entry, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 741 (1975).
63. See generally Cecelia M. Waldeck, Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under
the Exon-Florio Amendment, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1190-94 (1991).
64. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
65. "Japan is neither a natural-resource-based exporter nor, until possibly very recently, a
major participant in intra-industry trade." Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan, S1I and the International
Harmonization of Domestic Economic Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 453 (1991).
66. Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1191.
67. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 69, 68 Stat. 919, 934-35 (1955) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2099
(1988)).
68. Id.; see also Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1196.
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such restrictions are apparent. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has also been granted discretionary power to protect national de-
fense. Under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC
can bar ownership by refusing to issue licenses when "the public interest
will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license."' 69 This is based
"upon the idea of preventing alien activities against the government during
the time of war," thereby justifying the Atomic Energy Act on national
defense grounds.7°
As a result of these restrictions, Congress has allowed the federal gov-
ernment to use discretion when allowing foreign ownership. These restric-
tions are justified as safeguards to national defense and, as a result, cannot
be effectively contested. Therefore, foreign investors must be aware of fed-
eral entry restrictions for specific industries when intending to acquire en-
terprises of this nature.71
3. The Exon-Florio Amendment
Another area of legitimate U.S. concern is the purchase of high technol-
ogy industries by the Japanese. According to testimony at a House sub-
committee hearing, 163 United States high technology firms have been
purchased by six of the largest Japanese industry groups since 1988.72 The
Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) joint venture,
a consortium of government and private sector officials, recently provided
further evidence of how the Japanese are refusing to cooperate with Ameri-
can semiconductor manufacturers. 73 According to the report provided by
SEMATECH, Japanese suppliers are refusing to sell equipment containing
leading edge technology to U.S. companies. 74 "Even if American buyers
succeed in gaining access to such technology, it is priced at a premium and
often delivered late."'75 In support of this proposition, the report listed sev-
eral types of equipment that are not generally available to U.S. semiconduc-
tor manufacturers, but can be bought openly by Japanese producers. 76 This
loss of technology may be the price the United States pays for an influx of
69. Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1192 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1982)).
70. Id.
71. State restrictions also exist. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
72. H.R. REP. No. 399, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 10 (1991).
73. SEMATECH released this information in a report titled, How the Japanese Are Sheltering
Key Technology, which was released at a May 6, 1991 press conference. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. These products included high-tech furnaces, electrical circuitry, chassis, and chemical
tools. Id.
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foreign dollars,77 but a continual loss of technology may be dangerous to
national security and cannot be tolerated. While these interests are more
adequately protected by other types of legislation,78 in recent years the pro-
tection of technology has been utilized as an excuse to try to close Ameri-
can markets to the Japanese and other foreign investors.
Although Congress was aware that FDI was drastically increasing in
the United States, the extent of these investments remained unknown until
Congress passed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974. 79 This Act
authorized a Commerce Department survey of foreign investment activity
in the United States. 0 As a result of the data collected, Congress realized
the need for continual tracking of foreign investment and enacted the Inter-
national Investment Survey Act of 1976 (IISA).8 1 In addition to facilitating
the continued collection of FDI information, IISA enables the President to
"conduct a regular data collection program to secure current information
on international capital flows and other information related to international
investment. ' 82 This Act was not intended to restrain or deter foreign in-
vestment in the United States,83 but to keep the federal government ap-
praised of ongoing FDI transactions and "to provide analyses of such
information to the Congress, the executive agencies, and the general pub-
lic."'8 4 President Gerald Ford designated authority to the Department of
Commerce8 5 to conduct these surveys and created the Committee on For-
eign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as an advisory agency.86
Through these measures, Congress and the President created a permanent
mechanism to monitor foreign investment activities in the United States.
Although there was an enormous amount of FDI in the following dec-
ade, Congress appeared content with this limited FDI policy. However, the
complete inability of the federal government to control foreign investment
became painfully obvious as a result of two events: (1) the attempted hos-
77. Stanley A. Weiss, National Security Putting Crimp in Foreign Investments, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 27, 1992, at A21.
78. See Robert S. Schwartz & Bennett A. Caplan, Conditioning the Unconditional, 210 N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 5; see also infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
79. Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-54 (1974).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-54 (1974).
81. Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 2, 90 Stat. 2059, 2059-64 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3108 (1988)).
82. 22 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1988).
83. 22 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1988).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1988).
85. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. § 86 (1978), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. § 147
(1978).
86. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), reprinted as amended in 45 Fed.
Reg. 989 (1980).
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tile takeover of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company by British corporate
raider Sir James Goldsmith in 1986 and (2) the proposed purchase of
Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation by Fujitsu, Ltd. of Japan in 1987.
Despite Commerce Department concerns regarding competition and the
confidentiality of classified information,17 no U.S. agency had the power to
stop either acquisition, short of declaring a national emergency."8
Although both transactions dissolved prior to completion, 9 Senator J.
James Exon9 ° and Representative James J. Florio9 were concerned with
the government's potential inability to act under such circumstances. This
concern led to the introduction of the trade bill now known as the Exon-
Florio Amendment (EFA or "Amendment").92
The EFA was adopted on August 23, 1988, as Section 5021 of the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act.93 Generally, this Amendment to the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 195094 provides a mechanism for the federal government to
challenge mergers and acquisitions of U.S. corporations by foreign entities
when national security is at stake.95 The President, or a presidential desig-
87. Prior to the Goldsmith raid, Goodyear had an aerospace division that produced com-
puters, F-15 flight simulators, missile guidance systems, and other defense-related hardware. Ac-
quisitions by Foreign Companies, 1987 Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 23 (1987).
88. The only action that could have been brought was on antitrust grounds. See Mark L.
Hanson, Comment, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States Defense
Industry, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 658, 662-63 (1989).
89. Fujitsu abandoned its quest, fearing political backlash as a result of the strong protection-
ist sentiment in the United States. See Thomas W. Soseman, Comment, International Law-The
Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist
Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597, 599-600 (1990). Goldsmith's action was eventually halted by the
invocation of an antitakeover statute in Ohio. Goodyear's management then agreed to purchase
Goldsmith's shares at a premium. Id. at 600; see also Greene, supra note 16, at 1556-63 (discuss-
ing the effects of state antitakeover legislation).
90. Senator J. James Exon is a Democrat from Nebraska.
91. Representative James J. Florio, a Democrat from New Jersey, became governor of that
state in 1990.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1988).
93. Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.).
94. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.).
95. The Exon-Florio Amendment reads as follows:
§ 2170. Authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
(a) Investigations
The President or the President's designee may make an investigation to determine the
effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers proposed or pending...
by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States. If it is determined that an investigation should
be undertaken, it shall commence no later than 30 days after receipt by the President or the
President's designee of written notification of the proposed or pending merger, acquisition,
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nee, is authorized to conduct an investigation of a proposed acquisition of
an American "person"96 by a "foreign person."97 This investigation must
begin within thirty days of the President's receipt of voluntary written noti-
or takeover as prescribed by regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Such inves-
tigation shall be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.
(b) Confidentiality of information
Any information or documentary material filed with the President or the President's
designee pursuant to this section shall... [not] be made public except as may be relevant
to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to prevent disclosure to either House of Congress or to any duly authorized
committee or subcommittee of the Congress.
(c) Action by the President
Subject to subsection (d), the President may take such action for such time as the President
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover.., by or
with foreign persons so that such control will not threaten to impair the national security.
The President shall announce the decision to take action pursuant to this subsection not
later than 15 days after the investigation....
(d) Findings of the President
The President may exercise the authority conferred by subsection (c) only if the Presi-
dent finds that-
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in the President's judgment provide adequate
and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security in the matter
before the President....
(e) Factors to be considered
For purposes of this section, the President or the President's designee may, taking into
account the requirements of national security, consider among other factors-
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense require-
ments, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and
other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it
affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national
security.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988).
96. The acquired "person" may be "of a variety of forms of ongoing or sustainable business
entities, including a corporation, a partnership, a division of a corporation, or an unincorporated
entity." H.R. CONF. RFP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 925, 926 (1987).
97. "Foreign person" is intended to include:
[A]ny individual who is not a U.S. citizen or a U.S. national under the laws of the United
States . . . [or] an entity organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of
business in a country other than the United States, provided such entity is directly or
indirectly controlled by a foreign person. It would also include any foreign person who,
for example, acquires a domestic corporation for the purpose of acquiring control of an-
other domestic corporation in contravention of the purposes of this [Amendment].
Id. at 925-26.
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fication of the proposed transaction98 and be completed forty-five days
thereafter. 99 During this investigation, the President must determine
whether there is credible evidence to support a finding that the change in
control may result in actions that threaten national security'00 and whether
any other legal provision' ° ' supplies the President with appropriate author-
ity to protect national security.'0 2
Based on the above criteria, the President may suspend or prohibit any
transaction, or limit the level of proposed foreign control. 03 If the parties
fail to report a transaction, the President may also order a foreign corpora-
tion to relinquish its control, making use of the phrase "voluntary notifica-
tion" somewhat inappropriate." 4 If the President deems action is
necessary, a written report of the results of the investigation and a state-
ment of the intended action must be transmitted to both the House and the
Senate. 10 5 Even though all information contained in this report is confiden-
tial, it may be released to other agencies when it is relevant to any adminis-
trative or judicial proceeding.' 0 6 In addition, the President may seek
appropriate relief'017 in the federal district courts to implement and enforce
the provisions of this Amendment in both the investigation and relief
stages.' 08
As stated above, the federal government retains the right to place "safe-
guards" on foreign investments when U.S. security is at risk. 10 9 Under the
EFA, the standard for transactional review is "national security," which is
not defined by the Amendment." 0 This definition was intentionally left
open to allow the President broad discretion in regulating foreign invest-
98. "Transaction" will hereinafter include mergers, acquisitions, or other business
combinations.
99. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (1988).
101. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988). The International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988), may also provide presidential authority.
102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
104. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
105. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (1988).
106. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (1988).
107. "The term 'appropriate relief' is intended as a broad term to give the President flexibility
to deal with any foreign control attempt which the President deems to pose a threat to national
security.... [Such relief] includes broad injunctive and equitable relief including, but not limited
to divestment relief." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 96, at 927.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
110. See Greidinger, supra note 61, at 121-35.
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ment matters. 11  Congress did, however, provide a list of suggested factors
to be taken into account by the President when making national security
determinations under the EFA. These include the domestic production
needed for projected national defense requirements and the capability of
domestic businesses to meet that demand.1 12
The current EFA is susceptible to abuse by both free trade advocates
and protectionists. Free trade advocates propose that the Amentment is
protectionist in nature and really does not have anything to do with na-
tional security as it claims. They assert that protectionists may see the EFA
as a vehicle to manipulate foreign ownership and control relying upon per-
ceived economic disadvantages as an element of national security. How-
ever, a protectionist administration has not been in power since the
implementation of the EFA, and thus the real question of abusive applica-
tion lies with future administrations. A protectionist administration may be
elected and, as a result, the federal government needs to make the now
overbroad EFA more defined.113 Additionally, an outburst of public senti-
ment may lead to presidential abuse of the vague standards set forth under
the EFA.
Future free trade administrations may recognize the invisible bounda-
ries of the national security standard in order to preserve the inflow of capi-
tal. These boundaries, however, may be too narrow to protect technology
vital to national security. As of November 26, 1991, more than 650 notices
of foreign acquisition have been provided to CFIUS under the EFA.114
However, only thirteen investigations and one divestiture have been ordered
to date.115 This can be attributed to the Reagan and Bush Administrations'
dedication to retaining free trade.116 It is also possible, however, that neces-
111. Although the conferees did not intend to authorize investigations of foreign acquisitions
that are "outside the realm of national security," the national security standard should be "inter-
preted broadly without limitation to particular industries." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note
96, at 926. Moreover, the Conference Report states that "[tihe Conferees recognize that the term
'national security' is not a defined term in the Defense Production Act... [and they do not mean]
to imply any limitation on the term 'national defense' as used elsewhere in the... Act." Id.
112. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988).
113. The 1992 presidential candidates who openly advocated free trade were Paul Tsongas
and George Bush. Tom Harkin, Bob Kerrey, and Pat Buchanan, on the other hand, emphasized
the need for protectionism. Bill Clinton claimed to remain neutral. See Rosenbaum & Bradsher,
supra note 12, at Al-2. But see Kondracke, supra note 15 (stating that Clinton campaigned as a
free trade advocate).
114. H.R. RP. No. 399, supra note 72, at 6.
115. Id. at 6-7; see Joseph E. Reece, Buyer Beware: The United States No Longer Wants
Foreign Capital to Fund Corporate Acquisitions, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 294-301
(1990) (discussing the prior investigations and the divesture proceeding that have taken place
under the EFA).
116. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
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sary actions are being overlooked due to the vague standards set forth in the
current EFA.
This concern stems from a recent discovery made by the Subcommittee
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competition regarding U.S. pro-
duction of semiconductors in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when it was
realized that the domestic semiconductor industry would not have been
able to support the demand of the United States had the war continued.1 17
Since the EFA went into effect in 1988, eighty-five American-owned semi-
conductor material and equipment manufacturers have been sold to foreign
investors, more than sixty of which were sold to Japanese firms.11 The
Administration testified that had the United States not been able to obtain
semiconductors from a foreign source throughout the Gulf War, it would
have taken six months to put domestic semiconductor manufacturing "on-
stream" to meet U.S. defense needs. 1 9 This six-month deficiency would
not only have prolonged the conflict; it would have cost American lives. 
120
This is one of the situations the EFA was designed to protect against. De-
spite the above-mentioned problems with the current EFA, its "sunset
clause" was recently removed from the statute, thereby making it a perma-
nent part of U.S. foreign investment law. 121
III. STATE RESPONSES TO FDI
The Supreme Court has said that states "may not tell this Nation or
Japan how to run their foreign policies." 122 However, "[n]o one questions
the fact that the states now lead the nation in shaping foreign investment
policy.... They [have] provided the leadership, dictated the parameters of
the issue, and persuaded their legislatures to allocate resources earmarked
for recruiting foreign capital." 123 These are three of the very steps that
Congress has failed to take. By organizing promotional agencies and pro-
posing individual regulations, the states are testing the vague federal FDI
policy. However, they may also be sending mixed signals to foreign
investors.
117. "Iraq had bought United States companies with needed equipment and technology, and
had stolen components from nuclear weapons of other countries. Rarely in world history had the
strength of an aggressor country depended so heavily on technology, equipment and other re-
sources bought in the open world marketplace." H.R. REP. No. 399, supra note 72, at 7.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-99, § 8,
105 Stat. 487.
122. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979).
123. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 34.
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A. State Promotional Agencies
Support for the free trade sentiment is evidenced by the growing
number of states hoping to increase the amount of inward FDI by offering
incentives to foreign investors. By 1979, forty-seven states had established
agencies in foreign countries to disseminate information to potential foreign
investors on local markets, business conditions, and export opportunities. 24
These promotional agencies have been particularly concerned with encour-
aging Japanese investment, and many state governors now work directly
with the Japanese to encourage both new and continuing investment.12 5
Several states have offered incentives to attract foreign investors. The
incentives include "tax breaks, grants, low-interest bond financing, loans
and loan guarantees, employee training site and access improvements, land
grants, and special lease promotions." '26 An additional incentive that be-
came increasingly popular in the late 1980s was the "Japanese school."
Designed to help Japanese workers and their families learn English and ad-
just to life in the United States, as well as to help Japanese children retain
their traditional values, these schools offer inexpensive incentives to pro-
mote investment. 27 While foreign investors rarely base their investment
decisions solely on these types of incentives, "[i]ncentives are, if anything tie
breakers in stage two of the location decision process."12 8
On its face, this appears to be a step in furthering the open trade policy
that the federal government purports to advocate, but state encouragement
of foreign investment may be going beyond constitutionally allowable state
action. As stated above, the U.S. position on foreign investment supports
the view that all corporations should be treated equal-regardless of the
nationality of corporate ownership.12 9 Many states have gone beyond the
boundaries of this view by offering incentives solely to foreign investors and,
as a result, some foreign corporations may be receiving more favorable
treatment than their domestic counterparts. These state promotional activi-
ties may be sending mixed messages to foreign investors. "[A]ttempts by
most of the State governments to attract foreign investments blur the
boundary between international and domestic economic interests and could
complicate the efforts of the federal government to negotiate with foreign
124. GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 233.
125. Id
126. Id. at 235.
127. "Kentucky promised to spend $5 million over 20 years for schools for Japanese employ-
ees of Toyota." Id.
128. Id. at 228.
129. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
governments to reduce incentives for and restrictions on foreign direct
investment." 130
B. State Attempts to Regulate
Concurrent with such promotional activities, some state governments
have responded to pressure from worried constituents by proposing a vari-
ety of legislative measures. In so doing, states are testing the federal gov-
ernment's tolerance of state-imposed protectionism. The concerns of the
states undoubtedly mirror those of the federal government. However, con-
gressional failure to provide a national standard has prompted these state
proposals to appease the public. These proposals range from mere registra-
tion requirements to blanket reciprocity and approval requirements."'
However, when considering legislation, the states must concern themselves
with the limitations imposed by the Constitution and the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has made the distinction between pure protectionist
legislation, which on its face discriminates against foreigners and is subject
to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," 132 and mere burdens on the free
flow of trade, which may pass constitutional scrutiny.1 33 In order to deter-
mine valid interstate regulations, several criteria have been provided by the
Supreme Court. The proposed regulation must: (1) have a "substantial
nexus" with the regulating state, (2) be substantially apportioned so that it
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (3) be fairly related
to the services provided by the state. 134 Since the Supreme Court places the
highest scrutiny on measures that restrict foreign commerce, 135 additional
challenges to these state regulations have been imposed. State regulations
may not duplicate federal regulations. Additionally, these regulations must
not hinder the nation from "speak[ing] with one voice" regarding FDI
transactions. 136 If these criteria are met, the transaction will pass the judi-
130. Tate, supra note 32, at 2030 n.531 (citation omitted).
131. See id. at 2027-28 (providing examples of state regulations proposed in 1989).
132. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
133. Id. at 623-24.
134. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
135. "Facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect; but at minimum, such facially
discriminatory statutes invoke the strictest scrutiny." Id. at 337.
136. For example, state governments have tried to impose statutes that tax the worldwide
incomes of corporations within their states. The Supreme Court has ruled that if a state tax is
"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State," it will be upheld. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). In
relation to foreign commerce, however, there is the added criteria of 1) whether there is a risk of
multiple taxation and 2) whether the tax prevents the government from "speak[ing] with one voice
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cially imposed constitutional scrutiny test, unless the action is pre-empted
by federal law. 37
As a result, the only currently valid state impairments to foreign invest-
ment are entry-level restrictions, which states can justify on various eco-
nomic and political grounds. For example, since real property ownership is
largely a matter of state law, states can limit or prohibit foreign ownership
of agricultural land. Foreign investors must check existing state restrictions
carefully and confirm early in the investment process that no prohibitive
legislation is pending, since state legislatures are becoming more creative in
justifying restrictions against foreign investment. 3
IV. How Do WE MOVE FROM HYPOCRISY TO UNIFORMITY?
As stated above,139 Congress has failed to "[provide] the leadership,
[dictate] the parameters of the issue, and [persuade] ... legislatures to allo-
cate resources earmarked for recruiting foreign capital."" However, as a
result of proposed state actions, the federal government should be receiving
a message to take charge of its constitutionally imposed duty to create a
consistent federal policy on foreign investment.
In working toward a uniform policy on FDI, however, several factors
must be taken into consideration. It is clear that the nation as a whole is
concerned with the issues of security and reciprocity, especially as these
factors relate to the Japanese. These issues must be reconciled by a uniform
national policy on foreign investment to save the reputation of the United
States as a free trade nation. The promotional activities of the states should
provide enough evidence to Congress that free trade sentiment is alive in
American society. However, the federal government needs to curb
favorable treatment of foreign corporations and reassure domestic corpora-
tions that equal treatment is promoted. An additional problem with cur-
rent state encouragement is the failure of such programs to foster
reciprocity. Incentives should be provided to promote the opening of mar-
kets in other countries, rather than providing blanket incentives to increase
inward foreign investment. Incentives for reciprocity should be advocated
by the federal government; however, a message must also be sent back to
the states that protectionism will not be tolerated by the federal govern-
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
137. See generally CONANT, supra note 20, at 9-44 (discussing the structure of the Constitu-
tion and its role in economic decisions).
138. See generally Tate, supra note 32.
139. See supra part III.
140. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 34.
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ment. Although the future of proposed state legislation is uncertain, the
importance of such bills cannot be diminished; they evidence a hasty polit-
ical response to short-term protectionist sentiment among constituents.
Keeping these objectives in mind, the federal government must decide
whether reciprocity is the answer or whether clarification and increased en-
forcement of existing laws are necessary for universal application of a U.S.
policy.
A. The Debate over Reciprocity
1. Is Legal Reciprocity the Answer?
Even with the EFA in place, "the United States is still a long way from
the substantive preacquisition reviews that some other countries have im-
posed on foreign bidders, to say nothing of the laws in some countries that
in effect require foreign investors to bring in local partners."'' Since the
United States is an attractive investment ground for foreigners who would
not allow the same transactions to take place in their own countries, both
protectionists and free trade advocates agree that some form of reciprocity
should be encouraged. However, their definitions of reciprocity are vastly
different because they are motivated by different beliefs.
"The traditional U.S. position is one that advocates right of establish-
ment together with national treatment; that is, a firm from one country
should have the unimpeded ability to establish subsidiaries in other coun-
tries, and once established, these subsidiaries should receive the same treat-
ment as domestic firms."' 42 Therefore, under traditional policy, treatment
of firms operating in the United States should be neutral, without bias for or
against foreign ownership of U.S. productive assets. Free traders, on the
other hand, do not seek to limit the incoming FDI, but encourage other
nations to open their markets and, thereby, increase the amount of U.S.
investment is emphasized.
Protectionists argue that the United States should limit FDI transac-
tions to include only such transactions that would be allowed by the inves-
tor's home country. For example, a bill introduced in Congress in 1980
would have amended securities laws to restrict acquisitions of public com-
panies by non-U.S. corporations.1 43 Unless the laws and regulations of the
bidder's country allowed a U.S. corporate acquisition under similar circum-
stances, the foreign entities would not have been afforded purchasing rights
141. LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS: MERGERS AND AC-
QUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 98 (1990).
142. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 72.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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in the U.S.. 1" This bill never passed, demonstrating congressional recogni-
tion that the United States should not close its barriers, but rather should
encourage other nations to open their markets.
An additional protectionist argument provides that foreign investors
should be subject to the laws of their home country with respect to U.S.
transactions.14 5 If this definition "were applied literally and consistently on
both sides, certain types of foreign investment could actually receive more
favorable treatment under the law than would domestically controlled com-
petitors."" Under this theory, however, "selective" reciprocity is actually
advocated, in that reciprocity exists only when U.S. firms in the home coun-
try are more regulated than these same firms in U.S. markets. In effect, the
stricter of the two laws is applied against the foreign investor. It is clear
that this standard would discourage FDI and is therefore against the stated
U.S. policy.
2. Attempting "Cultural Reciprocity"
Because of the discretionary nature of both the EFA and other restric-
tions on FDI, changing attitudes toward the Japanese and the traditional
policy may sway decisions. Therefore, the protectionist xenophobia toward
Japan, which periodically sweeps the country, is a potential cultural impedi-
ment to foreign investment. Such an effect, resulting from the EFA, needs
to be eliminated. However, it is questionable whether elimination of nega-
tive attitudes toward the Japanese would in itself remove the problems of
discretion within the EFA. After all, "[t]o the extent that foreign investors
behave like locals but bring about superior performance, [it is questionable]
whether, at the end of the day, the nationality of firms actually matters all
that much." 147
In the United States, however, it appears that the more visible the for-
eign investment and the foreign investors are, the greater the American
anxieties surrounding them.148 For example, "[t]he same amount of money
spent by the Japanese on Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach would ar-
guably have been much less troublesome had it been less conspicuous prop-
erty and less conspicuous investors." '149 However, the United States is not
144. Id.
145. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 117.
146. Id.
147. Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Acquisitions of Critical U.S. Industries: Where Should the
United States Draw the Line?, WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 61, 64.
148. Leroy 0. Laney, The Impact of U.S. Laws on Foreign Direct Investment, 516 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 144, 150-51 (1991).
149. Id. at 151.
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likely to commit political suicide by restraining the purchase power of spe-
cific nationalities. 5 0 Also, Japanese influence on American industry cannot
be ignored, since it will continue to grow.' 5 1 It is conceivable that future
laws may restrict the sale of "certain nationally historic or otherwise valua-
ble property."' 152
It appears that the legal reciprocity that many Americans are pushing
for is not the answer to effectively restricting U.S. markets or making ac-
cess to Japanese markets easier for U.S. businesses. Since reciprocal xeno-
phobia is an obvious barrier to investment in both countries, reciprocity in
cultural understanding appears to facilitate a better overall solution to the
investment problems between the United States and Japan. Through the
concept of negotiation, Americans may be able to successfully invest in Ja-
pan and better accept the terms of a Japanese investment. In the process,
some of the aversion to the Japanese may be overcome, further increasing
the likelihood of successful transactions.
The Japanese will also need to make a few adjustments if they have any
hope of continued investment in the United States. Despite the reputed
Japanese business savvy, as the Japanese "become more firmly entrenched
in America, Japanese firms may start to act more like the typical American
company next door, acquiring the sensitivity needed to avoid lawsuits and,
like other foreign multinationals, allowing American managers to control
their piece of the pie."' 153 Although the Japanese may continue to invest
much needed capital in U.S. corporations, in order to overcome American
animosity the Japanese will need to exert more tact when publicizing acqui-
sitions of American companies. 154 Willingness to share information will
also be important in high technology areas if investment is to be continued
in these industries. It is clear, however, that "whether with arms out-
stretched or folded firmly in defiance, more Americans will have to get used
to working with the Japanese."' 1
55
B. Clarification and Enforcement of Existing Law
While cultural understanding can only help facilitate a better business
relationship with the Japanese, one must take "seriously the possibility that
Japan ... might someday become a military enemy of the United States."' 6
150. Id.
151. Business Tokyo, supra note 43.
152. Laney, supra note 148, at 151.
153. Business Tokyo, supra note 43.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Moran, supra note 147, at 62.
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As a result, it is necessary to keep laws in place to protect the technological
future of the United States. However, the EFA in its current state provides
"a dull weapon at best." '157 As a result, the existing policy needs to be
modified and stronger safeguards must be implemented.
1. Clearly Defining National Security
It has been argued that "it is often more difficult for an overseas com-
pany to buy a U.S. product containing sensitive technology than to
purchase the entire company that makes the product."158 This may be true
based on the current state of the law and, as a result, many Americans are
encouraging Congress to resolve the vagueness of the current federal pol-
icy. 159 This vagueness also causes problems for investors, since many firms
that are not critical to national security feel obligated to report their invest-
ments to CFIUS, creating unnecessary transactional delays." This makes
it harder for U.S. corporations to attract foreign bidders and, in effect, the
EFA is deterring FDI in industries outside the scope of what the EFA in-
cluded. Therefore, critics of the EFA are trying to tell the United States
that "[o]nly a clear definition [of national security] will put teeth in the law
to protect critical technologies while keeping the welcome mat out for for-
eign investment."1 61
Foreign nations have also pushed for a clarification of the U.S. standard.
The Japanese have failed to comment on the EFA, but the European Com-
munity (EC) has been particularly disturbed by the potential inconsistency
of U.S. policy. Although "the EC in no way contests the right of any coun-
try to take such measures as are necessary to defend its national secur-
ity,"1 6 the EC has stressed its concern about the "'potentially very wide'
scope" of the EFA, stating that the EC considers the possibility of protec-
tionism "very serious indeed." '163 If the United States entertains hopes of
entering into a trade agreement with the EC, the U.S. government had bet-
ter heed the EC's warning.1 64
157. Ellison F. McCoy, The Reauthorization of the Exon-Florio: A Battle Between Spurring
the U.S. Economy and Protecting National Security, 22 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 685, 699 (1992).
158. Moran, supra note 147, at 62.
159. See generally McCoy, supra note 157.
160. Weiss, supra note 77, at A21.
161. Id.
162. These concerns were recently expressed by David Tirr, a top EC official. EC Complains
of Uncertainty Associated with Exon-Florio, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 300 (Feb. 19,
1992).
163. Id. at A3.
164. "While the EC is not asking that the law be amended," it has been suggested that there
is "room to explore the national security concept." Id.
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The Technology Preservation Act of 1991165 (TPA or "Act") was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives on June 12, 1991, to ensure that
transactions "vital to United States national security are thoroughly investi-
gated, and that any threats to national security that might arise from such
combinations are effectively remedied and prevented." 16 6 Although the
EFA's national security standard was retained under the TPA, this Act
proposed several significant changes to the EFA. One important addition
would have granted the CFIUS powers concurrent with those of the Presi-
dent and enabled CFIUS to direct the involved parties to delay their final
transaction until an investigation could be completed.1 67 The Act would
have also granted the President the additional authority to direct parties to
"unwind" completed deals. This unwinding would have removed any in-
centive for American owners to speed up a sale to avoid having the sale
blocked under the EFA. 168 Additionally, the problem of the foreign pur-
chaser finding a suitable buyer through divestiture procedures would have
been avoided.169 Finally, the TPA would have allowed the President to
require "assurances" from foreign persons that their control of a U.S. firm
would not impair the national security of the United States. 7 '
Additional factors were also provided for the President to consider
when making national security determinations. The most important of
these was the capability and capacity of foreign-owned or foreign-controlled
firms located within the United States to meet the national defense require-
ments. This section of the Act addressed the Gulf War semiconductor issue
discussed earlier in this Comment. 17'
The most significant portion of the TPA, however, was a move toward
an increased understanding of the effects of foreign ownership and control
on American industries that are vital to national security. Under the Act,
the President would have been required to conduct a study to determine
what, if any, technologies or types of U.S. firms should be preserved for
research and development and production, and to what extent foreign in-
vestment is a factor in the inability of defense suppliers to provide materials
and components for defense weapons.
165. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
166. H.R. REP. No. 399, supra note 72, at 6.
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id. at 9.
170. Although such assurances have been provided to the CFIUS under the current EFA, the
CFIUS does not have the power to solicit or enforce such assurances. Id. at 8.
171. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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In addition, each individual transaction referred to CFIUS would have
been subject to an initial examination by a White House Science Advisor.
The Advisor would be appointed to identify all cases that involve technolo-
gies essential to the national security. 72 This may have forced the investi-
gation of transactions the President may have otherwise overlooked.
Absent judicial review, however, the Act did not compel action on such
matters.
The TPA was not passed by the 102d Congress. The introduction of
this bill, however, did represent a small step toward defining national secur-
ity interests. The analysis of national security was complicated by the Bush
Administration's opposition to bringing commercial and economic con-
cerns under review,173 coupled with an inability to clearly separate military
from civilian technology. 74 The changing political world also makes it dif-
ficult to determine "friendly" and "unfriendly" nations, and resulting
threats to national security.1 75
It is doubtful that the Act will be reintroduced in the present congres-
sional session.1 76 If the Act is reintroduced in its original form, however,
several problem areas remain. The lack of judicial review reflected a contin-
ued ability for presidential abuse of discretion; the President was still af-
forded the opportunity to investigate all referrals without a judicial check
on his final decision. As a result, Congress would again fail to provide ade-
quate restrictions. Therefore, although this proposed amendment to the
EFA is justified as an attempt to protect national security, it may have been
nothing more than a protectionist attempt to appease the brainwashed
American public.
2. Antitrust Considerations
It has also been suggested that the national security concerns could be
more adequately protected by adding an antitrust element to the national
security standard. For example:
[I]f the largest four firms (or four countries) control less than 50
percent of the market, they lack the ability to collude effectively even
if they wish to exploit or manipulate recipients. If they control more
172. Laney, supra note 148, at 148-49.
173. Id at 149.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 148.
176. See, eg., Congress Unlikely to Take 'Activist' Role in Foreign Investment Issues, Aide
Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. No. 33, at 138 (Aug. 18, 1993).
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than 50 percent of the market, they have the potential to coordinate
denial, delay, blackmail, or manipulation. 177
While the "4-4-50" rule described above would not place responsibility
for antitrust considerations upon the Justice Department, 17 1 it has been sug-
gested that increased enforcement of the current antitrust laws and stricter
antitrust guidelines would more objectively determine the legality of foreign
investments.17 9 While increased enforcement of the current antitrust stat-
utes is expected with Ann A. Bingaman at the helm of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division, it is doubtful that FDI will be discouraged in the
process.10
3. New Technology Protection Statutes
Another concern over merely restricting the ownership of U.S. compa-
nies is that:
Rejecting the foreign acquisition may simply mean that the foreign
company remains offshore, where U.S. authorities have the least
clout over its operations, from which position it can undermine the
U.S. domestic-owned competitor or consign American industries to
using second-class products if U.S. authorities use trade protection
to prop it up. 18
Therefore, "[t]he need for high-tech legislation was an important ele-
ment of the Democratic congressional agenda in the Bush Administration,
and a Clinton-Gore campaign plank with vocal business support."' 82 The
proper tool to eliminate such effects has not yet been determined, but Con-
gress is now attempting to find a remedy for the situation through means
separate and apart from the EFA.
One such measure is the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act
of 1980, which was amended on June 14, 1993.183 The purpose of this bill
was "to contribute to the competitiveness of the United States by enhancing
the Department of Commerce's technology programs."'' 8 4 This bill, in its
current form, would require U.S. companies to "(1) 'agree' to promote the
177. Moran, supra note 147, at 65.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. A New Direction for Antitrust Enforcement: The New Chief ofJustice's Antitrust Division
Makes It Clear That Theories of Economic Efficiency Will Not Trump Vigorous Competition, RE-
CORDER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File.
181. Moran, supra note 147, at 65.
182. Schwartz & Caplan, supra note 78, at 5.
183. H.R. 820, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
184. Id. § 202 (proposed amendment to Section 301 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act of 1980) (amended at (1988)).
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manufacture within the U.S. of products resulting from supported technol-
ogy and (2) 'agree' to procure parts and materials from 'competitive United
States suppliers.' "I" It includes the National Outreach Program, grants,
and other educational aspects, which are expected to encourage domestic
research and development efforts. 186
While the Act is therefore expected to increase the amount of technol-
ogy research conducted in the United States, it also limits the transfer of
that technology, whether the corporation is domestic or foreign owned. It
is uncertain what impact this bill will have upon current industry but as the
bill is universally applied to both domestic and foreign owned corporations,
it appears to be on the right track; the Act provides two assurances that the
level of technology will not be reduced. Through the enhancement of cur-
rent methods and preservation of both new and existing technology, the Act
appears to be in the best interests of national security advocates, without
providing a discretionary means of enforcement that can be skewed by fluc-
tuations in public opinion.
In addition, this Act would enable the states to encourage continuing
investment in local communities. By ensuring that technological advances
in manufacturing remain in the U.S., this Act would protect U.S. jobs and
ensure continuing economic support for their local economies. Whether
this bill becomes a law or other similar legislation arises, Congress will
clearly pursue this type of legislation until it becomes a permanent part of
U.S. policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The inability of the Clinton Administration to commit to a strict free
trade stance is representative of the current dilemma sweeping the country.
Congress needs to reiterate its free trade stance and provide a consistent
policy to ensure that uniform standards are maintained. Although the ex-
ecutive branch has declared its objectives concerning both inward and out-
ward foreign investment, congressional attitudes have not been consistent
with those of the executive branch. Usually, the more visible congressional
positions are opposed to some specific form of FDI, and although no purely
protectionist legislation has passed, legislation is occasionally introduced to
limit it. As a result, the overall congressional view can be classified as sup-
porting some form of managed trade when national security is a concern.
However, failure to agree on the level of such management has resulted in a
185. Schwartz & Caplan, supra note 78, at 8 (citation omitted).
186. H.R. 820, supra note 183 § 204 (proposed amendment to Section 303 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980).
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federal government that appears neutral in its views. Such neutrality could
be dangerous. If changes in legal attitudes are significant, they could con-
ceivably cause changes in the U.S. legal and regulatory environment. As a
result, legal treatment of direct foreign investment must be changed. It is
important that the federal government honor its constitutionally imposed
responsibility and present a stable foreign investment policy that can react
to short term political and social sentiments without violating long-term
U.S. policy goals. In the process, such a policy would eliminate the need
for state-imposed regulations and avoid the escape of technology necessary
for a stable U.S. economy.
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